Quarterly Mixed Migration Update:
West Africa

This Quarterly Mixed Migration Update (QMMU) covers the West Africa (WA) region. The core countries of focus for this region are Niger, Mali, Burkina Faso and Nigeria. Depending on the quarterly trends and migration-related updates, more attention may be given to any of the countries over the rest.

The QMMUs offer a quarterly update on new trends and dynamics related to mixed migration and relevant policy developments in the region. These updates are based on a compilation of a wide range of secondary (data) sources, brought together within a regional framework and applying a mixed migration analytical lens. Similar QMMUs are available for all MMC regions.

The Mixed Migration Centre is a global network consisting of seven regional hubs and a central unit in Geneva engaged in data collection, research, analysis and policy development on mixed migration. For more information on the MMC, the QMMUs from other regions and contact details of regional MMC teams, visit mixedmigration.org and follow us at @Mixed_Migration

MMC's understanding of mixed migration

"Mixed migration" refers to cross-border movements of people, including refugees fleeing persecution and conflict, victims of trafficking, and people seeking better lives and opportunities. Motivated to move by a multiplicity of factors, people in mixed flows have a range of legal statuses as well as a variety of vulnerabilities. Although entitled to protection under international human rights law, they are exposed to multiple rights violations along their journey. Those in mixed migration flows travel along similar routes, using similar means of travel - often travelling irregularly, and wholly, or partially, assisted by migrant smugglers.

Quarterly Mixed Migration Update:
West Africa

Quarter 2 - 2020

Key Updates

- **Regional fluctuation in mobility:** According to the International Organization for Migration (IOM), border closures across most of the West African region in response to the coronavirus pandemic had a significant impact on regional mobility. There was a steep decline in flows in March, and an overall reduction in flows of 39% in the period January-May 2020. It appears that this trend is beginning to reverse, however, as flows between April and May increased by 65%.

- **Malian displacement within and from Burkina Faso:** Violence in northern Burkina Faso has caused the near total evacuation of two refugee camps, previously hosting more than 15,000 Malian refugees. More than 4,000 of the refugees have returned to Mali, and others have faced secondary displacement within northern Burkina Faso.

- **Influx of Nigerians to Maradi:** Some 23,000 persons fleeing **Nigeria** were allowed to enter Niger in April, seeking refuge in its Maradi region. They were driven out by violent attacks by bandits and vigilantes in the northwestern Nigerian states of Katsina, Sokoto and Zamfara.

- **Canary Islands arrivals:** The estimated number of irregular arrivals in the Canary Islands for the April-June quarter, based on a compilation of Spain Weekly Snapshots (Weeks 14-26) from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), was 1,240. This showed a slight decrease over the previous quarter (1,625). The estimated 2,865 refugees and migrants who have arrived in the Canary Islands so far in 2020 has already outstripped the total figure for all of 2019 (2,700).

- **Talibés returning to Niger:** Some 7,000 Nigeriens had returned from Nigeria to southern Niger from the beginning of the quarter to mid-June. The majority of these were unaccompanied minors, *talibés* coming back to Niger following the closure of Koranic schools in northern Nigeria due to the pandemic.

Regional Overview*

Spain

Morocco

Tunisia

Algeria

Libya

Western Sahara

The number of people who arrived by boat in the Canary Islands in the second quarter was estimated at 1,240

Mauritania

Mali

Some 1,400 stranded Nigeriens were assisted to return from Burkina Faso in early May

Niger

23,000 Nigerians fled into Niger's Maradi region in April

Chad

Senegal

The Gambia

Guinea-Bissau

Guinea

Burkina Faso

An estimated 7,000 Nigeriens, primarily *talibés*, returned from Nigeria between April and mid-June

Sierra Leone

Ivory Coast

Ghana

Togo

Benin

Nigeria

Central African Republic

Liberia

Cameroon

*Information on the map relates to selected updates and does not represent all mixed migration flows within and out of West Africa.

Mixed Migration Regional Updates

West Africa region

The International Organization for Migration (IOM) noted a steep decline in regional migration flows in March – corresponding with the period in which travel restrictions were substantially enacted around the region – and an overall reduction in flows of 39% in the period January-May 2020. Nonetheless, even with such restrictions in place across the region, people continued trying to move, with porous borders making it difficult for authorities to effectively control entries and departures in many places.

It appears that the downward trend in regional mobility was short-lived, and is now beginning to reverse, as flows between April and May increased by 65%. As of the end of May, IOM estimated that 17,000 people on the move were stranded across the region due to travel measures taken in response to the coronavirus.

Displacement in the Central Sahel

While the pace of internal displacement in **Burkina Faso** appears to have slowed in the last quarter, as compared to previous quarters (289, 591 IDPs as of 30 September 2019, 560,033 IDPs as of 31 December 2020, 838,548 IDPs as of 31 March 2020 etc), nonetheless, more than 100,000 Burkinabés were displaced within their own country from the end of March through 23 June.

The violence uprooting Burkinabés has also affected the population of Malian refugees who have been living in Burkina Faso. Two refugee camps which had hosted approximately 15,000 Malians in the country's northern Sahel region have been largely depopulated in recent months. In March the Goudoubo camp in Seno province was attacked by militants who robbed and physically assaulted residents, ordering them to evacuate the camp within five days. At one time hosting some 9,000 refugees, by early April the camp was essentially empty.

Insecurity in the north of Burkina Faso had already caused aid organizations to recall staff, consequently reducing access to education and health services in the Mentao camp in Soum province. The camp had sustained attacks by armed groups, and on 2 May at least 32 residents of the camp were wounded following an incursion by government security forces who claimed that the refugees had been supporting militants. They were also given an ultimatum to leave the camp within three days or be killed, and by mid-May the camp was largely deserted.

About half of the refugees from Goudobo have returned to Mali, and while many from Mentao camp have expressed their desire to take advantage of repatriation supported by UNHCR, this program has been curtailed due to border closures related to the pandemic. Thus, while official UNHCR refugee figures have showed a decline over the first five months of the year (20,933 as of 31 May 2020 as compared to 25,442 as of 31 December 2019), many Malian refugees have experienced secondary displacement, leaving camps in the north of Burkina Faso and moving to other towns in northern Burkina Faso (Dori, Djibo etc). Due to ongoing insecurity in Mali, those refugees who have managed to leave Burkina Faso and return to Mali may yet be unable to return to their places of origin within the country.

In **Mali**, a fire broke out in late April at the Faladie site in Bamako, largely destroying the tents and personal belongings of the displaced persons who were sheltering there. While precise numbers are not available, it seems that between 1,600 and 2,350 displaced persons were living at the site. These were primarily comprised of displaced Malians, but included some 159 Burkinabé refugees. Some animals perished in the blaze, but according to UNHCR, no human fatalities were reported. While 178 households were assisted to move to the Mabile IDP site following the fire, other households, including those of the refugees, remained behind in Faladie. Creation of a new site which can accommodate displaced persons in Bamako is being expedited.

A 31 May attack on the Intikane hosting area in the western **Niger** region of Tahoua – home to some 20,000 Malian refugees and 15,000 internally displaced Nigeriens – resulted in the deaths of two leaders of the refugee community, as well as a leader of the local host community. The attack was carried out by more than 50 armed men on motorbikes, who also burned food and other supplies, and cut communication and water lines. More than 3,000 refugees, internally displaced and members of the host community fled Intikane following the attack. Niger's western border regions of Tillabéry and Tahoua have been experiencing increased insecurity, and as of mid-May they already hosted approximately 170,000 displaced persons (including refugees). In April alone, 4,000 people were displaced in Tillabéry, with some 6,000 Nigeriens fleeing to Mali in the first four months of the year.

In spite of Niger's border closure in response to COVID-19 in March, some 23,000 persons fleeing **Nigeria** were allowed to enter Niger in April, seeking refuge in its Maradi region. Violent attacks by bandits and vigilantes in the states of Katsina, Sokoto and Zamfara have been pushing significant numbers of people across the border into Niger since April of 2019. While the pace of flight slowed in May, as of June, UNHCR estimated that there were more than 70,000 Nigerian refugees in Maradi, as well as approximately 23,000 internally displaced Nigeriens. UNHCR, in coordination with local authorities and humanitarian partners, has launched a campaign to relocate refugees away from the border to so-called villages of opportunity to ensure their safety, and aim for 15,000 refugees to be relocated by the end of August. Additionally, there are an estimated 176,457 IDPs in Katsina, Sokoto and Zamfara in northwestern Nigeria, which represents a slight decrease from figures reported in the previous quarter, when the number of IDPs as of February 2020 stood at 178,475.

Mixed migration from West Africa towards North Africa and Europe[1]

Western Mediterranean Route

As of 28 June, total land and sea arrivals to Spain in 2020, as reported by UNHCR, stood at 8,453, a 35% decrease as compared to the same period in 2019. This estimated figure covered arrivals by sea to the Spanish mainland, Canary Islands and Balearic Islands, and arrivals to Ceuta and Melilla. Four West African countries have consistently been among the top ten nationalities of arrival in Spain in recent quarters and remained so as of the end of May, joined by Cameroon. Among the total recorded arrivals, 13% hailed from Guinea, 12% from Mali, 11% from Ivory Coast, 8% from Senegal and 1% from Cameroon.

The estimated number of irregular arrivals in the Canary Islands for the April-June quarter, based on a compilation of UNHCR's Spain Weekly Snapshots (Weeks 14-26), was 1,240. This showed a slight decrease over the previous quarter (1,625). The estimated 2,865 refugees and migrants who have arrived in the Canary Islands so far in 2020 has already outstripped the total figure for all of 2019 (2,700), and is more than six times the number of arrivals in the corresponding period of last year (455). As of mid-May, the Islands were considered to be the main portal of irregular entry into Spain during the pandemic. Between 15 March and 15 May, some 68% of these arrivals to Spain occurred in the Canary Islands.

This surge in arrivals, coupled with the coronavirus pandemic, has strained the Islands' reception system. Transfers to the mainland have not been possible, and the Spanish Interior Minister suspended controversial return operations due to the pandemic. The Islands' two migrant detention centers, Centros de Internamiento de Extranjeros (CIEs), closed their doors following Spain's declaration of emergency and were reported to be empty in April. In the case of the Barranco Seco CIE in Las Palmas de Gran Canaria, those being held in the center were transferred to a school residence hall in early April following the diagnosis of eight COVID-19 cases in the CIE.

There has been uncertainty over what to do with new arrivals, particularly in light of a Ministry of Health order that requires anyone entering the Islands from abroad to spend 14 days in quarantine. Initially arrivals were brought to police facilities, and social workers then had to scramble to find locations in which they could spend their quarantines. Later space in the Port of Las Palmas was fitted out as a registration facility, but there have been criticisms over the conditions there, with only four portable toilets and no showers. According to the Spanish Commission for Aid to Refugees (CEAR) Canarias, "the lack of humanitarian reception places cannot be an excuse for people arriving in the Canary Islands to end up in industrial buildings, warehouses, lying on the ground and exceeding police custody." A parliamentary spokesman for the political party Nuevas Canarias has called for the referral of migrants to be resumed, as the responsibility for the arrivals has been difficult for the Islands to manage alone.

---

1   Numbers in this section reflect best estimates available at time data was accessed (late June/early July) but sources may be subject to later updates.

It is also important to underscore that not all boats that seek to reach the Canary Islands make it. Two shipwrecks recorded on this route by IOM's Missing Migrants Project during March and April resulted in the deaths of at least 63 people.

According to the Missing Migrants Project[2], elsewhere on the Western Mediterranean Route, eight migrant deaths were reported during the second quarter, compared to 43 in the first quarter of 2020 and 67 in the same period (April-June) of 2019.

Central Mediterranean Route

Provisional figures from June 28 put the number of irregular sea arrivals in Italy since the beginning of the year at 6,653. This was slightly more than double the total for the same period in 2019 (2,594). In the first five months of the year, four of the top ten nationalities of arrival were West African, with 13% from Ivory Coast, 4% from Guinea, 3% from Mali and 2% from Nigeria

Southbound mixed migration

Reception and quarantine challenges in Niger in the face of ongoing expulsions

On 13 May, the UN Network on Migration issued a statement calling on states to "suspend forced returns during the pandemic, in order to protect the health of migrants and communities, and uphold the human rights of all migrants, regardless of status." However, updates from an MMC colleague in Niger based on information shared through local networks indicates that expulsions from Algeria continued during the second quarter.

The prevailing border closures across West Africa have impeded normal mobility, leading to multiple situations in which migrants and refugees have been stranded en route or otherwise unable to return to their countries of origin. As of March IOM's Assisted Voluntary Return mechanism was blocked, meaning that IOM transit centers quickly reached full capacity, with no means to assist people to go back home and with arrivals continuing. The challenges inherent in quarantine, in makeshift facilities in the extreme heat of northern Niger, with no immediate solutions to return home, have prompted frustration among migrants and refugees.

In early April, some 256 people who had been en route to Libya were brought to Agadez after having been picked up in the desert by Niger's Civil Protection Department and IOM. Sources differ on the exact nature of their return – whether it was due to abandonment by their smugglers or a pushback from Libyan actors after crossing the border. They were kept in quarantine in the stadium in Agadez, and on 10 April, 43 of them fled the stadium.

---

2   As of 7 July 2020.

As of late April, nearly 640 returnees were being kept in quarantine in a camp in Arlit in northern Niger. On 20 April, some of the camp's inhabitants staged a protest, citing the difficult conditions of their quarantine and a lack of communication from IOM. A store was broken into; according to one of the returnees, the shop had essential items that they had not been provided. He also explained that he and others had already spent more than the required 14 days in the camp, and still had not seen any officials, or had any explanation of what would happen next. The uprising drew the police, who were reported to have fired tear gas, and resulted in the arrest of at least 13 people. Those who left the camp to avoid the tear gas were not allowed to re-enter.

Movements to and from Niger

On 21 April the Government of Niger agreed to the opening of a humanitarian corridor through which migrants stranded in Niger could be assisted to return to their countries of origin. This allowed for two land movements in May which facilitated the return by bus of 43 Burkinabés and 58 Beninese. In June, charter flights returned two groups of Malians, 179 and 159 respectively, and 44 Guineans to their countries. Additional return movements were in the pipeline. In a document covering the month of May, IOM indicated that close to 2,000 people remained in their transit centers in the region.

In early May, IOM assisted more than 1,400 stranded Nigeriens to return from Burkina Faso, also providing support for their quarantine on a site outside of Niamey. The majority were miners who had left southern Burkina Faso due to prevailing violence.

Nearly 1,000 Nigeriens returned from Nigeria to southern Niger in late March and an additional 7,000 Nigeriens had returned as of mid-June. The majority of these were unaccompanied minors, talibés coming back to Niger following the closure of Koranic schools in northern Nigeria due to the pandemic.

As of June, evacuation flights from Libya to Niger through UNHCR's Emergency Transit Mechanism (ETM) remained suspended due to the pandemic.

Thematic Focus: Migration, COVID-19 and Economic Impacts

It could be argued that the immediate humanitarian costs of COVID-19 for people on the move in West Africa have so far not been as significant as might have been expected, given the already existing general vulnerabilities of transit (e.g. lack of access to services) and the specific difficulty migrants and refugees may face in taking precautionary measures against the virus.

However, the economic consequences of the pandemic and its response are increasingly coming into focus, and we are already seeing the impacts on both people on the move and communities of origin, transit and receipt. These include increased costs in transit, lost opportunities, lost income and costs for families and communities. If not properly addressed, in the medium/long term this situation will further exacerbate migrants' and refugees' vulnerabilities, such as vulnerability to trafficking and exploitation.

Challenges in transit

As borders closed and internal travel has frequently become more challenging, people on the move who can't advance may run out of money because their costs are higher and/or their journey is taking longer than expected. In some cases this may be because they are not able to take a straightforward route through an official border crossing, and a circuitous route may cost more, perhaps requiring the assistance of a smuggler. This can lead migrants and refugees to become stranded due to lack of funds, regardless of border closures – they simply don't have enough money to move, even if the borders were open. In other cases, migrants and refugees who are stuck in one place without work may need to devote all their money to support themselves in limbo, meaning that they don't have money for other things, such as sending money to their families or saving for the onward journey. Refoulés may have had money and belongings seized in the course of their expulsion – as reportedly has happened to many people expelled from Algeria – making their post-quarantine prospects very uncertain.

A key informant who works with people on the move in Gao confirmed that they are paying significantly to cross borders, and explained that internal transit and accommodation costs within Mali have increased, with migrants and refugees being charged up to twice as much as Malians to travel between Bamako and Gao, and lodging in migrant ghettos (in Gao) jumping from 1000-1500 CFA per day to 2500-3000 CFA. He also underscored the substantial increase in transit time to reach the Algerian border, from 3-4 days to one or two weeks, which implies a corresponding increase in costs of travel and living.

Lost opportunities

In a region where agriculture and pastoralism are important livelihoods, the timing of the pandemic has led to opportunity costs for farmers and herders. During the agricultural off-season, it is not uncommon for people from farming communities – particularly young men – to migrate to seek paid labor opportunities, for instance finding work at gold mining sites. Some of them have been delayed in returning to their

communities by measures such as border closures and quarantines, and fear it will be too late to [cultivate the land](#) by the time they are able to get back. The pandemic has also presented challenges for nomadic pastoralists, who would typically be on the move with the [wet season](#) on the horizon, but in many cases have been blocked in transit. This period of mobility – generally around [May](#) – follows extensive border closures across the region. Not only does this impact the ability of [pastoralists](#) to find fodder and water for their animals, but it can also impede their ability to access markets to sell their animals.

Consequences for returnees, families and communities

The intersection between the pandemic and migration has consequences not just for people who are currently on the move. The challenges of economic reintegration for returned migrants – many of whom were already in precarious situations – are compounded by the pandemic and [responses](#) thereto. Curfews and business closures mandated by governments, as well as decreased demand for cafes and restaurants, have impacted the [jobs and small businesses](#) of many returnees, and 81% of some 1,100 returnees across the region surveyed by IOM indicate that they are economically worse off than prior to the pandemic. According to [IOM](#), many returned migrants originate from border regions, and these are locations whose economies have been particularly hit by border closures. Communities in [border areas](#) or other transit hubs that rely on the passage of people and goods are also negatively affected. Migrants and refugees who have lost jobs and/or who are stranded and need to devote more money to support themselves may be unable to send [remittances](#) home, and this at a time when the pandemic has caused price hikes for basic necessities.

Lost income and its impacts

Data from the [4Mi COVID-19](#) survey sheds light on how people on the move are experiencing the economic impacts of the pandemic and related measures. **Of the 1,401 migrants and refugees interviewed between 20 April and 20 June, 46% indicated that they had lost some of their income due to coronavirus.** Some variation was seen in terms of gender, with 50% of female respondents indicating that they had lost income as compared to 44% of male respondents. On the other hand, female respondents were also more likely to indicate that they were still working in spite of COVID restrictions (21% - F vs 15% - M).

Figure 1. Have you lost some of your income due to COVID-19 restrictions?

Even more striking differences were seen in terms of country of interview, with **57% of respondents in Burkina Faso indicating that they have lost some income due to the pandemic**, and only 5% reporting that they continue to work in spite of restrictions. This compares to 48% of respondents who reported losing income in Niger and 35% of respondents in Mali.

Figure 2. Impact of lost income

The impact that the lost income was reported to have was very similar between female and male respondents, but again, disaggregation by country of interview showed greater variation, with **68% of respondents interviewed in Burkina Faso and 61% of respondents interviewed in Niger indicating that they were unable to continue with their journey, as compared to 42% in Mali**.

Overall 42% of respondents indicated that they can no longer send remittances, and 40% reported increased worry and anxiety. The latter was echoed by a key informant in Agadez who spoke of migrants and refugees he has observed as being "a little lost" – uncertain over their next steps and worried that even if they make it to Libya or Algeria, they may not be able to enter or find a job.

Economic impact and changed plans?

Interestingly, despite the challenges outlined above, a plurality of respondents (42%) indicated that they had not changed their plans. 25% of respondents said that they had stopped for a time as they were stuck, and **only 7% said they had decided to return home**. When analyzing how lost income and changed plans intersect, we see that – perhaps not surprisingly – those who reported that they have continued to work (51%) were the least likely to have changed their plans as compared to those who lost income due to COVID (41%) or were not previously earning income (42%).

However, 49% of those who continued to work indicated a change in plan in the context of the pandemic, suggesting that even those who continue to earn an income face factors beyond their control that have caused their plans to evolve. This is echoed by input from a key informant interviewed in Agadez, who indicated that in many cases even those who have money to continue with their journey are not able to proceed due to the border closure, or to considerations such as preferring not to travel in a confined space with people they do not know, due to risk of COVID transmission.

It is clear both from secondary sources and from 4Mi data and key informant interviews that the coronavirus has had substantial economic consequences for people on the move, as well as the people who depend on them. Ultimately, the economic impacts of the pandemic can lead to other humanitarian impacts, as economic difficulties leave people more vulnerable in transit, and less able to support their own basic needs and those of their families. As the mindset regarding pandemic response shifts from an emergency footing to a more long-term approach, it is crucial that policymakers and practitioners consider the economic costs of the pandemic on the migration landscape in the region.

Highlighted New Research and Reports

[Aspirer à la mobilité pour construire son autonomie : s'ancrer dans l'espace transfrontalier ou «aller chercher» plus loin ? Étude sur les trajectoires et les représentations de la migration chez les jeunes sous mandat UNHCR et hôtes dans les régions de Tillabéri, Tahoua et Diffa](#)

Associée au Groupe d'Études et de Recherche Migrations Espaces et Sociétés (Université Abdou Moumouni, Niamey) | June 2020

In the Tillabéri, Tahoua and Diffa regions in Niger, young people from displaced and host communities have a variety of migration aspirations. This report takes a deeper look at the factors determining youth migration and the role migration plays in the transition into adulthood. While some youth are fleeing conflict, others are engaging in a regional rite of passage. For many, especially young men, migration is the keystone that allows them to create independent lives, enabling them to fulfill the societal expectations of marrying and providing for their families. For these young people, striking out on their own is both a gamble and a sign that they are taking intentional steps to prepare themselves for their adult lives. This report details the potential opportunities that await them and provides recommendations on how to better support them throughout their journey.

[Mixed Migration in West Africa in 2030: Results from the Mixed Migration Scenario Building Workshop / Migration mixte en Afrique de l'Ouest en 2030 Résultats de l'atelier d'élaboration de scénarios sur la migration mixte](#)

Mixed Migration Centre | April 2020

This report draws together the results of a scenario building exercise held as part of the Rabat Process with the participation of policymakers involved in migration from around the region. The exercise took a collective intelligence approach to imagining migration futures in the region, drawing on the expertise of participants to build on current data and trends, and project forward to the migration landscape of 2030. This report elaborates the current mixed migration context, analyses relatively certain dynamics that will impact migration through 2030 (e.g. demography and urbanization) and examines key uncertainties (e.g. climate change and epidemics) that could influence future migration. The report includes projections and a mapping of likely migration scenarios West Africa could experience by 2030.

The Political Economy of Migration Governance in Niger

Arnold Bergstraesser Institut | April 2020

This report examines the political economy of migration governance in Niger through the lenses of governance, political stakes, and societal relevance. While Nigerien citizens view migration as a normal part of society, several factors have increased the Nigerien government's interest in regulating migration, including increased attention from the EU in terms of migration governance and the growing presence of forcibly displaced persons. This report concludes by highlighting the European involvement in Nigerien migration governance juxtaposed with the priorities of local political desires and societal discourse.

The Political Economy of Migration Governance in Senegal

Arnold Bergstraesser Institut | June 2020

This report dives into the complicated layers of a changing migration policy in Senegal, where a burgeoning oil and gas sector as well as the complex security situation of its neighbors could soon result in a migration boom for the country. The Senegalese government, its partners in Europe, and a powerful diaspora often are at odds concerning migration policy reform. The Senegalese government is eager to gain the development aid associated with the implementation of a more restrictive, EU-aligned vision for migration policy. However, donor supported migration reforms which privilege a securitized approach are considered by some to exist in tension with Senegal's autonomy. The Senegalese public, viewing migration as a means to a better life, are apprehensive of the reforms and frustrated by their ad-hoc nature. The diaspora, whose remittances are vital to the Senegalese economy, also oppose many of the migration policy measures favored by the EU.

The MMC is a global network consisting of seven regional hubs and a central unit in Geneva engaged in data collection, research, analysis and policy development on mixed migration. The MMC is a leading source for independent and high-quality data, research, analysis and expertise on mixed migration. The MMC aims to increase understanding of mixed migration, to positively impact global and regional migration policies, to inform evidence-based protection responses for people on the move and to stimulate forward thinking in public and policy debates on mixed migration. The MMC's overarching focus is on human rights and protection for all people on the move.

The MMC is part of and governed by the Danish Refugee Council (DRC). Global and regional MMC teams are based in Amman, Copenhagen, Dakar, Geneva, Nairobi, Tunis, Bogota and Bangkok.

For more information visit:
mixedmigration.org and follow us at @Mixed_Migration

Mixed Migration Centre

DRC DANISH REFUGEE COUNCIL