{"id":9352,"date":"2022-05-23T09:20:14","date_gmt":"2022-05-23T07:20:14","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/staging.maisoninteractive.com\/mixedmigrationcenter\/?p=9352"},"modified":"2022-05-22T22:42:37","modified_gmt":"2022-05-22T20:42:37","slug":"the-noose-is-tightening-around-refugees-and-migrants-in-west-africa","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/staging.maisoninteractive.com\/mixedmigrationcenter\/articles\/the-noose-is-tightening-around-refugees-and-migrants-in-west-africa\/","title":{"rendered":"The noose is tightening around refugees and migrants in West Africa"},"content":{"rendered":"

Read in English<\/a> | Lire en fran\u00e7ais<\/a><\/p>\n

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The noose is tightening around refugees and migrants in West Africa<\/strong><\/h1>\n

While humanitarian projections for West Africa are extremely worrying in 2022, while forced displacements are the highest ever recorded in the region, and while aspirations for mobility will continue to be pressing, the migration of West African nationals is increasingly constrained. Yet it is an essential part of the solution.<\/p>\n

In the North, Algeria expels<\/a> migrants who have come from West African countries to work or beg – including nationals from third countries<\/a> such as Guinea, Mali and Sudan. Libya, where migrants still go to work, has become increasingly dangerous for refugees and migrants who are arbitrarily detained, subjected to enforced disappearances, killings, etc<\/a>. Libya also regularly expels<\/a> migrants from its territory, including recently to Niger. Niger, a country of departure and transit for West Africans heading for North Africa and Europe, is an important ally of the European Union<\/a>, which is progressively externalizing the control of its borders. In Nigeria, the violence in the North and around the Lake Chad has led to the displacement of nearly 3 million people within the country<\/a>.<\/p>\n

Further west, international pressure is being exerted to control the resurgence of the Atlantic route<\/a> that began in 2020. Thus, as reported in the newspaper El Pais<\/a>, with the help of Spain, Morocco and Mauritania have blocked an increased proportion of departures from their coasts to the Canary Islands in 2021. According to police sources, Morocco deterred 33% of departures in 2021, compared to 16% in 2020, and Mauritania stopped 50%, compared to 32.5% in 2020. Mauritania has also announced that it expelled 7,000 migrants<\/a> of all nationalities to its neighbours Mali and Senegal in 2021, through a rigorous border control policy<\/a>. In Senegal, the EU has recently proposed the support of Frontex<\/a>, and discussions are underway regarding the operationalisation of such cooperation. If the government of Senegal accepts the proposal, this would be the first time that Frontex would operate outside of the continent of Europe with its own personnel.<\/p>\n

At the same time, the context in West Africa is deteriorating by the day. The conflict in the Sahel, which started in 2012, has entered a new phase since 2020 and is spreading beyond the so-called tri-border area, including to the coastal countries<\/a>. The number of displaced people is steadily increasing and is approaching 2.5 million<\/a> as of March 2022. According to UNHCR<\/a>, six out of ten displaced people in the Sahel are now Burkinab\u00e8. So-called ‘cross-border onward movements<\/a>,’ are now a reality, with at least 19,200 Burkinab\u00e8 having fled<\/a> to neighbouring countries in 2021 (C\u00f4te d’Ivoire, Mali, Niger and Benin). In Niger<\/a>, the security situation is worsening considerably, and at the same time the country is already in last place on the human development index and is directly affected by climate change.\u00a0 In Mali, ECOWAS sanctions<\/a> are adding to the combined effects of the economic recession<\/a> due to the COVID-19 pandemic and the socio-political crisis. Finally, the war in Ukraine will certainly aggravate already serious food insecurity<\/a> in a region where harvests are declining due to climate change<\/a>.<\/p>\n

Thus, according to World Bank<\/a> projections, \u201cup to 32 million people in West Africa could be forced to move internally by 2050 due to slow-onset climate impacts in response to water scarcity, declining crop and ecosystem productivity, and rising sea levels exacerbated by storm surges\u201d. West Africa thus combines conflict and violence, deep poverty, demographic pressure, food insecurity and the impact of climate change, which are all causes and factors of internal and cross-border mobility for populations often in search of survival.<\/p>\n

Despite the mixed nature of migration in the region, i.e. migration routes used by a variety of people with different statuses driven by multiple and intertwined causes<\/a>, the EU continues to want to contain irregular migration while pointing to the root causes<\/a>. This position is reflected in increasingly restrictive policies that have adverse effects on people and their migration pathways. For example, ‘stricter border control measures’ are reported to be a factor in the use of smugglers in the Sahel[1]<\/a>.\u00a0 Refugees and migrants use smugglers because they thought it would be easier.’ The ability of smugglers to obtain cheaper and predictable rates of passage seems to be a reason why even migrants with valid legal documents resort to their use. [2]<\/a><\/p>\n

Increased border control leads to the use of more hidden – and therefore more dangerous – routes, making travellers more vulnerable to risks such as physical and sexual violence, theft, exploitation, trafficking, etc. [3]<\/a> Ultimately, the visible results of these policies are greater danger and greater cost to migrants (and their families), sometimes even creating involuntary immobility<\/a> in transit countries.<\/p>\n

Many of the root causes of migration have no apparent solution soon: conflict, problems with access to land, effects of climate change, political crises, corruption, lack of access to and poor quality of education, lack of opportunities for young people, etc. Can these root causes be resolved in the near future? Can these fundamental problems be solved in a sustainable way while the leaders of these same states sell off their natural resources, which are already too limited by growing populations and the effects of climate change?<\/p>\n

Mobility in the Sahel has traditionally been essential to the livelihoods of the population and for decades has been a means of adaptation to the effects of climate change. However, if the externalisation of European borders limits not only migration to Europe but also mobility across the region, then it will have adverse effects on people, their development and their resilience to disaster and security risks.<\/p>\n

The reality is that migration has always existed and will continue. More border management and security will perhaps push some onto more dangerous routes and certainly create more immobility. But mobility, whether internal or external, is part of the solution. Encouraging regular migration that allows those who can participate in the region’s development to access without danger what the rest of the continent and the world can offer – quality education, professional opportunities etc – will benefit the region. This requires movement to be allowed and facilitated by entry and residence policies that let migrants and refugees come and go to contribute to their countries of origin and destination.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

[1]<\/a> Analysis of survey conducted by the MMC with 154 smugglers in 2021 in Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso. Stricter border control was cited by 31% of the smugglers surveyed, second only to an increase in the number of migrants (52%).<\/p>\n

[2]<\/a> Study conducted by MMC for UNODC to be published in 2022.<\/p>\n

[3]<\/a> Ibidem<\/p>\n

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L\u2019\u00e9tau se resserre autour des migrants et r\u00e9fugi\u00e9s en Afrique de l\u2019Ouest<\/strong><\/span><\/h1>\n

Alors que les projections humanitaires<\/a> en Afrique de l\u2019Ouest sont extr\u00eamement pr\u00e9occupantes en 2022, que les d\u00e9placements forc\u00e9s sont les plus importants jamais enregistr\u00e9s dans la r\u00e9gion, et qu\u2019a fortiori les aspirations \u00e0 la mobilit\u00e9 se feront de plus en plus pressantes, la migration des ressortissants d\u2019Afrique de l\u2019Ouest est de plus en plus limit\u00e9e. Elle est pourtant un \u00e9l\u00e9ment incontournable de solution.<\/p>\n

Au Nord, l\u2019Alg\u00e9rie expulse les migrants<\/a> venus des pays d’Afrique de l’Ouest pour travailler ou mendier \u2013 y compris depuis quelques temps des ressortissants d\u2019\u00e9tats tiers<\/a> tels que la Guin\u00e9e, le Mali et le Soudan. La Libye, o\u00f9 les migrants se rendent encore pour travailler, est devenue de plus en plus dangereuse pour les r\u00e9fugi\u00e9s et migrants qui y sont arbitrairement d\u00e9tenus, victimes de disparitions forc\u00e9es, meurtres etc.<\/a> Ce pays expulse<\/a> \u00e9galement r\u00e9guli\u00e8rement des migrants au Niger. Le Niger, pays de d\u00e9part et de transit des ouest africains vers l\u2019Afrique du Nord et l\u2019Europe, est un alli\u00e9 important d\u2019une Union Europ\u00e9enne<\/a> qui tend \u00e0 externaliser le contr\u00f4le de ses fronti\u00e8res. Au Nig\u00e9ria, les violences au Nord et dans le bassin du lac Chad ont conduit au d\u00e9placement de pr\u00e8s de 3 millions de personnes<\/a> \u00e0 l\u2019int\u00e9rieur du pays.<\/p>\n

Reste l\u2019Ouest o\u00f9 la pression internationale s\u2019exerce avec la volont\u00e9 de canaliser la r\u00e9surgence de la route Atlantique<\/a>de 2020. Ainsi, d\u2019apr\u00e8s le quotidien El Pais<\/a>, avec l\u2019aide de l\u2019UE, le Maroc et la Mauritanie auraient consid\u00e9rablement r\u00e9duit le volume de d\u00e9parts depuis leurs c\u00f4tes vers les \u00eeles Canaries en 2021. Ils auraient bloqu\u00e9 33% des d\u00e9parts depuis le Maroc (contre environ 16% en 2020) et 50% en Mauritanie en 2021 (contre 32,5% en 2020). La Mauritanie a \u00e9galement annonc\u00e9 avoir expuls\u00e9\u00a07000 migrants<\/a> toutes nationalit\u00e9s confondues vers ses voisins le Mali et le S\u00e9n\u00e9gal en 2021, gr\u00e2ce \u00e0 une politique rigoureuse de contr\u00f4le des fronti\u00e8res<\/a>. Au S\u00e9n\u00e9gal, l\u2019UE a r\u00e9cemment propos\u00e9 le soutien de Frontex<\/a>, et les discussions sont en cours quant \u00e0 l\u2019op\u00e9rationnalisation d\u2019une telle coop\u00e9ration.\u00a0 Si le gouvernement du S\u00e9n\u00e9gal accepte la proposition, Frontex op\u00e9rerait pour la premi\u00e8re fois en dehors du continent d’Europe avec son propre personnel.<\/p>\n

Dans le m\u00eame temps, le contexte en Afrique de l\u2019Ouest se d\u00e9t\u00e9riore de jour en jour. Le conflit au Sahel qui a d\u00e9but\u00e9 en 2012 connait une nouvelle phase depuis 2020 et s\u2019\u00e9tend au-del\u00e0 de la zone dite des trois fronti\u00e8res, y compris vers les pays c\u00f4tiers<\/a>. Le nombre de personnes d\u00e9plac\u00e9es est en hausse constante et approche les 2.5 millions<\/a> en mars 2022. D\u2019apr\u00e8s le UNHCR<\/a>, six personnes d\u00e9plac\u00e9es sur dix au Sahel sont maintenant Burkinab\u00e8. Des mouvements dits \u2018ult\u00e9rieurs transfrontaliers<\/a>\u2019, sont \u00e0 pr\u00e9sent une r\u00e9alit\u00e9, avec au moins 19 200 Burkinab\u00e8 ayant d\u00e9j\u00e0 fui<\/a> vers les pays voisins en 2021 (C\u00f4te d\u2019Ivoire, Mali, Niger et B\u00e9nin). Au Niger<\/a>, la situation s\u00e9curitaire s\u2019aggrave consid\u00e9rablement alors que le pays est d\u00e9j\u00e0 en derni\u00e8re position sur l\u2019\u00e9chelle de l\u2019indice de d\u00e9veloppement humain et subit directement les effets du changement climatique. Au Mali, les sanctions prises par la CEDEAO<\/a> s\u2019ajoutent aux effets combin\u00e9s de la r\u00e9cession \u00e9conomique<\/a> due \u00e0 la pand\u00e9mie COVID-19 et de la crise sociopolitique. Enfin, la guerre en Ukraine va certainement aggraver une ins\u00e9curit\u00e9 alimentaire d\u00e9j\u00e0 qualifi\u00e9e de grave<\/a> dans une r\u00e9gion dont les r\u00e9coltes sont fragilis\u00e9es par le changement climatique<\/a>.<\/p>\n

Ainsi, selon les projections de la Banque mondiale<\/a> \u00ab\u00a0jusqu’\u00e0 32 millions de personnes en Afrique de l’Ouest pourraient \u00eatre contraintes de se d\u00e9placer \u00e0 l’int\u00e9rieur de leur pays d’ici 2050 en raison d’impacts climatiques \u00e0 \u00e9volution lente en r\u00e9ponse \u00e0 la p\u00e9nurie d’eau, \u00e0 la baisse de la productivit\u00e9 des cultures et des \u00e9cosyst\u00e8mes, et \u00e0 l’\u00e9l\u00e9vation du niveau de la mer, accentu\u00e9e par les ondes de temp\u00eate\u00a0\u00bb. L\u2019Afrique de l\u2019Ouest combine donc \u00e0 la fois les conflits et la violence, la pauvret\u00e9 profonde, la pression d\u00e9mographique, l\u2019ins\u00e9curit\u00e9 alimentaire et l\u2019impact du changement climatique, qui sont autant de causes et facteurs de mobilit\u00e9 interne et transfrontali\u00e8re pour des populations souvent en qu\u00eate de survie.<\/p>\n

Malgr\u00e9 la nature mixte de la migration dans la r\u00e9gion, \u00e0 savoir emprunt\u00e9es par une vari\u00e9t\u00e9 de personnes aux statuts diff\u00e9rents pouss\u00e9es par des causes multiples et entrem\u00eal\u00e9es<\/a>, l\u2019UE continue de vouloir contenir les migrations irr\u00e9guli\u00e8res tout en pointant les causes profondes<\/a>. Cette position se traduit par des politiques de plus en plus restrictives qui ont des effets n\u00e9fastes sur les personnes et leur parcours migratoire. Ainsi, \u2018des mesures de contr\u00f4le des fronti\u00e8res plus strictes\u2019 sont rapport\u00e9es comme facteur de recours aux passeurs au Sahel.[1]<\/a> Les r\u00e9fugi\u00e9s et migrants utilisent des passeurs pour la \u00ab\u00a0facilit\u00e9\u00a0\u00bb. La capacit\u00e9 de ces-derniers \u00e0 obtenir des taux de passage moins couteux et pr\u00e9visibles semble \u00eatre une raison pour laquelle m\u00eame les migrants qui poss\u00e8dent les documents l\u00e9gaux appropri\u00e9s recourent \u00e0 eux.[2]<\/a><\/p>\n

Un contr\u00f4le accru des fronti\u00e8res entra\u00eene l\u2019utilisation de routes plus cach\u00e9es – donc plus dangereuses -, les voyageurs sont ainsi plus vuln\u00e9rables \u00e0 des risques tels que la violence physique, sexuelle, le vol, l\u2019exploitation, le trafic, la traite, etc.[3]<\/a> Finalement, les r\u00e9sultats visibles de ces politiques sont marqu\u00e9s par davantage de dangerosit\u00e9 et un co\u00fbt plus important pour les migrants (et leur famille), allant parfois jusqu\u2019\u00e0 cr\u00e9er de l\u2019immobilit\u00e9 involontaire<\/a> dans les pays de transit.<\/p>\n

Un grand nombre des causes profondes de la migration sont sans solution apparente dans un futur proche : les conflits, les probl\u00e8mes d\u2019acc\u00e8s \u00e0 la terre, les effets du changement climatique, les crises politiques, la corruption, le manque criant d\u2019acc\u00e8s \u00e0 l\u2019\u00e9ducation et de qualit\u00e9 de celle-ci, l\u2019insuffisance d\u2019opportunit\u00e9s pour les jeunes,\u00a0etc. Ces probl\u00e8mes fondamentaux peuvent-ils trouver une issue durable alors que les dirigeants de ces m\u00eames \u00e9tats vendent leurs ressources naturelles<\/a> d\u00e9j\u00e0 trop limit\u00e9es par une d\u00e9mographie croissante et les effets du changement climatique\u00a0?<\/p>\n

La mobilit\u00e9 au Sahel est traditionnellement essentielle \u00e0 la subsistance des populations, elle est un moyen d\u2019adaptation aux effets du changement climatique mis en place depuis des d\u00e9cennies. Or si l\u2019externalisation des fronti\u00e8res europ\u00e9ennes limite non seulement la migration vers l\u2019Europe mais aussi la mobilit\u00e9 \u00e0 travers la r\u00e9gion, elle aura alors des effets n\u00e9fastes sur les populations, leur d\u00e9veloppement et leur r\u00e9silience face aux catastrophes et aux risques s\u00e9curitaires.<\/p>\n

La r\u00e9alit\u00e9 est que la migration, qui a toujours exist\u00e9, va continuer. Plus de s\u00e9curisation et de contr\u00f4le des fronti\u00e8res encouragera peut-\u00eatre l\u2019emprunt de routes dangereuses et cr\u00e9era s\u00fbrement plus d\u2019immobilisme.\u00a0 Or la mobilit\u00e9, qu\u2019elle soit interne ou externe, fait partie des solutions. Favoriser une migration r\u00e9guli\u00e8re qui permette \u00e0 ceux qui peuvent participer au d\u00e9veloppement de la r\u00e9gion\u00a0d\u2019acc\u00e9der sans dangers \u00e0 ce que le reste du continent et du monde peut offrir\u00a0– une \u00e9ducation de qualit\u00e9, des opportunit\u00e9s professionnelles \u2013 se fera au profit de la r\u00e9gion. Si tant est que la circulation soit encore possible et facilit\u00e9e par des politiques d\u2019entr\u00e9e et de s\u00e9jour qui permettent aux migrants et r\u00e9fugi\u00e9s d\u2019aller et venir afin de contribuer \u00e0 leurs pays d\u2019origine et de destination.<\/p>\n

[1]<\/a> Analyse d\u2019une enqu\u00eate men\u00e9e par le MMC aupr\u00e8s de 154 passeurs en 2021 au Mali, Niger, et Burkina Faso. Le contr\u00f4le plus strict des fronti\u00e8res est cit\u00e9 par 31% des passeurs r\u00e9pondants \u00e0 l\u2019enqu\u00eate, juste apr\u00e8s l\u2019augmentation du nombre de migrants (52%).<\/p>\n

[2]<\/a> Etude \u00e0 paraitre du MMC sur le trafic de migrants pour l\u2019ONUDC, 2022<\/p>\n

[3]<\/a> Ibidem<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Read in English | Lire en fran\u00e7ais The noose is tightening around refugees and migrants in West Africa While humanitarian projections for West Africa are extremely worrying in 2022, while forced displacements are the highest ever recorded in the region, and while aspirations for mobility will continue to be pressing, the migration of West African…<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":9366,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[75,83,88,81],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-9352","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-human-trafficking","category-migration-management","category-protection-and-risks","category-smuggling","region-west-africa","country-algeria","country-libya","country-mali","country-niger","country-nigeria","country-senegal","writer-aurelia-donnard"],"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/staging.maisoninteractive.com\/mixedmigrationcenter\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/9352","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/staging.maisoninteractive.com\/mixedmigrationcenter\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/staging.maisoninteractive.com\/mixedmigrationcenter\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/staging.maisoninteractive.com\/mixedmigrationcenter\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/staging.maisoninteractive.com\/mixedmigrationcenter\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=9352"}],"version-history":[{"count":4,"href":"https:\/\/staging.maisoninteractive.com\/mixedmigrationcenter\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/9352\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":9572,"href":"https:\/\/staging.maisoninteractive.com\/mixedmigrationcenter\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/9352\/revisions\/9572"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/staging.maisoninteractive.com\/mixedmigrationcenter\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/9366"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/staging.maisoninteractive.com\/mixedmigrationcenter\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=9352"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/staging.maisoninteractive.com\/mixedmigrationcenter\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=9352"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/staging.maisoninteractive.com\/mixedmigrationcenter\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=9352"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}