



MMC West Africa

QUARTER 2 2021

Quarterly Mixed Migration Update: West Africa



This Quarterly Mixed Migration Update (QMMU) covers the West Africa (WA) region. The core countries of focus for this region are Niger, Mali, Burkina Faso and Nigeria. Depending on the quarterly trends and migration-related updates, more attention may be given to any of the countries over the rest.

The QMMUs offer a quarterly update on new trends and dynamics related to mixed migration and relevant policy developments in the region. These updates are based on a compilation of a wide range of secondary (data) sources, brought together within a regional framework and applying a mixed migration analytical lens. Similar QMMUs are available for all MMC regions.

The Mixed Migration Centre is a global network consisting of six regional hubs and a central unit in Geneva engaged in data collection, research, analysis and policy development on mixed migration. For more information on the MMC, the QMMUs from other regions and contact details of regional MMC teams, visit mixedmigration.org and follow us at [@Mixed_Migration](https://twitter.com/Mixed_Migration)

MMC's understanding of mixed migration

"Mixed migration" refers to cross-border movements of people, including refugees fleeing persecution and conflict, victims of trafficking, and people seeking better lives and opportunities. Motivated to move by a multiplicity of factors, people in mixed flows have a range of legal statuses as well as a variety of vulnerabilities. Although entitled to protection under international human rights law, they are exposed to multiple rights violations along their journey. Those in mixed migration flows travel along similar routes, using similar means of travel - often travelling irregularly, and wholly, or partially, assisted by migrant smugglers.

Front cover photo credit:

Jean-Baptiste Joire (2017)

Women watching boats in Joal-Fadiout, Senegal, February 2017.

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
Quarterly Mixed Migration Update: West Africa

Quarter 2 - 2021

Key Updates

- **Displacement in Burkina Faso:** In the month of April alone, internal displacement in Burkina Faso increased by [71,055](#) persons, nearly equaling displacement numbers for the entire first quarter of the year, and bringing estimated total internal displacement in the country to [1,218,754](#).
- **Canary Islands arrivals:** Some 3,280 refugees and migrants arrived irregularly by sea to the Canary Islands in the second quarter of the year, according to a compilation of UNHCR's [Spain Weekly Snapshots](#). This was approximately [three times](#) as many arrivals as during the same period of 2020.
- **Deaths at sea along the Atlantic route:** IOM documented [250 deaths](#) at sea along the Atlantic route to the Canary Islands during the first half of the year, while estimating that this number is likely a significant undercount.
- **Canary Islands departures:** The Canary Islands saw a reduction in the numbers of people accommodated in official camps and reception centers throughout the islands. As of the end of May, this number was estimated at [2,288](#), compared to 8,000 at the end of December. This was attributed to an increase in transfers of people with vulnerable profiles to the Spanish mainland, coupled with the lifting of a block on independent travel by refugees and migrants with the necessary documentation.
- **Algeria expulsions to Niger:** In his [report on pushbacks](#), the Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Migrants highlighted the pushbacks occurring from Algeria to Niger, expressing his concern over these "collective expulsions."

Regional Overview*



*Information on the map relates to selected updates and does not represent all mixed migration flows within and out of West Africa.

Mixed Migration Regional Updates

West Africa region

From the end of March to the end of April, internal displacement in **Burkina Faso** increased by [71,055](#), an increase in one month almost equal to that of the entire first quarter of the year, bringing the total number of internally displaced persons in Burkina Faso to an estimated [1,218,754](#) as of 30 April. While updated displacement numbers were not available at the time of publication, a series of violent attacks taking place in three different regions of the country had displaced more than [17,500](#) people at the end of April and beginning of May. Such [attacks](#) continued during the quarter, suggesting that further significant increases in displacement will be tallied through the end of June.

Following operations returning **Malian** refugees to Goudoubo camp earlier in the year after security incidents had [emptied](#) the camp in 2020, some [12,200 people](#) lived in the camp as of the end of May. From April to the end of May, [907 new asylum seekers](#) were registered in the camp, in spite of the fact that the border between Mali and Burkina Faso was closed due to Covid-19. Several security incidents threatened the camp during the quarter, with humanitarian vehicles being targeted on the road to the camp.

According to UNHCR some [11,000 Nigerians](#) crossed the border from northwest **Nigeria** into the Maradi region of **Niger** in the first quarter of 2021. As of 1 May, the number of Nigerian refugees in Maradi stood at 80,896. With 25,363 Nigerien citizens displaced internally in the region, overall [displacement](#) caused by ongoing violence on the part of non-state actors (killings, kidnappings, looting) was estimated at 106,259 persons.

A series of attacks in the northeastern Nigerian state of Borno in early April led to the displacement of an estimated 65,000 people, according to [UNHCR](#). This included both host communities and people who had already been displaced internally, as well as people from Niger who lived locally. At that time internal displacement in northeastern Nigeria stood at 2.2 million, and overall displacement in the Lake Chad Basin was estimated at 3.3 million people.

In the **Central African Republic**, the second quarter saw an increase of internal displacement in relation to the December election crisis, whereas the number of new refugees did not show a significant change from the first quarter of 2021. [UNHCR](#) reports estimated that the number of refugees generated by the election violence stood at 131,275 as of late June, and the number of IDPs was 213,000. This new election-related displacement brought the total number of displaced Central Africans to over 1.5 million out of a country of less than [5 million](#).

Policy and legal updates

In April the European Union and Organization of African, Caribbean and Pacific States (OACPS) released their new [Partnership Agreement](#) replacing the Cotonou Agreement, which had, among other things, previously provided a framework for cooperation in relation to migration. The [EU](#) highlighted that in its Africa specific protocol to the agreement:

“Migration and mobility is a key issue, with greater emphasis than in the past. Our balanced, comprehensive and coherent approach takes into account legal migration and mobility, diaspora and remittances, but also the need to tackle irregular migration, the smuggling of migrants and human trafficking in line with international law, including international human rights law.”

The EU also emphasized that “improving cooperation on return and readmission of irregular migrants” is an important part of the new agreement, which will include an operational annex addressing this issue. The agreement will officially [supersede](#) the Cotonou Agreement after each side has signed a final text and completes the necessary internal legal procedures for adoption, a [process](#) which could take several months or longer.

On [27 April](#), the European Union released the [EU strategy on voluntary return and reintegration](#). It aims at harmonization of return procedures by member states and is meant to support the implementation of the [EU's New Pact on Migration and Asylum](#). Among other elements, the strategy underlines the role of Frontex in returns, and gives it new responsibility for reintegration. As of mid-2022, it will assume the functions currently carried out by the European Return and Reintegration Network. The [European Council of Refugees and Exiles](#) expressed misgivings about this enhanced role, stating:

“It's very risky to give additional roles to Frontex, particularly in third countries where Frontex operations tend to be quite opaque and where there is a risk that Frontex runs a sort of parallel foreign policy,” going on to say, “On the question of returns, in particular, we know return operations are a particular area where there is a risk of violations.”

Given the [prominence](#) of EU funded assisted voluntary return and reintegration programs in West Africa, this strategy is likely to have important implications for returns in the region.

In early June, the Italian foreign minister visited [Niger](#) where he and his Nigerien counterpart signed a joint declaration on migration, expressing a desire to enhance cooperation in this area. They also signed a new framework agreement on development cooperation. According to the Italian foreign minister, “thanks to our collective efforts, including within the EU, in recent years migration flows in this region have dropped by 70%.” He also paid a visit to [Mali](#) in April. In relation to his visit, the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs referred to the centrality of “strengthening cooperation on migration and security issues.”

Mixed migration from West Africa towards North Africa and Europe

Western Mediterranean and Atlantic Route¹

As of 27 June, UNHCR reported that there had been a total [13,176](#) irregular arrivals by land (Ceuta and Melilla) and sea (Spanish mainland, Canary Islands, Balearic Islands, Ceuta and Melilla) to Spain so far during the year. This was a 55% increase over the same period in 2020. While the latest nationality figures currently available are from [September 2020](#), in recent years multiple West African countries have been among the top nationalities of arrival in Spain.

A significant proportion of these arrivals continue to come to the Canary Islands. In the second quarter of the year an estimated 3,280 refugees and migrants disembarked there according to a compilation of UNHCHR's [Spain Weekly Snapshots](#) (5 April – 4 July). This was approximately [three times](#) as many arrivals as during the same period of 2020.

As of mid-May IOM had recorded more than [250 deaths](#) on the route to the Canary Islands in 2021, while highlighting the difficulty in documenting deaths at sea and the likelihood that actual totals are much higher. Following the discovery in April of a [boat](#) near the island of Tenerife carrying 24 deceased persons from sub-Saharan Africa, IOM and UNHCR issued a joint [press release](#) warning of the steady increase of migrant and refugee deaths at sea, and calling for more legal migration routes. Multiple additional instances of death at sea were recorded along the route during the quarter.

Situation in the Canary Islands

In late April, the [Spanish Ombudsman](#) presented to the Spanish parliament's Joint Committee on Relations with the Ombudsman. He shared findings from a monitoring mission to the Canary Islands carried out earlier that month, as well as from a [report](#) on migration to the islands which had been informed by a November 2020 monitoring mission. The report included data that had previously been unavailable, citing Ministry of Interior statistics on the nationalities of those who made it to the Canary Islands in 2020. According to these figures, West Africans comprised almost half of such arrivals, with 4,539 Senegalese, 4,126 Malians, 772 Ivoirians, 687 Guineans and 571 Gambians.

In his remarks before the parliamentary committee, the Ombudsman noted that up to that point in 2021, the majority of arrivals were from [sub-Saharan Africa](#), particularly Senegal. He also highlighted that the number of women and children coming to the islands has increased. In this regard, the [Ombudsman](#) voiced concerns about the obligatory period of detention upon arrival, stating "it is not humanitarian to detain mothers with children who have just been rescued at sea in terrible conditions for up to 72 hours".

The Ombudsman also warned specifically of the situation of refugees and migrants under the age of 18. Of 2,776 [unaccompanied minors](#) who arrived between 2020 and April 2021, some 2,084 were still waiting for age determination tests. As of the end of June this number remained at more than [1,700](#). The Ombudsmen

¹ Numbers in this section reflect best estimates available at time data was accessed (mid-July) but source figures may be subject to later updates.

additionally highlighted that minors had been found in adult centers; for instance, the number of possible minors in the infamous [Las Raíces](#) camp was found to be between 50 to 80. The Canary Islands authorities are also investigating alleged cases of [sexual exploitation](#), as well as other irregularities and abuses, in a center for refugee and migrant minors on Grand Canary Island. The center is due to be closed in mid-July.

There have been multiple official reports of sub-standard humanitarian conditions in centers that host migrants across the Canary Islands. Along with “a lack of agile and effective identification protocols for the referral of vulnerable people,” a “lack of adequate facilities” were primary shortcomings identified by the [Ombudsman](#) during the November 2020 monitoring visit. Specifically, there have been [concerns](#) related to inadequate access to medical assistance, bad hygiene conditions and poor quality food.

There has been unrest among refugees and migrants themselves in the face of the “worrying” sanitary and hygiene conditions. In [Las Raíces](#), a camp with a capacity of 1,200, which as of early April hosted some 1,500 people, [nine people](#) were incarcerated following a dispute over food which resulted in a dozen injuries and ultimately an [intervention](#) by riot police which included the use of rubber bullets. Migrants’ associations attribute such conflicts to “inhumane” conditions. In May [ten inhabitants](#) of the Las Canteras camp were arrested following an altercation in the center. Due to these difficult [conditions](#) and fear of being deported, [unknown numbers](#) of refugees and migrants have opted to stay outside of camps, often sleeping on the streets.

However, as of the end of May, the numbers of migrants and refugees sleeping rough were perceived to have declined. This was also true of the number of people staying in official camps and reception centers on the islands, which according to [government figures](#) stood at 2,288 at the end of May, down from 4,200 at the beginning of that month, and from 8,000 at the end of December 2020. This is attributed in part to the government increasing transfers of vulnerable persons to the Spanish mainland. There were 4,385 [transfers](#) from January-April 2021, as compared to just 2,168 in all of 2020. It is also in part due to the lifting of travel restrictions that had been imposed during the Covid-19 emergency; in April, a judge ruled that refugees and migrants could travel independently to the mainland as long as they had proper documentation (passport or asylum application) and were in compliance with Covid-19 safety protocols.

At the end of April, [Maliens](#) had the third highest rate of asylum application in Spain (9%) during 2021, after citizens from Venezuela (21%) and Colombia (20%). They had made 1,300 requests as of that time, which already almost reached the total number of requests made in 2020 as a whole (1,537). This seems to indicate that various challenges of [access to protection](#) that were evident in the overwhelmed reception system of the Canary Islands are gradually improving. Indeed, according to [UNHCR](#), “although more resources are still needed and the process has to be sped up, the access to information and the procedure have improved in the Canary Islands.”

Deportations from the Canary Islands to Mauritania

There have been no recorded deportation flights from the Canary Islands to Mauritania since November 2020. Nonetheless, the several such flights that took place in 2020 raised various [questions](#) in terms of screening, protection and oversight.

On 16 March, a [written question](#) on deportation flights from the Canary Islands to Mauritania was submitted by the United Left party to the European Parliament, addressed to the European Commission. Highlighting

the illegality of collective expulsion under international law, it asked whether the Commission considers that provisions under [EU Directive 2008/115/EC](#) (on common standards and procedures in Member States for returning illegally staying third-country nationals) are being met, whether deportations to Mauritania of third-country nationals are consistent with EU law, and whether EU funds are contributing to these deportation flights.

On 2 June, the EU Commissioner for Home Affairs [responded](#) on behalf of the European Commission, stating that “decisions taken under this directive should be adopted by Member States on a case-by-case basis and based on objective criteria.” The Commissioner went on to say that the Commission “has no indication that such guarantees have been breached in the case of return flights from the Canary Islands to Morocco and Mauritania.” She confirmed that “return actions,” including flights, may be co-financed through the EU’s Asylum and Migration Fund (AMIF), and that compliance with Directive 2008/115/EC is monitored by AMIF and periodically verified by the Commission.

Visit to Senegal of Spanish Prime Minister

In early April the Spanish Prime Minister made an official visit to [Senegal](#) where he met with the Senegalese President. He referred to Senegal as “[an essential partner in the management of migration flows](#),” and this was a priority issue addressed during his visit. According to figures included in the report of the [Spanish Ombudsman](#), Senegalese were the second most common nationality of origin for arrivals in the Canary Islands in 2020, with 4,539. The two leaders signed a joint declaration on cooperation in the fight against irregular migration, including through provision by Spain of additional resources for [border control](#), and both emphasized the role of [traffickers](#) in their remarks.

They also signed two migration-related memoranda of understanding (MoUs). One of these appears to build on previous discussions held during a visit of the [Spanish Foreign Minister](#) to Senegal in November 2020, seeking to enhance circular migration opportunities. The President of Senegal hailed this agreement as a potential “turning point” in terms of migration cooperation. The other MoU outlines institutional cooperation on [management of migration flows](#) with an emphasis on vulnerable groups such as women, children and people with disabilities. While the two leaders discussed [deportation flights](#) from Spain to Senegal, no concrete date or way forward was given for their resumption.

The Spanish Prime Minister also visited 40 members of the [Guardia Civil and National Police](#) who support Senegalese forces in combatting irregular migration. Supported by two boats, a helicopter and 11 all-terrain vehicles, this is the second largest detachment of such forces outside of Spain. The Spanish government has contributed more than 43 million euros to border surveillance in Senegal since 2007.

Central Mediterranean Route

As of 4 July, [UNHCR](#) reported that an estimated 21,473 refugees and migrants had arrived in Italy by sea during 2021, a 193% increase over the number of irregular sea arrivals over the same timeframe in 2020. This may be partially explained by the [decline](#) in arrivals to Italy in 2020 attributed to Covid. Three of the top 10 most common nationalities of arrival were from West Africa: Cote d’Ivoire (8%), Guinea (5%) and Mali (3%). Their [share](#) of the overall proportion of arrivals had decreased since the previous quarter, however.

Southbound mixed migration

International activities relating to evacuation and return

Activities continued under the auspices of UNHCR's Emergency Transit Mechanism (ETM) during the quarter. As of 1 June, 3,059 of the refugees and asylum seekers who had been evacuated to Niger from Libya had departed from Niger, with [373 evacuees](#) still remaining there. This compares to [623](#) evacuees in Niger as of March.

Various returns were facilitated through IOM's Assisted Voluntary Return (AVR) programming during the quarter. These included returns of [Malians](#) and [Nigerians](#) from Chad as well as returns from [Niger](#) of stranded migrants.

Expulsions

Algeria to Niger

A recent [report](#) on pushbacks published by the Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Migrants highlighted the expulsions of Nigerien and non-Nigerien citizens by the Algerian government:

The Special Rapporteur remains concerned at reports of large-scale pushbacks of migrants from Algeria to the Niger since 2014, which amount to collective expulsions. These pushbacks are allegedly carried out both through "official" repatriation convoys of Nigerien migrants by Algerian law enforcement authorities, as well as through unannounced collective expulsions, close to the border with the Niger, of non-Nigerien migrants, the majority of whom are from the Economic Community of West African States region, leaving hundreds stranded in a desert environment. Algeria has reportedly unlawfully expelled migrants of at least 20 nationalities to Niger, including many women and children, as well as asylum seekers from African and Middle Eastern countries; in some cases, security personnel have reportedly separated children from their families during mass arrests, and stripped migrants of their belongings.

A [UNHCR](#) update from June indicated that some 8,790 people had been expelled from Algeria to Niger since the beginning of the year; 6,315 of these were Nigeriens. It also highlighted that persons of concern to UNHCR continue to be among those expelled, stating that 36 people were found to fall under the UNHCR mandate and had been taken charge of accordingly.

Among those expelled from Algeria as of mid-April, [Doctors Without Borders/Médecins Sans Frontières \(MSF\)](#) pointed to one individual whose leg was broken, and another with a gunshot wound. In 2020, the organization had documented 989 people who had experienced violence, 21 of whom said they had been tortured, among those it treated following their expulsion from Algeria.

Mauritania to Mali

A key informant working with the MMC in Bamako reported that in the beginning of April there were four waves of people expelled from Mauritania to the Malian border at Gogui after attempting to transit through Mauritania. They were predominantly of Malian and Guinean nationality. Seven of the expelled persons expressed their desire to make a complaint against the Mauritanian authorities, citing mistreatment.

Thematic Focus:

Access and use of information by refugees and migrants on the move in West Africa

Understanding how refugees and migrants access and use information is essential for improving policies and programs which can increase their safety and security while on the move in and through West Africa. Much research has been done in this regard, frequently with an emphasis on the efficacy (and often lack thereof) of information campaigns carried out to sensitize prospective migrants to the dangers they may face en route.

The broader question of how refugees and migrants find and consume information has always been of importance to the MMC and has been a part of its ongoing [4Mi](#) data collection since the inception of the survey. While this was the subject of previous [analysis](#) by the MMC West Africa, the recent addition and amendment of relevant questions to the 4Mi survey have resulted in new data on this topic. Given that, as well as the recent publication of a qualitative [study](#) by the Danish Institute for International Studies/Danish Red Cross entitled Does Information Save Migrants Lives? Knowledge and needs of West African migrants en route to Europe, it is an opportune moment to revisit the 4Mi survey to highlight some of its quantitative findings on the subject. Among other things, this sheds light on those who travel without information, and what sources of information respondents view as the most reliable.


Profile of respondents

This analysis is based on 1,800 interviews carried out with refugees and migrants on the move through Burkina Faso (n = 341), Mali (n = 745) and Niger (n = 714) between February and June 2021. 35% of the respondents (n = 623) were women, and 65% (n = 1,177) were men, and the average age of respondents was 28.5. The top five countries of nationality of respondents were Nigeria (14%), Côte d'Ivoire (11%), Guinea (11%), Togo (8%) and Burkina Faso (7%). 27% (n = 481) of respondents reported hailing from a rural location in their country of departure (ie not necessarily the same as their country of nationality), and 73% (n = 1,423) came from urban environments.

Sources of information before and during the journey

Of those who had accessed information prior to departure (n = 1,423), close personal connections were the primary sources, with friends and family in another country the most frequently cited (60%) followed by friends and family in the country of departure (46%). Other important sources of information included those who may not have as close a social connection to the respondent: returned migrants (39%), smugglers (30%) and other migrants (27%). As had been alluded to in previous MMC West Africa [analysis](#) on information, the UN and NGOs were very infrequently indicated as sources of information, with just 2% of respondents citing them. Disaggregation by gender did not reveal major differences, although men respondents slightly more frequently cited returned migrants (41%) and smugglers (32%) as sources of information as compared to women respondents (33% and 26% respectively).

Figure 1. What were your sources of information?



Smugglers and other migrants were both more frequently utilized sources of information en route as compared to before departure, with 46% and 43% of respondents citing them respectively. This is in keeping with the increased likelihood of meeting and interacting with such individuals in the course of travel.

No substantial differences were seen between men and women respondents in terms of accessing information on the journey. A slightly higher proportion of women respondents reported turning to familiar sources of information en route, such as friends and family in another country (52% vs 47%) and more formal sources of information such as travel agents (15% vs 12%) or NGOs (4% vs 2%), though the latter two were not extremely prominent sources overall. Slightly higher proportions of men respondents reported obtaining information from less formal or less familiar sources, such as smugglers (46% vs 44%), returned migrants (21% vs 17%), other migrants (44% vs 42%) or local people met on the journey (19% vs 14%).

The importance of sources of information often varied according to country of interview, reflecting the diverse circumstances and resources prevailing along different routes or parts of a route. Particularly noteworthy was the greater frequency with which smugglers were cited by respondents interviewed in Niger (59%) as compared to respondents interviewed in Mali (36%) and Burkina Faso (34%). There seemed to be a corresponding decrease in the frequency with which respondents in Niger sought information from friends and family in the country of departure (18%) as compared to respondents in Mali (34%) and Burkina Faso (41%). Whereas respondents in Burkina Faso less often cited other migrants as a source of information (29%) than respondents from Mali and Niger (47% for both), they more often cited travel agents (37%) and the wider diaspora (15%) than did respondents from Mali (8% and 4% respectively) and Niger (7% and 7% respectively).

Mobility without information

It is worth highlighting that **21% of respondents had not obtained information prior to departure**, with important differences seen by gender and location of departure. 30% of women respondents indicated that they had not obtained information before leaving compared to 16% of men respondents. This was also the case for a greater proportion of respondents who came from rural locations in their country of departure (32%) as compared to those who came from urban areas (17%, n = 1316). Those who said they had not obtained information prior to departing were less likely to report having been influenced in their decision to migrate (55%, n = 375) as compared to those who had obtained information prior to departure (74%), suggesting perhaps unsurprisingly that information and influence can go in hand.


Additionally, **22% of respondents reported not having obtained information during their journey**. The gaps between men and women and rural and urban respondents were less pronounced among this group, with 28% of females not having accessed information while en route as compared to 19% of men, and 26% of respondents who had left a rural area as compared to 21% of respondents who had left an urban area.

There was a sizable overlap between these two groups, with 13% of respondents overall reporting that they had not obtained information prior to departure nor accessed it during their journey.

Perceptions of reliability

Previous studies have underlined both the importance of establishing [trust](#) in sources of migration information, as well as the inherent [challenges](#) in finding information that is accurate and trustworthy. The 4Mi survey sheds further light on this issue by asking respondents to indicate which single source, of all the sources of information they accessed, do they perceive as being the most reliable.

Figure 2. Of all sources, what has been the most reliable source of information overall?



The most frequently indicated source of both pre-departure and in journey information, friends and family in another country, were also most frequently seen as the most reliable source of information, as cited by 25% of respondents. They were followed by smugglers, cited by 18% of respondents. This provides a quantitative underpinning to qualitative conclusions from [Does Information Save Migrants Lives](#), which found that even though smugglers were often perceived to be “biased and self-interested,” there nonetheless was “generally a high degree of trust in the information received from smugglers, despite the mixed experiences, which migrants do not necessarily blame smugglers for but rather ascribe to the circumstances en route.”


While friends and family in country of departure were the second most cited source of information before the journey and the fourth most cited source of information during the journey, only 9% of respondents cited this group as the most reliable. This may suggest that people such as parents or community members with whom respondents had interaction prior to departure, and who may have helped influence their migration decision, were not found to have provided the most accurate information as respondents progressed in their journey.

Conclusion

The prominence of smugglers as both a frequently utilized source of information and as a perceived source of reliable information is an important takeaway from this analysis. It serves as a reminder that in spite of common narratives that paint smugglers as predators and migrants as prey, the relationship is often more complicated.

This analysis also suggests points of reflection for programming which seeks to reach people on the move with information, either before departure or during the journey. Women and people who departed from rural areas were less likely to have information and may therefore be particularly important in terms of targeting. At the same time, sources of information utilized often varied depending on country of interview, suggesting possibilities for optimizing how information is provided en route.

Highlighted New Research and Reports



[Conflict, Coping and Covid: Changing human smuggling dynamics in North Africa and the Sahel in 2019 and 2020](#)

Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime | April 2021

This report takes stock of the recent evolution of smuggling and trafficking in the Sahel and North Africa, both in the face of conflict in Libya and the Covid-19 pandemic. It provides in-depth overviews of recent trends in Niger and Mali. The report finds that in Niger, a smuggling economy that was rebounding following a crackdown by the government was dealt a major blow by the pandemic and corresponding mitigation measures. Decreased demand for smuggling services in light of Covid-related travel restrictions led to higher costs and more dangerous routes, and spurred some smugglers to find other work. In Mali, smuggling activities were found to have halted completely from April to September 2020, resuming in a limited fashion at the end of the year. At that time, conflict in the Liptako-Gourma region had shifted departures away from Gao, instead occurring primarily from Timbuktu.



[Enquête sur le Profil des Migrants Internationaux Résidant dans le Département de Dakar](#)

International Organization for Migration | June 2021


This study builds on and complements the migration profile for Senegal elaborated in 2018 by the Senegalese Agence Nationale de la Statistique et de la Démographie (ANSD) in collaboration with IOM. It zeroes in on international migrants living in Dakar for at least one year, and seeks to provide a socio-demographic profile, shed light on their livelihoods and living conditions, assess their level of integration and access to services and provide information that can be used in improving protection of these migrants. This research is based in 1,225 individual interviews and 917 household surveys, and the report estimates that there are some 58,369 international migrants residing in the department of Dakar.



[See Migration Like Water: An Analysis of Flow Monitoring Survey Data on Migration Flows in and Through West and Central Africa / « Les mouvements migratoires sont comme un flux d'eau » Analyse des données de l'enquête de suivi des flux migratoires de l'OIM en Afrique de l'ouest et du centre](#)

International Organization for Migration | April 2021

This report draws on an analysis of IOM flow monitoring data gathered in 2018 and 2019 from 110,402 migrants of 73 different nationalities collected at 39 flow monitoring points across West and Central Africa (Burkina Faso, Chad, Guinea, Mali, Niger, Nigeria and Senegal). Recognizing the complexity of the mixed migration that characterizes the region, and the fact that protection frameworks have not kept up with this reality, the report examines the profiles and experiences of people on the move through the region, seeking to provide evidence-based recommendations to reduce their vulnerability and improve their protection. It does so by analyzing protection challenges, risks and hazards along the route; migrant vulnerability to harm along the Central and Western Mediterranean Routes; and risks and challenges associated with migration in and through the region in the face of the Covid-19 pandemic.



The MMC is a global network consisting of six regional hubs and a central unit in Geneva engaged in data collection, research, analysis and policy development on mixed migration. The MMC is a leading source for independent and high-quality data, research, analysis and expertise on mixed migration. The MMC aims to increase understanding of mixed migration, to positively impact global and regional migration policies, to inform evidence-based protection responses for people on the move and to stimulate forward thinking in public and policy debates on mixed migration. The MMC's overarching focus is on human rights and protection for all people on the move.

The MMC is part of and governed by the Danish Refugee Council (DRC). Global and regional MMC teams are based in Copenhagen, Dakar, Geneva, Nairobi, Tunis, Bogota and Bangkok.

For more information visit:
mixedmigration.org and follow us at [@Mixed_Migration](https://twitter.com/Mixed_Migration)

