

mixed migration research series

explaining people on the move

A Certain Catalyst

an overview of the (mixed) migration
and development debate with special
focus on the Horn of Africa region



RMMS

Regional
Mixed Migration
Secretariat



9

Study

November 2015

A Certain Catalyst: an overview of the (mixed) migration and development debate with special focus on the Horn of Africa region

This is the ninth of a series of studies - *explaining people on the move* - focusing on different aspects of mixed migration associated with the Horn of Africa and Yemen region.

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The Regional Mixed Migration Secretariat (RMMS)

Formed in 2011 and based in Nairobi, the overall objective of the RMMS is to support agencies, institutions and fora in the Horn of Africa and Yemen sub-region to improve the management of protection and assistance to people in mixed migration flows in the Horn of Africa and across the Gulf of Aden and Red Sea in Yemen. The co-founders and Steering Committee members for the RMMS include UNHCR, IOM, Danish Refugee Council (DRC), INTERSOS and the Yemen Mixed Migration Task Force. The RMMS is therefore a regional hub aiming to provide support and coordination, analysis and research, information, data management and advocacy. It acts as an independent agency, hosted by the DRC, to stimulate forward thinking and policy development in relation to mixed migration. Its overarching focus and emphasis is on human rights, protection and assistance.

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A Certain Catalyst: an overview of the (mixed) migration and development debate with special focus on the Horn of Africa region.

List of acronyms

| | |
|--------|---|
| ACMS | African Centre for Migration & Society |
| ACP | African, Caribbean and Pacific |
| AEP | Africa-Europe Platform |
| AfD | Alternative für Deutschland (Alternative for Germany) |
| AfDB | African Development Bank |
| AIR | African Institute for Remittances |
| AMF | Anti-Money Laundering |
| AMISOM | African Union Mission to Somalia |
| AU | African Union |
| BBC | British Broadcasting Cooperation |
| CFT | Countering Financing Terrorism |
| CMP | Common Market Protocol |
| COMESA | Common Market for Eastern Africa |
| DEMIG | Determinants of International Migration |
| DFID | Department for International Development |
| DRC | Danish Refugee Council |
| DRC | Democratic Republic of the Congo |
| EAC | East African Community |
| EC | European Commission |
| ECOWAS | Economic Community of Western African States |
| ECDPM | European Centre for Development Policy Management |
| EEA | Office of the Ethiopian Expatriate Affairs |
| EIA | Ethiopian Investment Agency |
| EU | European Union |
| FAO | Food and Agriculture Organization |
| FDI | Foreign Direct Investment |
| FN | Front National |
| FPÖ | Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (Freedom Party of Austria) |
| GDP | Gross Domestic Product |
| GMG | Global Migration Group |
| GTZ | Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (currently: GIZ) |
| HIPS | Heritage Institute for Policy Studies |
| HLD | High Level Dialogue |
| IDB | Inter-American Development Bank |
| IBM | Integrated Border Management |
| ICMPD | International Centre for Migration Policy Development |
| IDP | Internally Displaced Person |
| IDMC | Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre |
| IGAD | Intergovernmental Authority on Development |
| ILO | International Labour Organisation |
| IOM | International Organization for Migration |
| IPCC | International Panel on Climate Change |
| IRC | International Rescue Committee |
| IMI | International Migration Institute |
| INGO | International NGO |
| IS | Islamic State |
| IZA | Institute for the Study of Labor |
| KNOMAD | Global Knowledge Partnership on Migration and Development |
| MDGs | Millennium Development Goals |
| MIDA | Migration for Development in Africa |

| | |
|---------|--|
| MME | Migration, Mobility, Employment and Higher Education |
| MTOs | Money Transfer Operators |
| NADICOK | National Diaspora Council of Kenya |
| NCPD | National Council for Population and Development |
| NGO | Non-Governmental Organization |
| ODA | Official Development Assistance |
| ODI | Overseas Development Institute |
| OECD | Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development |
| OHCHR | Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights |
| PEAs | Public Employment Agencies |
| Pegida | Patriotische Europäer gegen die Islamisierung des Abendlandes (Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamisation of the West) |
| PNG | Papua New Guinea |
| PRSP | Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper |
| PVV | Partij voor de Vrijheid (Freedom Party) |
| QUESTS | Qualified Expatriate Somali Technical Support |
| RDPP | Regional Development and Protection Programme |
| REC | Regional Economic Community |
| RMMS | Regional Mixed Migration Secretariat |
| RMPF | Regional Migration Policy Framework |
| RQAN | Reintegration of Qualified African Nationals |
| SADC | Southern African Development Community |
| SDC | Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation |
| SDGs | Sustainable Development Goals |
| SGBV | Sexual and Gender-Based Violence |
| SIDA | Swedish International Development Agency |
| TFTA | Tripartite Free Trade Area |
| TOKTEN | Transfer of Knowledge Through Expatriate Nationals |
| UDC | Union démocratique du centre (Swiss People's Party) |
| UK | United Kingdom |
| UKIP | UK Independence Party |
| UN | United Nations |
| UNCTAD | United Nations Conference on Trade And Development |
| UNDESA | United Nations Population Division, Department of Economic and Social Affairs |
| UNDP | United Nations Development Program |
| UNECA | United Nations Economic Commission for Africa |
| UNESCO | United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation |
| UNFPA | United Nations Population Fund |
| UNHCR | Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees |
| UNICEF | United Nations Children's Fund |
| UNITAR | United Nations Institute for Training and Research |
| UNOCHA | United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs |
| UNODC | United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime |
| URPN | Urban Refugee Protection Network |
| US | United States |
| USD | United States Dollar |
| UNU | United Nations University |
| WHO | World Health Organization |

Summary of key findings

The British economist, Paul Collier, starts his recent analysis of immigration and multiculturalism in the 21st century¹ with a chapter on The Migration Taboo. He states that of all the social sciences the study of migration is most polemical and taboo because being seen as defending one side or another appears to have ethical and political overtones beyond the defined scope of discussion and often irrespective of evidence.

While respecting this warning, this RMMS report aims to discuss mixed migration in a balanced and evidence-based way, describing current and future trends and particularly exploring the linkages between migration and development in the Horn of Africa and Yemen region. While previous RMMS reports have often focused on protection risks and negative aspects of mixed migration flows in the region and beyond, there is a positive side to migration as well. Migration can be an effective poverty-reduction strategy and has many beneficial effects for countries of origin, destination countries and for migrants themselves.

The main report includes an elaborate discussion on the (theoretical) linkages between migration and development, addresses migration myths and highlights the many ways in which migration could or actually does contribute to development. The report discusses in detail topics such as diaspora engagement, labour migration, free movement, remittances and refugee economies. While details, the underlying theory and argumentation and many global and regional examples are provided in the main report, this summary focuses on describing the implications of the main findings for the East and Horn of Africa region.

An extended summary of this longer report is available as a separate publication in hard copy or electronically on the RMMS website.

The relation between development and migration

- Until countries in the region reach higher middle-income levels, economic development will lead to more migration. Migration within and from the Horn of Africa region is still relatively low, but is bound to increase in the next decades. Ethiopia in particular may witness rising emigration rates in the next few decades.
- Policies aimed at reducing migration flows from region through development cooperation and economic development are likely to achieve the opposite and will result in more migration.

The myth of invasion

- Relatively, migration has not increased significantly, only a fraction of Africans are migrating, and not all are migrating to Europe as most stay within the region.
- The implementation of free movement provisions (such as in the East African Community Common Market Protocol) will not necessarily lead to more migration within regions. Migration rates are relatively stable over the years and when compared between regions (whether there is free movement or not). However, although data is unavailable, implementation of free movement provisions between regions (for

¹ Collier, 2013.

example, between West Africa and Europe or between the Horn of Africa and Europe) could lead to increased migration flows between these regions.

Relation between restrictive immigration policies and migration

- Countries in the region are increasingly appearing to be strict on migration – partly in response to security threats – with, for example, common and mass arrests and detention of irregular migrants in for example Kenya and Tanzania, the closure of the border between Kenya and Somalia and the construction of a wall between those two countries.
- Due to restrictions and the lack of legal means for migration, the migrant smuggling business in the region is flourishing, as restrictive immigration policies will not stop migration, but only push migrants into irregular migration, divert the routes, increase the demand for smugglers (which fuels corruption) and increases migrants' vulnerability.
- Whereas Kenya is increasingly trying to restrict movement between Somalia and Kenya, this might lead to a temporary but sudden surge in migration from Somalia, as well as prevent the return migration of Somalis, which might hamper the ongoing voluntary return operation of Somali refugees and push more Somalis into permanent settlement in Kenya.

The securitization of migration

- Migration is increasingly being viewed through the prism of national security, which might lead to a generalization that all refugees and migrants are a potential security threat.
- Although the terrorist threats facing Kenya are very real, Kenya's plans to build a wall on the border between Kenya and Somalia (as well as directives ordering all urban refugees to refugee camps, mass arrests of refugees and irregular migrants and threats to close Dadaab refugee camp) are also expressions of this securitization of migration. Closing the border with Somalia and building a wall might have negative consequences and is not likely to contribute to security, as: building a wall will not stop home-grown terrorism; border barriers are not always efficient in keeping irregular migrants from entering a territory; building and maintaining a comprehensive wall requires huge resources; as long as there is corruption within Kenya's security services and among the police, a border wall alone will not suffice; blocking cross-border movement does not consider the pastoralists who have homes and livelihoods in both Kenya and Somalia; and, finally, psychically closing the border and blocking existing and extensive (cattle) trade patterns between Somalia and Kenya, could have a strong negative impact on the national and regional economies, both in Somalia and in Kenya.
- Instead of making large investments in closing the border and building a wall, Kenya, as well as other countries in the region, are better off by developing and investing in integrated border management, which should include addressing institutional weaknesses. Integrated border management could contribute more to controlling and securing the borders, while also enabling the development potential of cross-border trade and movement.

Diaspora and development

- Diaspora bonds are one way to facilitate investment and mobilize diaspora savings for development. Although some countries in the region (such as Ethiopia and Kenya) have been issuing bonds, there might be a lot of untapped potential.
- However, for the diaspora to become engaged in their origin countries, for example through buying bonds, making investments or starting a business or even return, it is important that these countries have favourable business environments and low levels of corruption. On the World Bank's Ease of Doing Business ranking (a high ease of doing business ranking means the regulatory environment is more conducive to the starting and operation of a local) most countries in the region score relatively low. Only Rwanda scores relatively well, placing 46th out of 187 countries. All other countries are between position 131 (Tanzania) and 187 (Eritrea). Moreover, most countries score relatively low on the Transparency International Corruption index. Without improvements with regard to the business environment and corruption it will be difficult for countries in the region to fully benefit from the economic and development potential of the diasporas.
- The recognition of dual citizenship for the diaspora has many economic benefits for the origin countries. Although most countries in the region – with Tanzania as a notable exception - now allow dual citizenship, it is important these laws are implemented and that the process of applying for dual citizenship is easy and efficient.
- Although the embassies of some countries in the region try to reach out to their diasporas, generally they have little information about their diaspora members, little expertise on how to work with the diaspora and do not effectively cooperate with ministries and other embassies. In order to benefit more from the diaspora's resources, countries in the region and their embassies should acquire more knowledge and information about the diaspora, build capacity and improve coordination.

Migration, employment and labour markets

- Most migration within Africa is driven by employment. Fluctuations in migration flows are more related to economies than to immigration policies. Ethiopian migration to Saudi Arabia continued despite a major crackdown on irregular migration and mass deportations in 2013/2014 and still continues despite the war in Yemen. As long as there are jobs available in Saudi Arabia or elsewhere, Ethiopians and other migrants groups from the region will continue to migrate to Saudi Arabia and other Gulf States.
- The demand for, and supply of, labour is becoming more international as millions may no longer be able to find jobs in their home labour markets and labour shortages increase in destination countries. A lack of opportunities for legal labour migration however forces economic migrants, including many Ethiopians, to move irregularly, which leaves them vulnerable for all kinds of abuse and it hampers the full use of the development potential of labour migration.
- Bilateral agreements supporting temporary migration programs between countries in the region and destination countries (e.g. between Ethiopia and the Gulf States and European countries) could be used to increase legal migration from African countries. These programs, however, require careful monitoring to protect migrants from exploitation by employers and intermediaries. Engaging in stricter law enforcement, providing information on the dangers of migration and improving

regulation of intermediaries would all help in organizing well-managed labour migration flows as well as fight trafficking.

- Together with reducing remittance costs, reducing recruitment costs for international labour migration (for example the recruitment amounts paid by Ethiopians and Kenyans who are working in the Gulf States) would lead to saving millions every year, which could be used by migrants and their families in the region to save money, invest, to spend it on education and household needs or used for development purposes.
- Contrary to public perception, developed countries benefit economically from low-skilled migration from developing countries. Moreover, these countries struggle with an ageing population. Circular migration programs between countries in the region (with a young and fast growing population) and developed destination countries could be beneficial for all.
- Labour migration between developing countries – although under-researched – appears to have many economic benefits for the destination countries as well (and for migrants themselves and origin countries). One of the best ways to increase regular and well-management labour migration within the region, is to lift immigration restrictions and facilitate more free movement of migrant workers between countries and regions. Countries in the region could benefit from effectively implementing existing free movement agreements, such as the East African Community Free Market Protocol.
- Mobility between developing countries, and its impact on development, still tends to receive less attention, compared to the migration and development linkages regarding labour migration from developing countries to developed countries. However, most migration occurs within regions and both monetary and non-monetary transfers also occur in the context of South–South migration. This deserves greater attention, as migrants can also make important contributions in other developing countries. If this receives more positive attention in public communication and in the media it could also foster integration and help address the xenophobia that immigrants face in many countries in the South.

Remittances

- Compared to other migration corridors, there is a lack of knowledge on collective remittances in the region and it appears there are not many initiatives in the region with regard to mobilizing collective remittances for development initiatives. However, as with diaspora investments, a positive investment climate, trust in the government and low levels of corruption and bureaucracy are important prerequisites for the mobilization of collective remittances.
- There is no region in the world where migrants face higher charges for remittance transfers, and remittance corridors in East Africa (for example Uganda-Kenya and Uganda-Tanzania) are among the most expansive in the world. To increase the development potential of remittances in the region, the most important step would be to lower the remittance costs and this could lead to enormous savings for migrants and their families.
- Although Sub-Sahara, and Kenya in particular, leads with the up-take of mobile money services, the opportunities for international money transfers through mobile money services are still limited. An expansion of mobile money services from domestic to regional and international services has a great development potential, especially since the remittance costs in the region are among the highest in the world.

Free movement

- Regional organizations such as the SADC, the EAC, IGAD, and COMESA have all introduced rules for free movement of nationals between their member states, but the agreements have been poorly implemented or contradicted by the restrictive policies and practices of member states. Generally, the free movement commitments in the region have not enjoyed sufficient national political support to be effectively implemented. More evidence is needed on the potential development benefits of mobility as well as the socio-economic loss if mobility is not intensified. Currently, the potential of intra regional labour mobility remains limited. The limited implementation and monitoring of labour mobility frameworks also exposes African migrant workers to the risk of exploitation, poor and hazardous working conditions and denial of labour rights.
- Measures designed to restrict migration can have negative impacts, since they raise the costs and risks of migration for poor people and lower the benefits by keeping them in informal low-paid job markets. Facilitating legal migration and labour mobility in the region – by implementing the existing free movement arrangements – could benefit both origin and host countries as well as migrant workers themselves. With more opportunities for legal or regular migration, irregular migration is bound to decrease, giving states greater control over migration, decreasing the demand for smugglers and decreasing migrants' vulnerability to exploitative smugglers and traffickers. Increased mobility and free movement could lead to higher remittances, more investments in origin countries and lesser social costs through the ability to return more frequently.
- Visa restrictions, high costs of obtaining travel documents and procedural constraints all act as clear barriers to (labour) mobility in Africa. East Africa has particularly high scores on the visa restrictiveness index for other African nationals. Rwanda, however, which is regarded as having the continent's most liberal migration policy, showed the benefits of lifting immigration restrictions, as it led to large increases in tourism from African countries and trade with neighbouring countries. Other countries in the region could follow this example, by easing visa restrictions and enhancing labour mobility agreements.

Refugee economies

- Instead of assuming a need for indefinite care and assistance to refugees, refugee interventions should go beyond a strictly humanitarian perspective and focus on development, by nurturing the skills, talents, aspirations and capacities of refugees. This could, for example, involve improved opportunities for education, skills development, access to microcredit and financial markets, business incubation, and improved internet access.
- This requires allowing refugees to live outside of camps, freedom of movement and the right to (self)employment and education. However, most countries in the region, except Uganda, host most refugees in camps and limit refugees' right to work and freedom of movement. If given the right to work and freedom of movement, refugees are capable of making a contribution to the national and local economies. Examples from Kenya and Uganda show that Uganda's more liberal stance towards refugees seems to be beneficial to its economy, while Kenya's more restrictive policies could actually hurt the Kenyan economy.
- The potential of the private sector with regard strengthening refugee

livelihoods should be taken into account. Many refugees do engage in petty trading or gain employment in small-and medium-sized businesses, even if not allowed to work. Many refugees are self-employed and can even create jobs and new markets for the host economy.

Kenya

- Increasingly recognizing the potential and important contribution of its diaspora (estimated to be three million) to the development of the country, the Kenyan government launched its Diaspora Policy in January 2015. The main objective is to mainstream the Kenyan diaspora in the development agenda of Kenya.
- Although research finds that most Kenyans in destinations such as the UK, the United States and Canada are actively involved in remittance transfers, return-visits, savings and investments in Kenya, several factors act as obstacles to full participation in the development at home, including corruption, insecurity, fraud, bureaucratic procedures and high remittance costs. The benefits that Kenya derives from its diaspora are just a fraction of the development potential that the diaspora possess.
- Kenya's diaspora policy seems to mainly focus on Kenya's diaspora in the global North, but Kenyan migrants in other African countries can make an important contribution to development in Kenya as well. Especially when taking into account that the bulk of Kenyan migrants does reside in other African countries and recounting the high remittance transfers costs between East African countries, there is considerable untapped potential, which is often overlooked.

Ethiopia

- Compared to many other countries in Africa, migration rates out of Ethiopia are relatively low. However, due to the sheer size of Ethiopia's population (an estimated 94 million), in absolute numbers its diaspora is one of the largest of all African countries.
- Since the mid-1990s a growing number of Ethiopian institutions have tried to promote the collaboration with the Ethiopian diaspora, for example by providing information to the diaspora (on investment possibilities, trade, government affairs; by facilitating temporary and permanent return and reintegration of the Ethiopian diaspora; by granting diaspora Ethiopians nearly the same rights as Ethiopians holding Ethiopian citizenship; by supporting different initiatives to facilitate the transfer of knowledge from diaspora experts institutions in Ethiopia; by setting up regional offices tasked to support diaspora investors; and by attracting remittances and launching corporate diaspora bonds.
- In 2013, the Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs published its official Diaspora Policy – which is generally in line with previous activities - to utilize the economic potential and skills of the Ethiopian diaspora in a more organized and consistent way.

Somalia

- Many Somalis left and are still leaving their country and the country has a large diaspora in neighbouring countries as well in countries like the UK, the US, Canada, Norway, Sweden, the Netherlands, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates and South Africa.
- Support from the Somali diaspora over the past twenty years has helped people in Somaliland, Puntland and South Central Somalia to survive. Many local NGOs receive support from the diaspora in the form of funding or in in-kind support and technical assistance.

- The inflow of financial (and human) capital (including remittances estimated at 1.3 billion annually) has been very significant to private sector development in Somalia. Many private investments receive at least partial funding from diaspora businesspeople.
- While the Somali remittance markets suffers from strict anti-terrorism and money-laundering regulations, the market for mobile money transfers is growing, which will potentially enable many Somalis – for whom the formal financial sector is largely inaccessible - to get access to remittances.
- Governments in Somaliland, Puntland and South Central Somalia do acknowledge the importance of proactively engaging with the diaspora and recognize the potential that diaspora capital holds for the reconstruction and development of the country and have established diaspora department within their ministries.
- NGOs, donors and UN agencies also run projects aimed diaspora engagement in Somalia, including temporary return programmes and projects supporting Somali diaspora organizations to become involved in development work in Somalia.
- Increasingly, Somali diaspora are returning to Somalia, outside of the sphere of assisted temporary return projects, which according to observers marks a new phase of diaspora engagement.

1 Introduction

migration
as a global
phenomenon

1.1 Migration as a global phenomenon

The age of migration

Migration is one of the defining global issues of the early twenty-first century, which has been called the 'Age of Migration'.² According to the World Bank, the stock of international migrants is estimated at 247 million in 2013, the highest number ever and significantly larger than the previous United Nations (UN) estimate of 232 million. The number is expected to surpass 250 million in 2015 and will further increase in the future, with demographic factors, economic disparities and environmental change continuing to be major drivers of migration.³

Box 1: Migration definitions

Migration is referred to as the "process of process of moving, either across an international border, or within a State. It is a population movement, encompassing any kind of movement of people, whatever its length, composition and causes; it includes migration of refugees, displaced persons, uprooted people, and economic migrants."⁴ At the international level, no universally accepted definition of migrant exists. The term migrant is usually understood to cover all cases where the decision to migrate is taken freely by the individual concerned for reasons of "personal convenience" and without intervention of an external compelling factor. This term therefore applies to persons, and family members, moving to another country or region to better their material or social conditions and improve the prospect for themselves or their family.⁵

A refugee is a person who meets the criteria of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) Statute and qualifies for the protection of the United Nations provided by the High Commissioner, regardless of whether or not s/he is in a country that is a party to the Refugee Convention or whether or not s/he has been recognized by the host country as a refugee under either of these instruments. In recent publications, and partly in response to the situation of refugees and migrants trying to enter Europe via the Mediterranean, UNHCR started to use the phrase 'refugees and migrants'⁶ to discuss mixed migration flows.

2 Castles and Miller, 2009.

3 World Bank, 2015c; United Nations, 2013, p. 1; Skeldon, 2013, p. 7. This number might not accurately capture irregular migration, as estimates are based on official statistics. There is a lack of data on the volume of irregular migration flows.

4 IOM, 2004.

5 Ibid.

6 See for example a July 2015 UNHCR publication on the sea route to Europe; UNHCR, 2015g.

The phenomenon of mixed migration⁷ reflects the tendency of an increasing number of people to migrate, despite greater risk, in search of a better future in more affluent parts of the globalised world. It also indicates that people are on the move for a combination of reasons that are fundamentally related to safeguarding physical and economic security. Conceptually, mixed migration includes:⁸

- Irregular migrants: Migrants dislodged by a real and/or perceived inability to thrive (economic migrants) or driven by aspirations, a desire to unite with other family members or some other factor.
- Refugees and asylum seekers (forced migrants): Migrants in search of asylum from conflict or persecution in their country of origin.
- Victims of trafficking (involuntary migrants): Internal and foreign migrants coerced or deceived into servitude, forced labour or sexual exploitation.
- Stateless persons: Migrants without recognised citizenship, placing them in a limbo between different national borders.
- Unaccompanied minors and separated children and other vulnerable persons on the move: Migrant children without protection or assistance, in a state of acute vulnerability.

This report follows UNHCR in using the refugees and migrants terminology, unless one of these categories is specifically referred to.

As of 2015, forced migration due to conflict is at its highest level since World War II, involving 59.5 million people, including 19.5 million refugees, 38.2 million Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and 1.8 million asylum seekers.

As of 2015, forced migration due to conflict is at its highest level since World War II, involving 59.5 million people, including 19.5 million refugees, 38.2 million Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and 1.8 million asylum seekers.⁹

It is not surprising that there are more migrants in the world than ever, as the world's population has increased to 7.349 billion, as of July 2015.¹⁰ The proportion of world's population identified as international migrants by the UN has not changed significantly since 1995, at around 3 per cent.¹¹ Contrary to popular belief, global migration rates have thus remained stable, although the absolute number has increased fast from an estimated 93 million in 1960 to the above mentioned 247 million. Daily news items showing images of people crossing land borders around the world, or the Mediterranean and South Asian seas in boats, however, contribute to a rising political panic about immigration and contribute to the image that migration is rising rapidly and that decisive measures are needed to stem the tide.¹²

7 The International Organisation for Migration (IOM) describes mixed migration as consisting of complex population movements including refugees, asylum seekers, economic migrants and other migrants (IOM, 2004, p. 42). The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) describes it as people travelling in an irregular manner along similar routes, using similar means of travel, but for different reasons (UNHCR, 2011a, p. 8).

8 RMMS, 2013d.

9 UNHCR, 2015d.

10 UNDESA, 2015.

11 Skeldon, 2013, p. 7.

12 De Haas, 2015b.

A balanced perspective on migration

Based on desk research between April and August 2015, this report aims to discuss migration in a balanced and evidence-based way, describing current and future trends and particularly exploring the linkages between migration and development in the Horn of Africa and Yemen region. Previous RMMS reports have often focused on protection risks and negative aspects of mixed migration flows in the region and beyond: human trafficking, kidnapping of vulnerable refugees and migrants, torture, abuse of female refugees and migrants, a shrinking protection space for refugees and migrants dying while crossing the Sahara desert to Libya, the Gulf of Aden to Yemen or the Mediterranean sea to Italy.

While it remains important to continue to describe these events in detail and emphasize human rights, protection and assistance of refugees and migrants in mixed migration flows, there is a positive side to migration that needs to be better understood. Clearly there is a continued and rising perception by those in migrant-sending communities (and asylum seekers themselves) that moving to other countries is a positive option, or at least the best option for them in their circumstances. From the refugee and migrant perspective migration, therefore, has beneficial outcomes that outweigh disadvantages. Apart from offering refuge and security for those fleeing persecution and conflict, migration can be an effective poverty-reduction strategy and has many beneficial effects for countries of origin, destination countries and refugees and migrants themselves.

Migration is driven by many complex factors, many of them subjective, but most migrants want to earn a better living, access better opportunities, to live in a more agreeable environment which include basic services or to join family or friends abroad. Those who willingly choose to migrate are largely driven by the desire for greater happiness, prosperity and well-being and many do succeed in their quest.¹³ Millions are on the move and find that despite struggle their lives and the lives of their families improve while they themselves contribute to the economies, and other sectors, of their destination countries and their origin countries. For example by sending remittances to their families at home or by making investments and starting up businesses in their home countries.

The subject of remittances has been closely analysed in the last decade. Migrants' remittances to developing countries are estimated to have reached USD 436 billion in 2014. All developing regions record positive growth of remittances.¹⁴ According to the UN Special Representative for International Migration, Peter Sutherland, there has been more and more positive recognition of migration, despite growing anti-migrant sentiment (sometimes even xenophobia), including discrimination and intolerance towards refugees and migrants across the globe. Policy makers are increasingly acknowledging the contributions of refugees and migrants and migration. He concluded that this goes some way towards addressing negative perceptions and protecting the human and labour rights of refugees and migrants in host countries.¹⁵

migration as a global phenomenon

Migration is driven by many complex factors, many of them subjective, but most migrants want to earn a better living, access better opportunities, to live in a more agreeable environment which include basic services or to join family or friends abroad.

13 IOM, 2013, p. 23.

14 World Bank, 2015c.

15 IOM, 2014, p. 2.

By acknowledging and describing different aspects of migration and from different perspectives, addressing some of the popular migration myths and highlighting the many ways in which migration could or actually does contribute to development, this report aims to contribute to a more balanced discussion around migration. As in previous reports, the focus will be on the Horn of Africa and Yemen, although it will also use many examples from other regions to put migration phenomena in a more global context.

1.2 African migration

Intraregional migration

While migration is a global phenomenon, the majority of all migration occurs within major areas rather than across major areas. Approximately 41 per cent of all the international migrants lived in developing regions.¹⁶ Most migrants do not go abroad at all, but instead move within their own country, for example in rural-urban migration flows.¹⁷ Migration from developing to developed countries accounts for only a minor fraction of movement. South-south migration from one developing economy to another is much more common.¹⁸ This is also true for Africa. During the period 2010-2013, the Africa-Africa corridor (meaning migration within Africa) overtook Latin America and the Caribbean-Northern America as the third largest international migration corridor in the world.

Migration in Africa

Mixed migration dynamics in Africa are complex. The continent is home to millions of refugees and IDPs in need of humanitarian assistance; an increasingly high percentage of refugees and migrants are women; economic migrants are vulnerable to human trafficking and exploitation; pastoralist communities routinely cross international borders in large numbers across the continent; and rural-urban migration is an increasingly prevalent phenomenon. Due to a lack of legal means, many economic migrants in Africa are involved in irregular migration flows, are being smuggled and might become victims of trafficking in the process.¹⁹

Perspectives on migration and development in Africa

Historically, migration in Africa has been portrayed in academic and development circles in largely negative terms - for example focusing on brain drain, exploitation of migrants and abandonment of families - and identified as one of the problems that development aims to address in Africa. Many academics in the 1980s and 1990s focused on migration as a process draining developing countries in general, and rural areas in particular, of their labour and human capital resources.²⁰ Pessimistic views have long remained among academics and politicians alike, viewing migration as a de-developing, destabilizing and undesirable product of poverty and as

16 United Nations, 2013, p. 3; p. 1.

17 UNDP, 2009, p. v.

18 Ibid.

19 UNECA and IOM, 2013, p. 2.

20 For example: Penninx, 1982; Lewis, 1986; Taylor, 1984; Rubenstein, 1992; cited in De Haas, 2007a, p. 43.

a problem which can and should be solved.²¹ Migration researcher Oliver Bakewell found in 2007 that international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) such as Oxfam International, ActionAid, Save the Children UK, Christian Aid, and Concern Worldwide referred to migration by mentioning, for example: increasing labour demands on those left behind; negative impact on agricultural production; a desperate measure to avoid poverty; the spread of HIV/AIDS; undermining traditional institutions; and undermining health services.²²

However, since early 2000 the potential positive role of migration in the development process has increasingly been given attention – in particular the contribution of migrants through remittances, skills transfers, and the development of transnational networks. More and more, migration has moved to the centre stage of development policy and, as will be discussed in the next chapter, have been included in the post-2015 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). In 2007 University of Oxford researcher, Oliver Bakewell, observed that many development agencies hold on to what he called a sedentary model of development. They aim to enable people to achieve a better quality of life at home, and within such models continued migration is an indicator of failure. Although many of these policies acknowledge that migration can support economic growth, they also assume that such growth would in turn reduce the pressure for migration among the general populace and are backed with an implicit objective to reduce the flows of international migration, especially to the industrialized world. However, as Oliver Bakewell concluded, “for many people in Africa increased opportunities for international migration (within and outside the continent) are an essential ingredient for their future well-being. Migration has always been a strategy used by people to try to improve their quality of life, and a development industry that fails to recognise this will severely limit its impact on poverty reduction.”²³ As will be discussed in this report, although it is increasingly acknowledged development might also lead to increased migration, the belief that development will reduce migration still seems to be strong in some circles. The next chapter describes many of the linkages between migration and development, globally, but with a focus on Africa and the Horn of Africa in particular.

For many people in Africa increased opportunities for international migration (within and outside the continent) are an essential ingredient for their future well-being. Migration has always been a strategy used by people to try to improve their quality of life, and a development industry that fails to recognise this will severely limit its impact on poverty reduction.

21 De Haas, 2007a, p. 47.

22 Bakewell, 2007, p. 18-19.

23 Bakewell, 2007.

1.3 An overview of regional mixed migration trends²⁴

Mixed migration

The Horn of Africa and Yemen region can be characterized by large numbers of refugees and asylum seekers as well as regular and irregular migrants that are on the move within and beyond the region in increasingly complex mixed migration flows, with multiple drivers affecting the reasons for movement.²⁵

Many people in mixed migration flows in and out of the region embark on perilous journeys to reach their destination. Forced by the lack of legal migration opportunities, they circumvent official border controls often with the assistance of smugglers. Refugees and migrants have to travel – on foot or in the back of pickups or lorries - through deserts for days with insufficient food and water supplies. They also undertake dangerous sea crossings, such as the Red Sea or Gulf of Aden travelling to Yemen or the Mediterranean crossing from Libya to Italy's southern islands and Malta, during which many fatal accidents occur. The deaths and abuses surrounding the phenomenon of mixed migration are gaining increasing publicity and causing concern among policy-makers.²⁶

Mixed migration movements from the Horn of Africa

Four primary mixed migration movements originating from the Horn of Africa have been identified: the eastern route (into Yemen to Saudi Arabia and beyond); the southern route (down the Eastern Corridor via Kenya towards Southern Africa); the northern route (Egypt, via Sinai and into Israel) and the western route, through Sudan and Libya and onwards to Europe.²⁷

Forced displacement and refugees in the Horn of Africa

The Horn of Africa is one of the major refugee producing and hosting regions in the world. People in the region are displaced for numerous reasons. Conflict and violence (such as in South Sudan, Somalia and Yemen), persecution, repression and abuse of human rights (Eritrea and reportedly to some extent Ethiopia) are causes that force people to flee. Poor governance, political instability and the failure to protect human rights may often underlie these situations, leading to generalised violence that then puts pressure on people to move away to seek security or minimise

24 All issues referred to in this section are extensively covered in the RMMS monthly summaries (available on www.regionalmms.org) and in the RMMS Mixed Migration Research Series, consisting of 8 reports on: 1: Migrant Smuggling in the Horn of Africa and Yemen; 2: Mixed Migration in Kenya; 3: Responses to Mixed Migration in the Horn of Africa, Yemen and neighbouring countries; 4: Saudi Arabian migration policy and its impact on migration flows in the region; 5: Migration from the Horn of Africa through Sudan and Libya towards Europe; 6: Knowledge, Attitudes and Practices of Ethiopian migrants to and through Yemen. 7: Special risks facing female migrants and 8: Detention of migrants in and from the East and Horn of Africa.

25 RMMS, 2015b.

26 RMMS, 2015a, p. 5.

27 RMMS, 2014c, p. 15-16.

their livelihood vulnerability and exposure to risks. Underlying conditions such as water scarcity, food insecurity, drought (such as the 2011 famine in Somalia), environmental degradation, famine and natural disasters, as well as poverty, and the failure of economic development to secure viable livelihoods constitute increasingly important conditions that produce population displacement. As argued in a recent study on forced migration by Richard Zetter, most often it is a combination of these factors that is causing displacement.²⁸ Within the region, Ethiopia (hosting 704,816 refugees) Kenya (589,994) and Uganda (433,595) are among the top-10 refugee hosting countries (in terms of absolute numbers) in the world, while most of the refugees in the region are from Somalia and South Sudan.²⁹ Moreover, as of late 2014, the Horn of Africa hosted close to 2 million IDPs in Somalia (1,106,800), Ethiopia (397,200), Kenya (309,200) and Eritrea (up to 10,000).³⁰ Moreover, due to the renewed outbreak of conflict in Yemen early 2015, the number of IDPs in Yemen increased quickly from 334,100 late 2014 to 1,267,600, as of July 2015.³¹

Migration flows between Yemen and the Horn of Africa

In early 2015, conflict in Yemen escalated, when Houthi forces and forces loyal to former President Saleh started fighting forces loyal to the government. On 25 March 2015, a Saudi Arabia-led coalition launched airstrikes against the Houthi forces, in a bid to restore the former Yemeni government. The outbreak of this conflict led returnee and refugee flows between the Horn of Africa and Yemen. In the first and second quarter of 2015, fleeing Yemenis, as well as Somali and Ethiopian returnees (and a range of other nationalities including Syrians) were arriving at the ports of Obock (Djibouti), Berbera (Somaliland) and Bossaso (Puntland). As of July 2015, 20,973 people had arrived in Djibouti from Yemen and a further 23,751 had arrived in Somaliland and Puntland.³² In addition, refugees and migrants continued to cross the Red Sea from the Horn of Africa to Yemen, despite the worsening security situation. Since the start of the conflict in March 2015, some 10,500 new arrivals to Yemen have been recorded (37,000 arrived in Yemen by sea since the beginning of 2015, mostly Ethiopians).³³ However, reliable figures are only available up to March 2015. Since the outbreak of the conflict, the majority of monitoring exercises have been suspended. Reportedly, many of the refugees and migrants setting off towards Yemen were unaware of the scale of the conflict and deteriorating security situation. Some were aware of the conflict, but said that they had been convinced to travel by the smugglers who told them that the conflict had ended.³⁴ Many others are aware of the risks but if they compare it to their dire economic situation at home, they are willing to take the risk in order to get a job in Saudi Arabia.³⁵

Refugees and migrants travelling to and through Yemen face a range of risks and abuses including: exposure to the elements, physical violence, sexual assault, abduction and torture, mental abuse and discrimination, economic deprivation, detention by the authorities, extortion, trafficking and enslavement, dehydration, starvation and loss of life.

28 Zetter, 2014, p. 21-22.

29 UNHCR, 2015e; UNHCR, 2015c; UNHCR, 2015b. Figures as of mid-2015.

30 IDMC, 2015a

31 Ibid; IDMC, 2015b.

32 RMMS, 2015f.

33 UNHCR, 2015h.

34 RMMS, 2015d.

35 Wood, 2015.

Abuse of migrants travelling through Yemen to the Gulf States

Between 2006 and mid-2015 as many as 641,000 refugees and migrants (approximately 75 per cent Ethiopians) from the Horn of Africa crossed the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden from the Horn of Africa to Yemen.³⁶ Refugees and migrants travelling to and through Yemen face a range of risks and abuses including: exposure to the elements, physical violence, sexual assault, abduction and torture, mental abuse and discrimination, economic deprivation, detention by the authorities, extortion, trafficking and enslavement, dehydration, starvation and loss of life.³⁷ In a 2014 report, Human Rights Watch described how Yemeni traffickers in and around the northern town of Haradh would take refugees and migrants captive and transport them to isolated compounds, where they would inflict severe pain and suffering to extort money from the migrants' relatives and friends in Ethiopia and Saudi Arabia. This practice allegedly began as far back as 2006. Migrants who survived or escaped, referred to these places as 'torture camps'. It is reported that Yemeni officials of various ranks and positions take bribes to turn a blind eye, or even play a more active role in the operations.³⁸ At the beginning of 2015 over 65 per cent of the people arriving in Yemen having crossed the Red Sea were reporting to NGO patrol teams that they were immediately captured by armed criminals and held for ransom on arrival. Often female refugees and migrants are separated from males and many disappear, presumed trafficked.³⁹

Despite some improvements in Saudi labour law and proposals to reform system over the years, many (Ethiopian) domestic workers still endure forced confinement, food deprivation, and psychological, physical, and sexual abuse in Saudi Arabia. Based on the reports from different organizations, individuals, and migrants (returnees) themselves, a Saudi crackdown on irregular migrants during 2013-2014 (when over 160,000 Ethiopians were deported back to Addis Ababa) appears to have been accompanied by severe human rights abuses, including arbitrary detention, theft of migrants' belongings, beatings, and killings.⁴⁰

A closed route to Israel and trafficking of Eritreans in the Sinai Peninsula

Until recently, Israel was a major country of destination for Eritrean refugees and migrants. It is estimated that between 2006 and 2012 close to 40,000 Eritreans arrived in Israel, passing through Egypt's Sinai Peninsula. Stringent Israeli immigration measures put in place in 2012 and finalised in 2013 have reduced this number to almost zero.⁴¹ Many refugees and migrants who travelled this route were vulnerable to being kidnapped by traffickers and sold on to other traffickers and criminals and held hostage for ransom in Sudan, Northern Ethiopia and in particular in Egypt's Sinai desert. These kidnappings were mainly organized by a Bedouin tribe known as the Rashaida. Hostage takers demanded exorbitant ransoms from the victim's family for their release - as much as USD 30-50,000 per individual - and used extreme brutality to

36 UNHCR, 2014c; RMMS, 2014e; UNHCR, 2015h.

37 RMMS, 2014d, p. 10.

38 Human Rights Watch, 2014a, p. 5.

39 RMMS, 2014d.

40 Human Rights Watch, 2015; RMMS, 2014b, p. 9-10.

41 RMMS, 2014c, p. 22.

obtain payments.⁴² Since Israel closed its borders, it is no longer the preferred destination for most migrating Eritreans. Nevertheless, kidnappings and hostage-taking in the Sinai has continued since 2013 but to a lesser degree Eritreans have continued to be kidnapped in East Sudan (including from Shagarab refugee camp) in order to be transported to the Sinai sold to Sinai traffickers. A 2013 Tilburg University study on Sinai trafficking conservatively estimated that between 25,000 and 30,000 people were victims of Sinai trafficking between 2009–2013 and estimated that between 5,000 and 10,000 people have died in the context of the Sinai trafficking.⁴³

On a more positive note, in 2014 a reduction of abduction was reported from eastern Sudan by UNHCR following its anti-trafficking work with the Government of Sudan there, and also from the Sinai. The Egyptian military operations in the Sinai in the last two years has done much to disrupt and restrict the trafficking groups that were active.⁴⁴

Detention of migrants

The use of immigration detention is widespread in the main destination and transit countries affecting migrants in and from East Africa and Horn of Africa countries. Instead of being a measure of last resort, detention of migrants is a routine practice in countries like Djibouti, Israel, Kenya, Saudi Arabia, Tanzania and Yemen. In 2013 and 2014 several countries, such as Kenya, Saudi Arabia and Tanzania carried out mass operations during which thousands of migrants were detained.⁴⁵

The Southern route and xenophobic violence in South Africa affecting Horn of Africa migrants

Mixed migration flows towards the Southern African region to a large extent originate from the Horn of Africa, particularly Ethiopia and Somalia. In 2009, it was estimated that every year between 17,000 and 20,000 refugees and migrants from these two countries travel through the Great Lakes and Southern African regions to reach South Africa.⁴⁶ There are no recent estimates although information obtained by RMMS suggests that numbers may have increased after 2009 but are now declining after repeated anti-migrant violence. The country is a magnet for refugees and migrants from all over Africa and estimates of immigrant numbers vary from 2 million to 5 million – the majority from neighbouring countries, mainly Zimbabwe and Mozambique. There have been frequent eruptions of xenophobic violence in South Africa (some have called it ‘Afrophobic’ as the target of this violence are always fellow Africans). South Africa is one of the most unequal societies in the world and has an estimated unemployment rate of one in three. In 2008, in a wave of xenophobic violence, 62 people, including 21 South Africans, were killed and more than 150,000 displaced. More recently in April 2015, the Zulu king, Goodwill Zwelithini, reportedly incited followers to take action by calling for foreigners to pack their bags

Between 5,000 and 10,000 people have died in the context of the Sinai trafficking.

In 2008, in a wave of xenophobic violence, 62 people, including 21 South Africans, were killed and more than 150,000 displaced.

42 Reisen et al., 2012; van Reisen et al., 2013; Humphris, 2013; Jacobsen et al., 2013; RMMS, 2014c, p. 69.

43 van Reisen et al., 2013;

44 RMMS, 2015b.

45 RMMS, 2015c, p. 11. A full account of detention of migrants in and from the East and Horn of Africa is available in the RMMS (2015) report ‘Behind Bars’.

46 Horwood, 2009.

and leave.⁴⁷ One of the worst outbreaks of xenophobic violence in recent years followed. It started in Durban but soon spread to other urban areas leaving at least five people dead, hundreds forced to flee their homes and shops run by foreigners looted and burnt down.⁴⁸

Shrinking protection space for migrants and refugees in Kenya

In response to security/terrorism threats, a common reflex in Kenya has been to tighten migration and refugee policies.⁴⁹ Kenya regularly carried out mass operations arresting and detaining refugees and migrants, often shortly after a deterioration of the country's security situation. In the summer of 2012, Kenyan authorities announced the '*Fagia Wageni*' ('Do away with/ get rid of the foreigners') operation, intended to round up irregular migrants in the country and subsequently carried out two raids in the (primarily Somali) Eastleigh neighbourhood of Nairobi. Following a series of grenade attacks, the Kenyan police launched a massive police operation in November 2012, detaining and targeting irregular migrants and issued a directive requiring all refugees living in urban areas (approximately 50,000 by that time) to return to refugee camps.⁵⁰ The High Court decided that the order was unconstitutional and in violation of numerous rights of refugees and overturned the directive in July 2013.⁵¹ At the end of March 2014, the Interior Ministry launched yet another security operation dubbed '*Usalama Watch*' ('Security Watch', again aimed at addressing rising terror attacks in Kenya. During this operation more than 4,000 individuals were arrested and detained, the majority of them Somali refugees and asylum seekers. An estimated 2,200 refugees were sent to Dadaab and Kakuma refugee camps, while 359 Somalis were deported to Mogadishu, Somalia by April 2014.⁵²

Later in 2014, the Kenya parliament passed a new *Security Laws (Amendment)* Act, which included intentions to limit the number of refugees and asylum seekers in the country to 150,000, and again enforced an encampment policy, limiting refugees to the country's two remote camps in Dadaab and Kakuma.⁵³ These plans were partly overruled by Kenya's High court, which in February 2015 annulled eight clauses, including the one which capped the number of refugees and asylum-seekers to 150,000.⁵⁴ Finally, shortly after the terrorist attack in April 2015 on Garissa University where Al-Shabaab gunmen killed 147 students, the Kenyan government threatened to close Dadaab refugee camp (which hosts around 350,000 Somali refugees), saying the camp is a national security threat, used by the Somali extremist group Al-Shabaab to plan attacks.⁵⁵

The Mediterranean boat crisis

Increasing numbers of refugees and migrants are engaging smugglers in Egypt and Libya to take them across the Mediterranean to reach Europe.

47 Smith, 2015.

48 The Guardian, 2015a.

49 RMMS, 2015a, p. 2-3.

50 RMMS, 2013b, p. 7; p. 41-42.

51 RMMS, 2013d, p. 56.

52 RMMS, 2015c, p. 61-62.

53 Gidron, 2015.

54 BBC, 2015a.

55 Washington Post, 2015.

This includes Horn of Africa refugees and migrants, particularly Somalis and Eritreans. Although it has been suggested that there might be Ethiopians as well among the refugees and migrants claiming to be Eritrean, as generally speaking Eritreans are granted asylum in most European Union (EU) countries while Ethiopians are more likely to be regarded as economic migrants.⁵⁶ For Horn of Africa refugees and migrants the journey to Europe includes dangerous overland travel through Eritrea, Ethiopia, Sudan and the Sahara desert before they reach the Libyan coast, a journey which some refugees and migrants do not survive.⁵⁷ For the crossing to Italy people smugglers charge between USD 800 for Sub-Saharan Africans and up to USD 2,500 for a safer passage for Syrians.⁵⁸ 2014 was seen as an extraordinary year in terms of the increase in numbers of refugees and migrants trying to cross the Mediterranean into Europe (219,000) and in terms of fatalities, with an estimated 3,500 deaths in 2014. However, figures will end up to be higher in 2015.⁵⁹ Between January and September 2015 over 500,000 refugees and migrants made the crossing with over 3,000 persons estimated to have died or gone missing.⁶⁰ Lawlessness and a long and generally unpatrolled Mediterranean coastline have made life easy for people smugglers. On Sunday 19 April 2015 in a single event as many as 800 people lost their lives off the Libyan coast. The recent surge of migration has overwhelmed authorities in Europe, which struggles to articulate a single coherent policy in response.⁶¹ Although Eritreans and Somalis are among the top nationalities of those arriving in Europe, most are from Syria (over 30 per cent), while other refugees and migrants are from the Balkans, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Nigeria and a range of other West-African countries like Senegal, Gambia and Mali. After the fatal boat accident in April 2015, the European Union has been criticized for failing to take decisive action. Shortly after the accident the EU held two crisis meetings and on 13 May 2015 adopted the European Agenda on Migration 2015.⁶² In acknowledging the current crisis in the Mediterranean and a need to act, the Agenda stipulates 5 immediate responses:

- A strengthened presence at sea aimed at preventing further migrant deaths.
- Targeting the criminal smuggling networks facilitating smuggling in the Mediterranean Sea and identification, capture and destruction of boats used by smugglers.
- Relocating asylum seekers to member states to ease the burden on frontline receiving countries like Italy, Greece and Spain, through a quota system.
- An EU wide refugee resettlement scheme which will offer a safer alternative for refugees seeking protection in Europe to the smugglers.
- Operational and financial assistance to frontline states such as Italy, Greece and Spain.⁶³

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Between July and September the headlines and media news services were almost completely dominated by unprecedented coverage and policy debate concerning the ever increasing numbers of migrants and refugees entering Europe.

56 RMMS, 2014, p. 28.

57 RMMS' (2014) report 'Going West' describes the whole migration route from the Horn of Africa through Sudan and Libya to Europe in full detail.

58 Altai Consulting, 2015; Kingsley, 2015a.

59 RMMS, 2015e.

60 Based on UNHCR and IOM statistics in October 2015.

61 Rice-Oxley and Walker, 2015.

62 RMMS, 2015e.

63 European Commission, 2015a.

During the European summer of 2015 the irregular migrant and refugee movement into Europe escalated in number rapidly with people entering Europe along western, eastern, and central European sea routes and eastern land routes. Between July and September the headlines and media news services were almost completely dominated by unprecedented coverage and policy debate concerning the ever increasing numbers of migrants and refugees entering Europe. The details and impact of this particular migrant or refugee 'crisis' are outside the scope of this report but they are noted here as evidence of the rising importance of migration and asylum issues in global and regional and inter-regional politics.

1.4 Concluding remarks

In global and regional politics, media reports and agency publications the dominant narrative normally focuses on the negative, crisis-causing aspects of migration, including the harsh human rights violations, fatalities, and the lack of protection of refugees and migrants. Migration has become an increasingly contentious issue. In the global North migration issues are defining national and regional politics more than ever – in some constituencies issues of migration have become the central political concern. Fears and myths around migration also often obscure the facts and more level-headed policy positions that need to be taken. The issues are complex and touch on powerful underlying issues relating to human rights, international economics, labour demands, security issues, governance and a globalised but unequal world.⁶⁴

A balanced assessment of migration needs to examine all sides and go beyond the prevailing, sometimes narrowly framed, narrative. In fact, human mobility benefits migrants, their families, countries of origin and countries of destination. Migrants (and, when allowed to work, refugees) could often fill critical gaps in labour markets, send billions of remittances to their countries of origin, pay taxes, stimulate trade and transfer technologies, skills and ideas.⁶⁵ As UNDP noted in its 2009 Human Development Report – dedicated to mobility - the majority of migrants, instead of being victims or unproductive and dependent on others, tend to be successful, both before they migrate and on arrival in destination countries. Outcomes in all aspects of human development, not only income, but also education and health, are for the most part positive, with people from the poorest places gaining the most. ⁶⁶ Over-emphasis on the rising levels of abuse might obscure these facts. However, the human rights of refugees and migrants are not only important from a humanitarian perspective, but from a development perspective as well, as human rights and development are linked. Without the protection of human rights, the human development potential of migration will be hampered.⁶⁷ As recently argued by Peter Sutherland, many of the financial gains of migration, rather than accruing to individuals or communities, go to the global criminal mafias, human traffickers and smugglers, recruiters and money-transfer operators, and exploitative employers. Billions of dollars are made from the illicit migration economy,

64 RMMS, 2015a, p. 11.

65 Sutherland, 2013, p. 152.

66 UNDP, 2009, p. v.

67 ACP/IOM, 2014, p. 127.

while trampling the basic human rights of refugees and migrants.⁶⁸

According to Peter Sutherland, more and more states are deepening their cooperation to solve migration-related challenges and countries have increasingly been mainstreaming migration into national development strategies, but, there is a still a long way still to go.⁶⁹ Migration is claimed to be a phenomenon inherent to human activity and it will continue. In fact, most commentators predict that current volumes of migration look set to increase, especially migration from developing countries.⁷⁰ If well-managed, migration can have a positive impact on the welfare of migrants and on the development of host and sending societies, as well as reduce some of the risks of migration.⁷¹

concluding remarks

If well-managed, migration can have a positive impact on the welfare of migrants and on the development of host and sending societies, as well as reduce some of the risks of migration.

68 Sutherland, 2013, p. 153.

69 Ibid.

70 Skeldon, 2013, p. 7; Clemens, 2014; World Bank, 2014a.

71 Katseli, Lucas and Xenogiani, 2006, p. 5; DFID, 2007, p.2; Mayer, Pascouau and Islam, 2015, p. 1.

2 The global debate: perceptions, myths and the future of migration

2.1 Migration and Development

The relationship between migration and development

Migration can be a cause and consequence of development. Correspondingly, development can be a cause and a consequence of migration.⁷² Moreover, particular aspects of migration can cause diverse and sometimes contradictory impacts, even within the same country.⁷³ For example, out-migration of people with certain skills can lead to skills shortages in one place, but lower unemployment rates in another area; or to positive spill-over effects on local economies through increased remittance inflow in one place, but also to increased local inequality, as some households receive remittances while others do not. Generally, it is not the poorest people who migrate - which might further increase local inequality in origin countries, as households with the means to pay for the migration of one of the members receive remittances - which also explains that wealthier countries have higher levels of out-migration than the least developed countries. Increasing development is thus to be associated with increased migration. In short, the relation between migration and development is not a linear or causal one. Instead, development and migration are intertwined in a set of complex, heterogeneous, and changing relationships.⁷⁴

Generally, it is not the poorest people who migrate.

Misconceptions and lack of knowledge

Despite the increasing importance of and optimism around the migration-and-development nexus in international debates many misconceptions still persist and the concrete impacts of one on the other are still not well known. This is especially true when it comes to South-South and intraregional migration between developing countries, which, according to the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) Observatory on Migration, have hardly been studied at all.⁷⁵ As will be discussed in this report, in policy and government circles of many countries, particularly destination countries, the 'root causes approach' still persists, entrenched in the belief that migration can be stemmed through development and poverty alleviation. For some countries, this remains a key motivation for engaging in the migration and development debate, which is highlighted by the focus given to return, reintegration and circular migration in migration and development policies of some European countries.⁷⁶

72 Bakewell, 2011, p. 136.

73 Siddiqui, 2012, p. 7.

74 Bakewell, 2011, p. 148.

75 ACP/IOM, 2013, p. 27.

76 ICMPD/ECDPM, 2013.

Since the early 2000s, the potential for remittances to contribute to national development priorities, including the reduction of poverty, increasingly has become a priority for policy-makers across the African continent.

Notwithstanding increasing enthusiasm about the potential contribution of migration to development in international circles, African governments for quite some time had a relatively negative attitude towards migration. In 2003, the Sussex Centre for Migration Research conducted a review of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) prepared by 48 states in Africa and found that 27 made reference to migration in negative or pejorative terms. Most countries did not mention international migration or remittances, but focused on negative aspects of internal migration, such as: urban unemployment, the breakdown of the extended family and its traditional systems of social protection, natural resource degradation, pressure on urban areas and promoting the spread of crime and diseases such as HIV/AIDS.⁷⁷ Only six had anything positive to say about migration: Cape Verde, Ethiopia, Mali, Niger, Rwanda and Senegal.⁷⁸ Since the early 2000s, however, the potential for remittances to contribute to national development priorities, including the reduction of poverty, increasingly has become a priority for policy-makers across the African continent.⁷⁹

Contribution of migration to development

There is now widespread consensus that migration – both South-North and South-South migration – has the potential to contribute to development and can be beneficial for migrants and their families, origin countries and destination countries alike. A Sussex University review paper on migration and development concluded that international migration reduces poverty at the family level and that the majority of male and female migrants – whether internal, cross-border/regional or international migrant workers – benefit economically from their movements. International migration positively contributes to human capital formation, migrant remittances create multiplier effects in rural economies and can thus contribute to economic development and education and healthcare receive high priority in the spending of remittances.⁸⁰

Contribution of migration to development in South-South migration

Although relatively under-researched, available studies also show generally positive effects of South–South migration on income. For many in the South, migration is an important livelihood strategy.⁸¹ It helps to diversify income sources and risks faced by households and is a way to ensure better education for the next generation. The development potential of diasporas in the South is high, as migrants return home more frequently than when they would reside in the North, bring experience and skills home when they return, invest in their countries of origin and form (trade) networks.⁸² In short, international migration has tremendous potential to improve development and welfare in origin countries. According to the World Bank and the African Development Bank, African governments could, however, play a far more significant role in securing the potential benefits of migration, for example, by strengthening ties to diasporas, improving competition in remittance markets and providing information and protection for migrant

77 Black, 2004, p. 13.

78 Bakewell, 2007, p. 18.

79 Black, 2004, p. 16; Bakewell, 2007, p. 1.

80 Siddiqui, 2012, p. 5-6.

81 ACP/IOM, 2013, p. 27; p. 31.

82 Ibid, p. 11-12.

workers abroad. However, limited fiscal and technical resources in African origin countries often constrain the effectiveness of such policies and reduce the gains from migration while exposing migrants to severe risks.⁸³ Supported by the EU, the African Institute for Remittances (AIR) is being established in Nairobi in 2015. The AIR aims to significantly reduce the costs of remittances in the EU-Africa corridors and to develop the capacity of the Member States of the African Union (AU), remittance senders and recipients to implement strategies and instruments to use remittances as tools for poverty reduction.⁸⁴

Box 2: Two examples from Sub-Saharan Africa

A 2014 publication – ‘International Migration and Development in Eastern and Southern Africa’, edited by Assefaw Bariagaber - discussed (among other issues) the migration of Ugandans to South Sudan and the Arab Gulf States and of Ethiopians to South Africa, the Middle East and ‘the West’.⁸⁵ In the chapter on migration of Ugandans, the author found that remittances sent by Ugandans who migrated to South Sudan and the Arab Gulf States have benefitted the migrants in terms of investment; their household, in terms of consumption and investment; and the national economy in terms of alleviating unemployment and foreign currency accumulation. The findings also indicated that there was no brain drain because most of the migrants to both destinations were relatively uneducated. However, it was also found that migrant abuses have been rampant in both South Sudan and the Gulf States, which confirmed findings in other studies that intra-African migration is often accompanied by human rights violations. Finally, the Ugandan Government has been relatively more engaged with those who migrated to the Arab Gulf States but not with those who migrated to South Sudan, which might point to a tendency in which migration closer to home (e.g. to neighbouring countries) is often overlooked, while the focus is mostly on intercontinental migration.⁸⁶

Chapter 4 of the same publication, discussed international migration of Ethiopians and also presented positive and negative findings. On the positive side, remittances sent home have been used wisely for investment and household consumption in Ethiopia and return migrants have acquired many skills. On the negative side, the findings indicate that Ethiopians have suffered abuses in the Middle East and South Africa. The author called upon the Ethiopian Government to come up with a comprehensive migration policy to promote the protection of its migrant citizens and to combat human smuggling and trafficking.⁸⁷

The findings of these two chapters are very similar. Clearly, there are many positive outcomes of migration, while at the same time

83 The World Bank and African Development Bank, 2011, p. 11.

84 Africa-EU partnership on MME, 2014.

85 Bariagaber, 2014.

86 Twesigye, 2014.

87 Addis, 2014.

many migrants originating from Sub-Saharan African countries suffer abuse and human rights violations in their destination countries. A balanced perspective on migration should take into account both, ensuring to enable the development potential of migration, while protecting and upholding the human rights of migrants.

2.2 The global debate on migration and development

The increasing importance of the migration and development nexus

In the last decade, migration and development has become a topic of significant importance across the world. In 2006, the UN emphasised this growing importance by appointing a Special Representative to the Secretary-General on International Migration and Development, by the formation of the Global Migration Group (GMG)⁸⁸ of multilateral agencies involved in migration-related activities and the organization of the first UN High Level Dialogue (HLD) on International Migration and Development.⁸⁹

Central to this increasing interest in migration and development was the understanding that migration from the developing to the developed world could play an important role in the development of the poorer countries of origin. This represented a departure from previous development thinking and practice which was either indifferent -with migration and development considered as distinct, separate areas of concern – or negative – with migration seen as a symptom of development failure.⁹⁰

Since the first High Level Dialogue in 2006, there has been increasing debate on how to best harness the benefits of migration for development.⁹¹ In 2009, UNDP dedicated its World Development Report to human mobility and proposed six reforms: opening up existing entry channels so that more workers can emigrate; ensuring basic rights for migrants; lowering the transaction costs of migration; finding solutions that benefit both destination communities and the migrants they receive; making it easier for people to move within their own countries; and mainstreaming migration into national development strategies.⁹²

Migration and development in Europe's policy⁹³

Migration and development also features prominently in the EU engagement with migration:

88 The GMG is currently chaired by the World Bank. The 18 members are: ILO, IOM, UNHCR, World Bank, WHO, UNCTAD, UNDP, UN DESA, UNICEF, UNESCO, UNFPA, UNITAR, UNODC, UN Regional Commissions, UN Women, FAO, UN OHCHR and UNU.

89 Bakewell, 2007, p. 18.

90 Skeldon, 2008 and Bakewell, 2008, quoted in: ICMPD/ECDP, 2013, p. 21.

91 IOM, 2013, p. 23.

92 UNDP, 2009, p. v.

93 Throughout the report, frequent reference is made to Europe when using examples outside of the East and Horn of Africa region, as it is the most relevant destination for refugees and migrants from the Horn of Africa who migrate beyond the region.

Since the first High Level Dialogue in 2006, there has been increasing debate on how to best harness the benefits of migration for development.

- Maximizing the development impact of migration and mobility is one of the (equally important) objectives in the EUs overarching framework on external migration.⁹⁴
- Addressing migration and development is part of the core objectives of the Africa-EU strategic partnership.⁹⁵
- The Africa-EU Migration, Mobility and Employment (MME) Partnership was established at the Africa-EU Summit in Lisbon in 2007 and aims to ensure sustainable development through better management of and joint cooperation on migration, mobility and employment issues. After the implementation of the first two action plans (2007-2010 and 2011-2013), currently the third action plan for the period 2014-2017 is being implemented.⁹⁶
- On 13 May 2015 the EU published its new European Agenda on Migration. Part of the fourth pillar of the agenda – a new policy on legal migration – is ‘maximising the development benefits for countries of origin’. The EU aims to support the development of countries of origin and argued for the inclusion of migration-related targets in the new post-2015 Sustainable Development Goals (see below).⁹⁷

Box 3: Two examples of a Regional Consultative Process (RCP) on migration

The Rabat Process

Since 2006 the Rabat Process (which is part of the Africa-EU partnership) has brought together nearly 60 origin, transit and destination countries in Europe and North, West and Central Africa, as well as the European Commission (EC) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Apart from the European and African states, the African Development Bank, FAO, Frontex, ICMPD, ILO, IOM, UNDP, UNICEF, UNHCR, UNODC and the World Bank participate as observers in the Rabat Process. One of its three fundamental pillars is ‘strengthening synergies between migration and development’, which includes: the adoption of an inclusive approach to matters of migration and development; the improvement the mobilisation of migrant remittances to the benefit of their country of origin, and; the realisation of the potential for migrant to engage with countries of origin.⁹⁸ In order to support Rabat Process partner countries in pursuing concrete actions, the European Commission is financing the Rabat Process Support Project. Since 2006, four ministerial conferences have taken place, the last one in Rome in 2014, during which the Rome Declaration and Programme was adopted, which is the strategic framework for 2014-2017. The Rome Programme introduced international protection as the fourth pillar structuring the dialogue. With regard to migration and development, the Rome Programme particularly emphasized the identification of root causes of migration and the role of the diaspora.⁹⁹

94 European Commission, 2011.

95 AU/EU, 2007.

96 Africa-EU Partnership on Migration, Mobility and Employment, 2014.

97 European Commission, 2015a, p. 16-17.

98 Rabat Process, 2006.

99 www.icmdp.org

The Khartoum Process

In November 2014, the EU-Horn of Africa Migration Route Initiative (the Khartoum Process) was launched at a Ministerial Conference in Rome. The Khartoum Process is led by a Steering Committee comprised of five EU Member States (Italy, France, Germany, UK, Malta), five partner countries (Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, South Sudan, Sudan) as well as the European Commission, the European External Action Service and the AU Commission. The objective of the Khartoum Process is to establish a long-standing dialogue on migration and mobility aimed at enhancing the current cooperation, including through the identification and implementation of concrete projects. In the first phase, activities will concentrate on addressing trafficking in human beings as well as smuggling of migrants. Despite the strong focus on tackling the challenges posed by the mixed migratory flows of irregular migrants, between the Horn of Africa and Europe, one of the thematic priorities is also to maximize the development impact of migration and mobility through concrete initiatives. Stakeholders in the Khartoum Process expressed political commitment to expand the Khartoum Process into a sustainable regional dialogue on migration and mobility which will address the root causes of irregular migration and mixed migration flows in a comprehensive and balanced way, including through efforts aimed at eradicating poverty and realizing Millennium Development Goals. The Khartoum Process will be directly supported under the "Support to Africa-EU Migration and Mobility Dialogue" programme.¹⁰⁰

Migration in the post-2015 development agenda

According to IOM, migration still remains inadequately integrated into development frameworks at national and local levels, and there is limited public understanding and appreciation of the contribution that migrants make to the development of their countries of origin and destination.¹⁰¹ Nevertheless, migration and development remains high on the agenda. In 2013, the UN organized a second UN Global High-level Dialogue on Migration and Development.¹⁰² Migration has also been included in the August 2015 finalized text for adoption of the post-2015 UN Development Agenda.¹⁰³

The previous Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) mentioned migration in terms of highlighting abuse of migrants' rights and the potential for migration to spread epidemic disease. It did not mention positive aspects such as the power and prevalence of remittances. With regard to internal migration, the MDGs claimed that rural-urban migration tends to increase poverty (while for many of the world's poor, domestic migration can be the route out of poverty). Due to the current political sensitivities surrounding migration, some observers feared that the new framers of targets might again choose to ignore migration in the new agenda, the Sustainable

100 EU-Horn of Africa Migration Route Initiative, 2014; www.europa.eu.

101 IOM, 2013, p. 23.

102 Zetter, 2014, p. 20.

103 United Nations, 2015.

Development Goals (SDGs).¹⁰⁴ Just two years ago migration was omitted from the goals and targets suggested in the Secretary-General's High-Level Panel of Eminent Persons on the Post-2015 Development Agenda report in 2013.¹⁰⁵

Early June 2013, a task force appointed by Secretary General Ban Ki-moon to deliberate on the next generation of the MDGs formally recognized migration as an important factor in development.¹⁰⁶ The finalized text adopted for the SDGs, includes the agenda that:

- The positive contribution of migrants for inclusive growth and sustainable development is recognized. It is also recognized that international migration is a multi-dimensional reality of major relevance for the development of countries of origin, transit and destination, which requires coherent and comprehensive responses. It announces cooperation internationally to ensure safe, orderly and regular migration involving full respect for human rights and the humane treatment of migrants regardless of migration status, of refugees and of displaced persons. Such cooperation should also strengthen the resilience of communities hosting refugees, particularly in developing countries.
- SDG 10 (Reduce inequality within and among countries) includes two migration-related targets:
 - Facilitate orderly, safe, regular and responsible migration and mobility of people, including through the implementation of planned and well-managed migration policies.
 - By 2030, reduce to less than 3 per cent the transaction costs of migrant remittances and eliminate remittance corridors with costs higher than 5 per cent.¹⁰⁷

Heads of State and Government and High Representatives met between 25-27 September 2015 at the United Nations headquarters in New York and adopted the SDGs.

The then draft SDGs were already eliciting criticism with regards to migration. The Centre for Global Development argues that the text is not sufficiently specific. According to the Centre of Global Development, it should be more specific, for example, by including a concrete commitment by industrialized economies to admit more migrants from low- and lower-middle-income countries and specific proposals on the portability of skills and bilateral labour exchange schemes, which could deliver triple wins for migrants, sending and recipient countries.¹⁰⁸

Conclusion: an ongoing debate

In 2002, the phrase 'migration and development nexus' began to gain traction among certain academics. Since then, there has been a vibrant migration and development 'industry', with numerous books, articles, papers and new initiatives and programmes, being developed on the topic. However, what is striking, according to migration researcher Oliver Bakewell, is the limited number of specific projects and initiatives which

104 Clemens, 2014b.

105 IOM, 2014, p. 3-4.

106 Sutherland, 2013, p. 151-152.

107 United Nations, 2015.

108 Pritchett and Kenny, 2015.

can be really be branded as migration and development. For example, he quoted research which struggled to find many different concrete projects and initiatives on migration and development, even from the UK and Dutch governments, which have adopted high profile positions with regard to both issues.¹⁰⁹

The lack of specific initiatives that could concretely be branded as migration and development might be related to the complex relationship between migration and development and the many contested issues.

The lack of specific initiatives that could concretely be branded as migration and development might be related to the complex relationship between migration and development and the many contested issues. According to some observers, the current 'migration and development buzz' reflects the thinking of 'migration optimists' who tend to see the relationship in a positive light – with migrant remittances reducing poverty, diaspora members offering an important sources of human capital and so forth. Within the global community, the migration-development term seems to refer to the positive effects of migration on development. At the other end of the spectrum are the 'migration pessimists' who claim that migration drains away the most economically active and innovative part of the population and their remittances tend to be used for consumption rather than investment and serve to increase inequality.¹¹⁰ Moreover, in development policy circles simplistic connections are sometimes made between migration and development. Particularly the idea that development is a way to reduce migration still seems to hold. The EU, in its new Agenda on Migration, for example states that it "aims to support the development of countries of origin and argues that migration-related targets should be included in the new Sustainable Development Goals, alongside targets in areas such as promoting decent work, youth employment, wage and social protection policies which can help countries of origin to create better economic opportunities at home".¹¹¹ Implicitly, the assumption seems to be that better economic opportunities might lead to less migration, while it can be argued better economic opportunities at home might initially lead to more migration.

Migration should be neither seen as only good or only bad for development, but as an integral part of the process.

The outcome of migration appears to be context-specific. Both migrant optimists and pessimists can point to case studies to support their arguments. Where the political, economic and social conditions are not conducive to development a more pessimistic analysis is likely to hold. Moreover, one has to differentiate between the impact of migration on the development of the nation (likely to be limited) and that of the household, where it may play a very important role in enhancing their well-being.¹¹² In short, migration should be neither seen as only good or only bad for development, but as an integral part of the process.

Despite misconceptions and contested issues, it is increasingly being acknowledged that migration cannot be separated from development. In a 2013 Communication on 'Maximising the Development Impact of Migration' the European Commission announced it "will ensure that future EU action on migration and development becomes truly comprehensive, addressing the full range of positive and negative impacts of the various forms that migration can have on sustainable economic, social and environmental development in low- and middle-income countries of origin

109 Bakewell, 2012, p. 1; p. 4-5.

110 Ibid, p. 2-3.

111 European Commission, 2015a, p. 16-17.

112 Bakewell, 2012, p. 2-3.

and destination". The EC concludes that "this requires a shift in focus, to place development concerns at the heart of action".¹¹³

To conclude, more than a decade after introduction of the migration and development nexus and almost ten years after the first High Level Dialogue on Migration and Development, the global debate is far from over and some observers argue there is now a need to seriously rethink the relationship between development and migration.¹¹⁴ Migration expert Ronald Skeldon reasoned that the future debate on migration and development might better be framed as 'development and migration' to give precedence to the broader shifts in economy and society that are likely to affect migration.¹¹⁵

2.3 Public perception, negative rhetoric and politics

Negative rhetoric and the power of language

Despite evidence pointing to positive effects of migration, public perception seems less convinced and anti-migration sentiment is high in many countries. The May 2015 Standard Eurobarometer, showed that European citizens now see immigration as the major challenge facing the EU. With 38 per cent it is way ahead of the economic situation (27 per cent), unemployment (24 per cent), the Member States public finances (23 per cent) and terrorism (17 per cent). It is the number one most frequently cited concern in 20 Member States reaching peaks in Malta (65 per cent) and Germany (55 per cent). Most Europeans (51 per cent) are positive about migration of people from other EU Member States, but 56 per cent are negative about immigration of people from outside the EU.¹¹⁶

Partly this is caused by and/or related to the negative rhetoric that is often used in media coverage and comment on migration. While there are many calls for compassion and assistance for maritime refugees and migrants in the Mediterranean, the press is littered with examples of aggressive coverage where labour migrants and refugees/asylum seekers and grouped together as undesirable. There is a strong tendency to speak about migration, and economic migrants in particular, in a very negative and sometimes clearly xenophobic way. The UNHCR have documented the wide-spread pejorative nature of media coverage of refugees and migrants in the past.¹¹⁷ In response to the April 2015 Mediterranean boat disaster, a senior UNHCR representative said that anti-immigrant rhetoric from politicians across Europe was blocking attempts to introduce large search-and-rescue operations in the Mediterranean that would save large numbers of refugee and migrant lives: "In many countries in Europe at the moment, the [political] dialogue and the rhetoric is quite extreme and very irresponsible."¹¹⁸

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113 European Commission, 2013, p. 12.

114 Foresti, 2015.

115 Skeldon, 2013, p. 24.

116 European Commission, 2015b.

117 Such as in a 2006 issue of UNHCR's Refugee Magazine, UNHCR, 2006.

118 Townsend, 2015.

Box 4: A public consultation on migration in Hungary

The media are not alone presenting an unbalanced environment in which to debate migration policy. In April 2015, the Hungarian government formulated questions for a public consultation on migration.

In a questionnaire to be sent out to 8 million citizens over 18 years of age, Hungarians were asked to answer 12 questions on whether “the mismanagement of the immigration question by Brussels may have something to do with increased terrorism”. They are also asked if they would support the Hungarian government in detaining illegal migrants who “themselves should cover the costs” of staying in Hungary. In a letter accompanying the survey, Prime Minister Viktor Orban wrote: “Economic migrants cross our borders illegally, and while they present themselves as asylum-seekers, in fact they are coming to enjoy our welfare systems and the employment opportunities our countries have to offer ...We shall not allow economic migrants to jeopardize the jobs and livelihoods of Hungarians”.¹¹⁹

In response, EU Commissioner Frans Timmermans wrote: “Public consultation can be an important tool for governments and other public authorities to develop policies that can count on support of the population. In this context, it is entirely up to the Hungarian authorities if they want to consult the people on migration. But a public consultation based on bias, on leading and even misleading questions, on prejudice about immigrants can hardly be considered a fair and objective basis for designing sound policies. Framing immigration in the context of terrorism, depicting migrants as a threat to jobs and the livelihood of people, is malicious and simply wrong - it will only feed misconceptions and prejudice. It will create and fuel negative attitudes towards minorities and it will stimulate confrontation between different groups in society. It is wilfully misleading to present migrants only as a burden to our economies and societies, without any mention of their contribution. When we address the many challenges posed by migration today, we must look at the issue in a frank, open and balanced way. We should not close our eyes to the sometimes serious challenges posed by migration in our societies. But in doing so, we should never lose sight of our fundamental values and of the need to preserve a pluralist and diverse society, based on mutual respect and equal treatment of every individual.”

Economist, Paul Collier, argues in his 2013 analysis *Exodus*¹²⁰ that the discourse on migration runs a risk of being hi-jacked or dominated by the hard-right, anti-migrant lobby precisely because more moderate parties and voices treat migration as a taboo subject and do not dare to take clear positions publically.

119 EU Observer, 2015.

120 Collier, 2013.

While media outlets associated with the right in politics are normally most vociferous in persistent negative characterisation of refugees and migrants in the global North, the coverage of refugees and migrants in the Horn of Africa is also often negative – presenting them as ‘illegals’, a draining force, and even as a danger to their host countries as the refugee debate becomes increasingly securitised.¹²¹

All over the world politicians are both exacerbating and responding to fears of their constituents about rising numbers or rising visibility of refugees and migrants. Sometimes characterised as trying to take the populist advantage, politicians in the North and South target refugees and migrants to support their policies and parties but also to gain popular following. Often they are also the scapegoat to other prevailing concerns such as crime, disease or terror. In recent years in Kenya for example, the immediate target in the aftermath of terror attacks has been the Somali refugees and migrants, with calls for their arrest or deportation dominating discourse.

One observer, commenting on European politicians who are using the terms ‘people trafficker’ and ‘smuggler’ interchangeably wrote that this “conflation conveniently obfuscates the issue and buys political breathing space. It is a classic public relations move by those faced with evidence of their complicity in human rights abuses – or in this case, arguably, a preventable atrocity. When faced with such horror, it is easier to make grand statements blaming refugee and migrant deaths on evil traffickers than to seek the causes and identify proper responses”.¹²² In response to the EU summit on the Mediterranean boat crisis, the Migrants Rights Network also argued that, when it comes to thinking about migration, words matter. Consequently describing the movement of people away from situations of danger or poverty as illegal migration, constrains public authorities (as well as the general public) to thinking that everyone in these routes is an illegal migrant.¹²³ However, Syria, Afghanistan, Eritrea and Somalia are among the top countries of origins of those arriving in Italy, which means many of them have genuine protection claims.

Anti-immigration politics¹²⁴

In some countries the negative rhetoric is strongly related to politics. In a May 2015 report, the Council of Europe noted that relations between nationals and migrants are often perceived as a ‘zero-sum game’ in a context of competition for scarce resources: if the migrants get more, the nationals inevitably have less. This belief causes a significant proportion of the hostile

All over the world politicians are both exacerbating and responding to fears of their constituents about rising numbers or rising visibility of refugees and migrants.

121 Early 2013, for example, the Nairobi-based Urban Refugee Protection Network (URPN) voiced concerns about media coverage they said linking refugees to insecurity without producing evidence. According to the URPN this aggravates xenophobic attitudes towards genuine refugees and asylum seekers (IRC, 2013). A review of print media in the run-up to xenophobic violence in South Africa in April/May 2008, showed that the media had uncritically reproduced xenophobic language and statements and concluded that the media had been complicit in encouraging xenophobic attitudes among the population (Crush, 2008, p. 9).

122 McQuade, 2015.

123 Migrants Rights Network, 2015.

124 Throughout the report, frequent reference is made to Europe when using examples outside of the East and Horn of Africa region, as it is the most relevant destination for refugees and migrants from the Horn of Africa who migrate beyond the region.

attitudes to migration. Several populist and anti-immigration parties that are pervading the European political scene – such as the Front National in France, the UK Independence Party (UKIP) in the UK, the Austrian Freedom Party (*Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs*; FPÖ), the Alternative for Germany Party (*Alternative für Deutschland*; AfD), the Dutch Freedom Party (*Partij voor de Vrijheid*; PVV), the Northern League in Italy, the Hungarian Jobbik and the Swiss People's Party (*Union démocratique du centre*; UDC) are all, according to the Council of Europe, reinforcing the process of stigmatising and even criminalizing migrants.¹²⁵ Recent examples from Europe include:

- In Austria, the anti-immigration Freedom Party received 21 per cent of the vote during the September 2013 elections, its best performance since 1999.¹²⁶
- In Switzerland, 50.4 per cent voted in favour of a referendum in 2014 on imposing immigration quotas.¹²⁷
- In 2014, a third of voters in France say they would consider voting for Front National (FN) due to its position on limiting immigration and integration.¹²⁸
- Political parties such as the FN or the Dutch Freedom Party (PVV) note that their countries should follow the example of Switzerland – reduce immigration and exit the EU.¹²⁹
- In October 2014, the far-right German political organization Pegida (Patriotische Europäer gegen die Islamisierung des Abendlandes or Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamisation of the West) was founded in the Eastern German city of Dresden. Pegida has been organizing marches throughout Germany attracting up to 25,000 people. In June 2015 Pegida, for the first time, participated in local, mayoral elections in Dresden and performed better than expected with nearly 10 per cent of the votes.¹³⁰
- In Greece the Golden Dawn party began as a far right party in the 1980s, but rose to prominence due to public anger of Greece's financial meltdown that began in 2009 and the following years of austerity. In 2012, Golden Dawn entered parliament and in the January 2015 national elections it became the country's third largest party, winning 6.28 per cent of the vote. In June 2015 a trial started in which the Golden Dawn leadership is being accused of running a criminal organization that attacked immigrants and opponents.¹³¹ Golden Dawn supporters are also accused of unleashing a rash of violence since the party rose to national office, including the stabbings and beatings of immigrants, ransacking an immigrant community centre, smashing market stalls and breaking the windows of immigrant-owned shops.¹³²
- Italy was experiencing a wave of hostility towards the influx of migrants before regional elections at the end of May 2015.¹³³
- In the run-up to the UK general elections early May 2015, the UK Independence Party has been accused of forcing a toxic debate about

125 Council of Europe, 2015, p. 9.

126 World Bank, 2014a, p. 19.

127 Ibid.

128 Ibid.

129 Ibid.

130 The Guardian, 2015b.

131 Ayiomamitis, 2015.

132 Faiola, 2012.

133 Townsend, 2015.

immigration and national identity.¹³⁴ According to another observer, the UK election debate was characterized by scare tactics and often evidence-free assertions on the costs (but rarely benefits) of migration.¹³⁵

- In a June 2015 national election in Denmark, the far-right anti-immigration, anti-EU, Danish People's Party emerged in second place. According to the New York Times, the flow of immigrants ignited a backlash that has heightened nationalist sentiments and immigration was a key and decisive issue in the campaign. The debate focused largely on the number of workers coming from places like Bulgaria and Romania, what sort of benefits they should receive, and whether Denmark should take in more of the migrants arriving at Europe's southern borders.¹³⁶

Xenophobia and anti-immigration sentiments outside of Europe

Similarly, outside of Europe there seems to be a growing xenophobia and tendency to blame refugees and migrants for insecurity and/or a lack of jobs. For example:

- In Kenya (Somali) refugees are increasingly blamed for rising insecurity due to a wave of terrorist attacks since 2013.
- In Israel, all illegal border crossers, even though they might be refugees from Eritrea or Sudan, are regarded as 'infiltrators' in the official discourse.¹³⁷ Moreover, in May 2012, a Likud-party member of the Knesset, Israel's parliament, called the 'infiltrators' "a cancer in our body," and the same month, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu called them "a threat to the social fabric of society, our national security, our national identity and our existence as a Jewish and democratic state."¹³⁸
- As described in chapter 1, South Africa is experiencing yet another wave of xenophobic violence against refugees and migrants, even though its economy relies heavily on migrants, be it to make up for a massive skills shortage or as cheap labour in farms and mines.¹³⁹
- Mass deportation of irregular migrants also points to rising anti-immigrant sentiment in some destination countries. In the US, over 368,000 people were deported in 2013 (mostly migrants seeking entry into the US and apprehended at the border), with Mexico and Central American countries as the main places of origin.¹⁴⁰
- As Saudi Arabia – a major destination country for Horn of Africa migrants, particularly Ethiopians – struggles with falling income from oil, high unemployment among its citizens, and the continuing threat of domestic unrest, one section of society is being increasingly marginalized: the low-paid foreign worker.¹⁴¹ Between November 2013 and early 2014, it is estimated 1 million migrants had been deported or willingly left Saudi Arabia. Among the deported migrants were approximately 160,000 Ethiopians and over 23,000 Somalis.¹⁴² Deportations from Saudi Arabia are ongoing. Between November 2014 and March 2015

134 Townsend, 2015.

135 Foresti, 2015.

136 Eddy, 2015.

137 RMMS, 2014c, p. 22.

138 Human Rights Watch, 2014b, p. 6.

139 Patel and Essa, 2015.

140 World Bank, 2014a, p. 1.

141 Wall Street Journal, 2015.

142 RMMS, 2014b, p. 10.

another 300,000 violators of the Kingdom's labour and residency regulations have been deported in the Saudi campaign "to flush out violators". In the same period, border guard patrols arrested 900,000 infiltrators who tried to enter the Kingdom illegally, with 84 per cent of them coming through the southern borders.¹⁴³

Box 5: Australia: strict asylum policy, well-managed labour migration and generous refugee resettlement

Asylum is a hot political issue in Australia and polls have shown that a significant number of Australians approve of taking a tougher stance. In 2011 for example, polls showed that Australians were most negative about unauthorized asylum seekers who arrive by boat: two-thirds thought they should be sent home.¹⁴⁴ Australia has a strict asylum policy. The previous Labour government in Australia reintroduced so-called off-shore processing of asylum claims in Nauru and Papua New Guinea (PNG). The government pays outsourced contractors to operate and provide security at temporary detention camps for asylum seekers on the Pacific islands. It also reached a deal with PNG that any asylum seekers judged to be genuine refugees would be resettled in PNG, not Australia. The current Liberal-National coalition, which won the 2013 elections, has adopted Labour's policies and expanded them, introducing Operation Sovereign Borders, which put the military in control of asylum operations.

The Australian government says the journey asylum seekers make by boat is dangerous and controlled by criminal gangs and they have a duty to stop it. Military vessels patrol Australian waters and intercept migrant boats, towing them back to Indonesia or sending asylum seekers back in inflatable dinghies or lifeboats. Australia has managed to almost completely stop boats from arriving in Australia, but Australia's asylum policy has been heavily criticized. Rights groups say conditions in the PNG and Nauru camps are totally inadequate, citing poor hygiene, cramped conditions, unrelenting heat and a lack of facilities.¹⁴⁵ The UN Human Rights Council stated in a March 2015 report that the government of Australia, by failing to provide adequate detention conditions, end the practice of detention of children, and put a stop to the escalating violence and tension at the regional processing centre, has violated the right of the asylum seekers including children to be free from torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment. By detaining children in immigration detention, and holding asylum seekers in dangerous and violent conditions on Manus Island, Australia is systematically violating the international Convention Against Torture, according to the UN report.¹⁴⁶ The Refugee Council of Australia said that Australian politicians are pandering to the politics of fear by supporting the forced

143 Arab News, 2015.

144 Marshall, 2011, p. 70.

145 BBC, 2014.

146 UN Human Rights Council, 2015.

turn-backs of asylum seeker boats.¹⁴⁷

On the other hand, Australia does accept refugees, but mostly through resettlement and not when they arrive by boat. In 2014, Australia recognised 2,780 asylum seekers as refugees. This was 0.09 per cent of the global total, leaving Australia ranked 37th overall, 46th on a per capita basis and 62nd relative to total national GDP. In 2014, 11,750 resettled refugees arrived in Australia, which account for 11.0 per cent of the global total. In terms of refugee resettlement, Australia ranks third overall and first on a per capita basis and relative to total national GDP.¹⁴⁸ Moreover, Australia is good example of an immigration nation, that has managed the influx of foreign workers to meet its economic and nation-building needs relatively well. It has the highest proportion of foreign-born population (24.6 per cent as of 2011) of any advanced industrial country, almost double that of the United States. Australia's employment-based migration, like Canada's, is closely related to value-added economic policies designed to maintain and improve relatively high and broadly shared incomes. Australia also resembles Canada in its evidence-driven employment-based migration policies that use a points-based system (PBS) to adjust migration flows to economic objectives.¹⁴⁹

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The relationship between public perception, negative rhetoric and immigration policies

The UN Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Migrants argued that the current system in many countries does not incentivize politicians to do something about negative perceptions, as they have nothing to gain by promising anything to migrants. As a result, stereotypes such as 'migrants take jobs', 'migrants are terrorists', 'migrants are security risks', 'they are criminals', 'they bring illnesses', continue to exist the public discourse because no one is speaking up against them.¹⁵⁰

According to the UK-based research think tank, Overseas Development Institute (ODI), the perceived need to respond to anti-immigration sentiment does eventually impact policy decisions.¹⁵¹ The governance of migration – the combined framework of legal norms and organisational structures that regulate and shape how states and other stakeholders act in response to international migration – is influenced by public perceptions of migration.¹⁵² Policies that can maximize the benefits from unskilled migration and minimize its costs receive too little attention, because the public dialogue on unskilled migration remains dominated by prejudice and fear.¹⁵³

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147 Refugee Council of Australia, 2015a.

148 Refugee Council of Australia, 2015b.

149 Marshall, 2011, p. 61.

150 Jackson, 2015.

151 Foresti, 2015.

152 SDC, 2013, p. 6.

153 Dadush, 2014, p. 20.

The ODI argues that this points to something of a paradox in the current direction of policies in countries receiving migrants. While economic evidence suggests that migration has significant benefits on destination countries, rather than develop a system to maximise the joint benefits of migration, most governments are concerned to appeal to voters influenced by anti-immigration parties.¹⁵⁴ For example, despite the reality that low-skilled migrants perform jobs that employers often struggle to fill with native workers, the general public believes that migrants, especially low-skilled migrants, are a major cause of stagnant wages and high unemployment in advanced countries. There is a belief that if one has to have migration, it should be high skilled migrants. Unskilled immigration should be deterred, if necessary, according to some politicians, by extending and reinforcing border control.¹⁵⁵

A 2014 paper by World Bank hosted Global Knowledge Partnership on Migration and Development (KNOMAD), concluded that “in few realms of public discourse is the gap between policy and the empirical and theoretical evidence found in the literature as wide as it is in migration of low-skilled workers. Advanced countries go to great lengths to restrict the migration of low-skilled workers. Yet, because low-skilled migrants (and it would appear skilled migrants, too) are imperfect substitutes to their native counterparts, and because the capital stock and the economy tend to expand roughly in line with the expanding population, the long-term impact on wages and employment of natives overall is almost certainly positive”. The study by KNOMAD does acknowledge that low-skilled migration is not without cost though, as it competes directly with other recently arrived low-skilled migrants, who are already among the most disadvantaged groups in the population, and who typically have less access to social safety nets and services than natives. In this way, unskilled migration could contribute to increased inequality. Unskilled migrants also compete to a degree with the least skilled of the native unskilled population. However, the impact on their wage and employment opportunities is found to be small.¹⁵⁶

Public perceptions, the use negative rhetoric by politicians and policy-makers and anti-migration sentiments are all interrelated.

Public perceptions, the use negative rhetoric by politicians and policy-makers and anti-migration sentiments are all interrelated. It is clear though that it affects migration policies in a potentially negative way, which limits the opportunities to fully utilize the potential positive impact of migration on destination and origin countries and on migrants themselves.

In a May 2015 report, the Council of Europe wrote: *“Migration is increasingly associated with threats to public order. In addition, inappropriate use of the terminology relating to migration plays a large part in fuelling xenophobic and racist attitudes and heightening the fear of migrants. Increasing incrimination of migrants undoubtedly has repercussions on their living conditions, whether they are regular or irregular migrants, affecting them in the employment field as well as in their everyday lives. This criminalisation of migrants facilitates and even to some extent legitimises the adoption of migration policies which are more and more under the sway of a security-dominated rationale. Governments should adopt a more objective approach towards migrants, observe fundamental rights standards, in particular by*

154 Watkins and Quattri, 2014, p. 12.

155 Dadush, 2014, p. 1-2.

156 Ibid, p. 19.

combating disinformation and negative stereotypes concerning migrants, and condemn the exploitation of migrants for political purposes.”¹⁵⁷

It is also remarkable how little has changed over the past years in the migration debate. The following paragraph, written by Oliver Bakewell in 2007, could just as well have been written in April 2015 by someone observing the debate in Europe in response to refugees and migrants crossing the Mediterranean:

“Another critical factor pushing migration to the top of the development policy agenda is the growing concern about irregular migration into the industrialised world. Undocumented migration from Africa into Europe through people smuggling, trafficking and other illegal routes is a major political priority in the EU. The pictures of young African men arriving on boats in the tourist destinations of the Mediterranean and Canary Islands give a popular impression of migration out of control, even though the numbers of people involved are relatively small. Such movements are seen to be driven by desperation and poverty, i.e. the failure of development, and create a huge pressure to find solutions which stops such desperate measures. This growing irregular international migration is represented as a threat to social cohesion, security and the nation state. The use of smugglers to co-ordinate illegal entry is often portrayed as feeding into organised criminal gangs, although there is evidence that the picture is much more complicated, with many of those involved being relatives and friends rather than criminal organisations. With the so-called ‘war on terror’ the presence of undocumented strangers is also presented as a major security threat especially when the migrants come from unstable (Islamic) states, such as Somalia and Sudan.”¹⁵⁸

To conclude, the World Bank, the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) and IOM (among many other agencies and academics) argue that where sentiments are based on misperceptions about refugees and migrants, more effort is needed to generate evidence on their role in host communities and progress on integration, and that misperceptions of migration should be addressed through factual information on positive contribution of refugees and migrants using means such as media and diaspora groups.¹⁵⁹

2.4 The securitization of migration

Migration as a security threat

There are many unsubstantiated myths with respect to the social and security risks of migration. For example, that migration imports ethnic tensions or that migrants are potential terrorists; that migrants pose health risks to the societies in which they settle; or that refugees and migrants are disproportionately involved in criminal activities. Even though there is virtually no evidence to support such assumptions, they are pervasive.¹⁶⁰

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157 Council of Europe, 2015, p. 1.

158 Bakewell, 2007, p. 17-18.

159 World Bank, 2014b, p. 19; UNECA and IOM, 2013, p. 6.

160 Koser, 2014.

In May 2015, for example, amidst ongoing discussions on Europe's response to the refugee crisis in the Mediterranean, the BBC wrote that Islamic State (IS) militants were smuggled into Europe on boats filled with refugees and migrants. Earlier, Frontex warned that it was possible that foreign fighters were using irregular migration routes to get into Europe.¹⁶¹ However, the BBC article was based on only one source, a security adviser to the Libyan government. And although the article included some nuance by stating that experts have cautioned that it is very difficult to verify or assess such claims, the headline might have a big impact on public perception and politics, and both are closely interrelated.

Such examples point to the increasing securitization of migration, which can be described as a process in which an issue is presented as posing an existential threat or a threat to national identities, security and social security and welfare systems.¹⁶² In the process, an issue – migration in this case - moves from being a normal, typical political issue to the realm of exception. The securitization of migration leads to several problems and risks:¹⁶³

- First, it leads to the inability to make the distinctions among the different types of migration, which might lead to the generalization that all refugees and migrants are considered as a potential security threat.
- Second, there is the risk of blaming the victims, by ostracizing still further people who may have fled for their lives, endured arduous journeys, and face discrimination in destination countries. When considering security aspects, however, it is often the refugees and migrants who are at risk or flee for safety reasons.
- Third, there is the risk that labelling migration as a national security issue may be used to legitimize extraordinary responses in order to overcome the risk. Border enforcement, detention of refugees and irregular migrants, and accelerated return procedures, are all examples of security-led responses to largely humanitarian issues.
- Fourth, there is the risk of fuelling media hype and public sentiment against immigration and also mobilizing further support for political parties that are currently making capital from opposing immigration.¹⁶⁴ The growth of racism and xenophobia among local populations is one of the most negative consequences of the securitization of migration¹⁶⁵

The Global Knowledge Partnership on Migration and Development (KNOMAD), also focuses on migration, security and development, aiming to develop a better understanding of these linkages, to dispel some of the myths, and equally focus policy attention on areas where there may be genuine concerns. KNOMAD acknowledges that there are circumstances where migration does pose a risk for national security, for example, where large-scale irregular migration challenges the exercise of sovereignty, or human trafficking intersects with other criminal activities, or massive refugee settlements impact in the local environment. According to KNOMAD, denying the possibility that migration may have security implications is as

161 BBC, 2015b. Frontex is the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union.

162 Gustavsson, 2006, p. 7; p. 12.

163 Themistocleous, 2012, p. 2.

164 Koser, 2014.

165 Themistocleous, 2012, p. 6.

narrow-minded as assuming that migration is critical threat to national security.¹⁶⁶

The effect of the securitization of migration on public perception and rhetoric has already been discussed in the previous section. Below, three other areas are discussed in which the securitization of migration negatively affects the development potential of migration: border management, refugees and remittances.

Border management – the case of Kenya

Examples from Kenya are used extensively in this section, as it provides a salient example from the region, but many of the findings and conclusions are also valid for other countries in the region.

One particular area in which the securitization of migration logically plays an important role is in border management. In an attempt to stem migration flows and/or in response to security threats, many countries have recently resorted to (temporarily) closing their borders and building a wall or a fence. Following the example of a number of these countries (most notably Israel, the United States, Saudi Arabia, Greece and Bulgaria (on the land borders with Turkey) and Spain (around the Spanish enclaves Melilla and Ceuta in Morocco), in April 2015, Kenya has reportedly also started the construction of a wall along the Kenyan-Somali border. The plans for construction of this wall were presented in a direct response to the April 2015 terrorist attack on a university in Garissa, where Al-Shabaab militants killed 147 students. While the terrorist threats facing Kenya are very real, it is questionable whether closing the border and building a wall will contribute to security.

Kenyan border closure

In 2007, Kenya officially closed the official border crossing centre(s) with Somalia near Liboi citing security concerns. Screening centres located at the border were also closed. Nevertheless, in the years that followed, hundreds of thousands of refugees and asylum seekers entered the country from Somalia. Kenya shares a highly porous, un-fenced border with Somalia (and with Ethiopia and South Sudan), which has long served as a convenient entry and exit point for migration and refugee flows, and it continues to do so whether the borders are officially open or closed.¹⁶⁷ Moreover, due to the lack of proper screening mechanisms, the categorisation of refugees and migrants entering Kenya is not well documented. From a security and health perspective, operational screening centres with the capacity to identify and categorise refugees and migrants in their respective groups would serve to ensure they are directed to appropriate assistance channels, while capturing data on new arrivals.¹⁶⁸ In a 2010 study on the impact of Dadaab refugee camps, the authors concluded that re-opening the border would not pose an added security threat as the border was already open for the majority of those who want to cross, and who are not poor marginalised refugees from

166 Koser, 2014.

167 RMMS, 2013c, p. 8; p. 11-12.

168 Ibid, p. 8.

Denying the possibility that migration may have security implications is as narrow-minded as assuming that migration is critical threat to national security.

Somalia and that the situation in Dadaab clearly showed that the officially closed border did little to regulate movements.¹⁶⁹

A border wall between Kenya and Somalia

Building a wall goes one step further than just closing a border without the infrastructure to actually physically close it. The wall, which according to the Kenyan government will be finished by the end of 2015 and will consist of a series of concrete barriers, fences, ditches and observation posts overlooked by CCTV stations, will run the 708 kilometres from the Indian Ocean to Mandera, where Somalia and Kenya converge with Ethiopia.¹⁷⁰

There are some reasons why a border barrier may not have the desired impact:

- Firstly the security threat may not originate from outside a territory. For example, all four of the Garissa attackers came from within Kenya, rather than from across the border.¹⁷¹ Building a wall will not stop such home-grown terrorism.
- Border barriers are not always efficient in keeping irregular migrants from entering a territory. The United States started work on their comprehensive wall to keep out Mexican (and other) migrants in 2001. This resulted in almost 700 miles of costly walls and fencing separating the United States from Mexico along with considerable resources needed to patrol and police the border. However, would-be migrants still find ways over, under, through and around them. So even the US, with arguably more resources available than Kenya, is not succeeding in keeping migrants out.
- Israel, on the other hand, has been effective in securing its borders.¹⁷² In 2012, the Israeli government constructed a 240km fence along the Sinai (Egypt)-Israeli border. After that, the number of migrants crossing this border dropped to almost zero (while between 2006 and 2011, 40,000 Eritreans alone arrived in Israel).¹⁷³ The 'separation barrier' between Israel and Palestine's West Bank has also been effective according to Israel. In the three years before it was built, suicide bombers killed 293 Israeli citizens; in the three years after the wall went up, that number dropped to 64 and terrorist attacks have dwindled since the construction. This comes at a cost though. The construction of this 800 kilometre long separation barrier was estimated at USD 2 million per kilometre, while annual maintenance costs are USD 260 million a year.¹⁷⁴ It is unsure whether Kenya will find the necessary resources for such a project.
- Finally, as long as there is corruption within Kenya's security services and among the police, a border wall alone will not suffice. Many illegal immigrants entering Kenya currently make use of corruption on the borders and within the country.¹⁷⁵ As terrorist might do the same, corruption among the immigration officials and the police is a major impediment when trying to capture terrorists.¹⁷⁶ Just a wall, without addressing the issue of corruption, will not stop terrorists from entering the country.

169 Enghoff et al., 2010, p. 82.

170 Laing, 2015.

171 Ibid.

172 RMMS, 2013a.

173 RMMS, 2014c.

174 Allison, 2015.

175 DW, 2015.

176 Wekesa, 2015.

Negative consequences of closing the border

Apart from the questions to what extent the wall will be feasible and have a real impact on security, it might have other negative consequences. Blocking cross-border movement, does not consider the pastoralists who have homes and livelihoods in both Kenya and Somalia, nor the peoples whose lineage and relationships defy geographic boundaries.¹⁷⁷

Related to these pastoralist movements, is the cross-border cattle-trade. The Kenya–Somalia–Ethiopia borderlands constitute a dynamic livestock trading zone, supporting the livelihoods of thousands of people. Over the last 20 years, the export of animals from Somalia to feed the growing Kenyan market for meat has expanded and flourished, despite political turbulence. The pastoral livestock trade begins in remote villages in South Central Somalia, where bush traders procure animals from pastoral households in village markets. From there, they are brought to primary markets such as Mandera, El-Waq and Wajir and from there to the primary livestock market of Garissa, which hosts a large livestock market. From Garissa, livestock are transported to the terminal markets of Nairobi and Mombasa. This cross-border livestock migration and trade kept the relations at community level vibrant, while national economies and local authorities benefit from taxes on the flourishing trade in livestock and livestock products. The trade provides incomes for herders, traders, middlemen, transporters and local authorities in all three countries.¹⁷⁸

The town of Garissa provides a good example of the value of cross-border livestock trade. Garissa experienced extraordinary growth due to the expanded cross-border livestock trade between Somalia and Kenya, as it grew into a key regional market. Cattle sales grew by approximately 400 per cent between 1991 and 1998, and 600 per cent between 1989 and 1998. The increased trade has contributed to an expansion in the number of new businesses in Garissa, including hotels, restaurants, wholesale businesses and small enterprises.¹⁷⁹

It has been argued, in a Chatham House paper, that the livestock trade is even more than a commercial operation and has social and political benefits, as the cross-border clan relationships that always underpinned the trade are increasingly giving way to multiple clan business enterprises. These involve extensive networks of people and help to build trust and integration among them.¹⁸⁰

Psychically closing the border and blocking existing trade patterns between Somalia and Kenya, could have a strong negative impact on the national and regional economies, both in Somalia and in Kenya, and would constrain a crucial source of livelihood for herders, traders and brokers as well as limiting the tax revenues of local authorities. Many communities on both sides of the border have a stake in livestock commerce and any restrictions on this economic activity would have a severe impact across the region.¹⁸¹ As it might also impact the interaction between different communities

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177 Kimari, 2015.

178 Mahmoud, 2010, p. 1-4.

179 Ibid, p. 8.

180 Ibid, p. 1.

181 Ibid, p. 10.

and clans and affects regular (cross-border) movement patterns of pastoral communities (in search of water and pasture) it could even have troubling long-term implications for peace and stability in the region.¹⁸²

In short, the plan to build a wall might actually hurt Kenya's economy, cause further instability, without contributing to security. Nevertheless, Kenya does face very serious security threats and needs to protect its borders to prevent Al-Shabaab militants to enter the country.

Integrated border management

Border management (or border control) is often seen only in terms of security. An assumption which leads to the notion that border management – at least implicitly – is an obstacle to the free movement of people, goods and services and consequently a potential hindrance to the full development potential of such mobility.¹⁸³ However, comprehensive and functioning border management encompasses both aspects of security and of facilitation, two aspects which should not contradict but complement each other. In a recent ICMPD paper on border management and development, the authors argue that the absence of comprehensive and functioning border management system does not mean facilitated movement of people, goods and services across state borders. It means the opposite: delays, harassment, violation of rights and corruption. Its absence hampers development. On the other hand, efficient borders improve the recognition of rights of the persons crossing a border, the regulation and inspection of passengers and the management of migration. It improves the flow of goods and the collection of revenues, reduce the threat of crime and terrorism and improve law enforcement. All of this leads to improved respect for human rights, enhanced mobility of people, trade facilitation, more competitive private sectors, increased revenues for the state, and improved public safety and national security.¹⁸⁴

Generally speaking, the crossing of goods and services over African borders is hampered by cumbersome and costly procedures, the need to make illegal payments and to bribe officials, regular congestion and delays due to outdated procedures and insufficient manpower and infrastructure.

Generally speaking, the crossing of goods and services over African borders is hampered by cumbersome and costly procedures, the need to make illegal payments and to bribe officials, regular congestion and delays due to outdated procedures and insufficient manpower and infrastructure. Such 'border experiences' also impact the mobility of people, tourists, business travellers and migrants, both in terms of their actual crossings and the likelihood of future visits to the country in question.¹⁸⁵

Institutional weaknesses, such as insufficient operational resources at the border resulting in badly trained, underpaid and unguided staff, create bottlenecks which harm the good governance of borders. Other bottlenecks include overburdened staff, insufficient equipment, ill-designed communication lines, dysfunctional cooperation between the competent entities and units at the border and at centralised levels and uncoordinated work flows.¹⁸⁶

182 Allison, 2015.

183 Pluim and Hoffman, 2015, p. 2.

184 Ibid, p. 2.

185 Ibid, p. 10.

186 Ibid, p. 8.

Contrary to what is often believed, more international integration and interaction between states does not imply less border control but better border management. So-called integrated border management (IBM) aims combining the traditional modes of border control and protection of state security with those processes at the border that would facilitate the exchange of goods and services and the transfer of people with the neighbouring states. According to the 2004 EU Guidelines on IBM (updated in 2010), IBM “covers coordination and cooperation among all the relevant authorities and agencies involved in border security and trade facilitation to establish effective, efficient and integrated border management systems, in order to reach the common goal of open, but controlled and secured borders.”¹⁸⁷

Nevertheless, countries in the region have strong arguments to perceive the strengthening of border security in itself as an enabler for development. Secure borders are needed to counter a number of phenomena that are detrimental to development, such as trans-border and international crime, terrorism, trafficking in human beings, trafficking of arms, illicit and informal cross-border trade, human smuggling and the illegal entry of unauthorised individuals into the territory of a state. But, as ICMPD argues, security is only one side of the coin; trade and mobility should always be the other. IBM is particularly suited to serve as an enabler for development because it explicitly rules out any trade-off between security and the facilitation of trade and human mobility.¹⁸⁸ Instead of making large investments in closing the border and building a wall, Kenya, as well as other countries in the region, would be better off by developing and investing in integrated border management, which should include addressing the institutional weaknesses as described. Integrated border management could contribute more to controlling and securing the borders, while also enabling the development potential of cross-border trade and movement.

Refugees and security concerns

Security concerns also play an important role in the way countries choose to deal with refugees. Refugee hosting countries are increasingly concerned that refugees might be the cause of security threats or that there are risks of refugee conflicts spilling over to other countries in the region. As displaced people in urban locations are even more difficult to keep under surveillance than in camps this raises further security concerns.¹⁸⁹ Refugee hosting countries, therefore, often prefer to keep refugees in refugee camps (so-called encampment) instead of in urban centres. In many countries, encampment often forces refugees to reside in the most remote and least hospitable regions of a country, without access to basic livelihoods or mechanisms to ensure basic rights. Forcible relocation to camps, often under threat of expulsion or imprisonment, is nearly always justified though a national security rhetoric.¹⁹⁰

Refugee policies in response to security threats in Kenya

In response to security/terrorism threats, a common reflex is to tighten

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187 Pluim and Hoffman, 2015, 10-11.

188 Ibid, p. 12-13.

189 Zetter, 2014, p. 36.

190 Lewis, 2015.

migration and refugee policies. In 2007, the Kenyan government officially closed the border with Somalia, citing security concerns, as described above. In 2012, in response to a series of grenade attacks and other terrorist incidents in Nairobi and other major towns, the government issued a directive requiring all refugees in urban areas to relocate to refugee camps.¹⁹¹ It was also announced that no further refugee registrations would happen in Kenya's cities.¹⁹² Badu Katelo, then Kenya's acting Commissioner for Refugee Affairs, said that refugees, particularly those living in urban centres, were contributing to insecurity in the country. In the following operation, abuse and extortion by police of Somali refugees in Kenya's capital was widely reported.¹⁹³ While a High Court ruled the directive was unconstitutional in 2013, the same Court upheld an identical directive reissued by the Government in 2014. In September 2013, parliamentarians urged Somali refugees to return to Somalia after the Westgate Mall terrorist attack.¹⁹⁴ In March 2014, Kenya once again pushed forward with attempts to limit refugee presence to the camps. Joseph Ole Lenku, then cabinet secretary of the Ministry of Interior, reiterated that all refugees outside of the camps must be relocated, citing the "emerging security challenge in our urban centres". The ensuing counter-terrorist operation, '*Usalama Watch*', saw Kenya's Somali community once again become scapegoats, with thousands arrested and ill-treated, forcibly relocated and hundreds unlawfully expelled.¹⁹⁵

Later in 2014, the Kenyan parliament passed a new *Security Laws (Amendment) Act*, which included sections aimed at limiting the number of refugees and asylum seekers in the country to 150,000, and again enforcing an encampment policy, confining refugees to the country's two remote camps in Dadaab and Kakuma. Interestingly, 150,000 was more or less the number of officially registered refugees in Kenya who are not of Somali origin. According to the International Refugee Rights Initiative, this raised questions about whether such a plan might also have violated international law provisions prohibiting discrimination, as it seems likely that Somali refugees would have been the first ones to be pushed out of the country, had the Kenya government started implementing this new legislation.¹⁹⁶ However, once again, these plans were partly overruled by Kenya's High Court in February 2015 through the annulment of eight clauses, including the one which capped the number of refugees and asylum seekers to 150,000.¹⁹⁷ Nevertheless, other provisions remained in place that threaten to restrict the rights of refugees. These include the enforced encampment of refugees and limiting the time asylum seekers have to apply for asylum once they enter the country. Previously, the Refugee Act held that a refugee who entered Kenya, whether lawfully or otherwise, and wished to remain in the country and be granted asylum, must "make his intentions known by appearing in person before the Commissioner immediately upon his entry or, in any case, within thirty days after his entry into Kenya." Under the new amendment the thirty days limitation is cancelled, and all refugees

191 RMMS, 2015a, p. 2-3.

192 Wilson, 2014.

193 Ibid.

194 RMMS, 2015a, p. 2-3.

195 Wilson, 2014.

196 Gidron, 2015.

197 BBC, 2015a.

must avail themselves in person before the Commissioner “immediately” upon their entry. Failing to do so may lead to the rejection of his or her application.¹⁹⁸

It remains to be seen how this latter provision and the plan to close Kenya’s border by building a wall will work synchronically. Without proper facilities in place at the border for refugees to submit a request for refugee status, Kenya’s plans to build a wall and narrow the time limit for registration, is likely to block refugees’ access to Kenya, which might constitute a breach of the non-refoulement principle and as such a violation of Kenya’s international obligations.

Threats to close Dadaab refugee camps

Finally, shortly after the Garissa terrorist attack the Kenyan government threatened to close Dadaab refugee camp (which hosts around 350,000 Somali refugees), relying on assertions the camp is a national security threat, used by the Somali extremist group Al-Shabaab to plan attacks, like the one on Garissa University College, even though evidence supporting those claims has never been made public.¹⁹⁹

UNHCR responded quickly by urging the Kenyan authorities to give the matter further consideration and stated that it was concerned that abruptly closing the Dadaab camps and forcing refugees back to Somalia would have extreme humanitarian and practical consequences, and would be a breach of Kenya’s international obligations.²⁰⁰ Kenya is a signatory to the 1951 U.N. Refugee Convention, which forbids the involuntary return of refugees to a country where they face persecution.²⁰¹

Experts doubt whether Kenya will go ahead with closing Dadaab. A senior advocate for Washington-based Refugees International was quoted in the Washington Post saying it “is a threat the government made to show they’re doing something to combat the terrorism problem, but to carry out a shutdown would be quite difficult”.²⁰²

Nevertheless, it shows that the fear of terrorism has defined the popular perception and policy debate around refugees, asylum seekers and migrants in Kenya but also in Djibouti, Somaliland, Yemen and, to a lesser extent, Ethiopia.²⁰³ While the threat is very real, such measures are as the result of a tendency to conflate refugees with terrorism. Since the increase of Al-Shabaab attacks on Kenyan soil, refugees have been at the forefront of an often heavy-handed response by the Kenyan state.²⁰⁴ The security challenges have been used to justify the erosion of protection and the rights of refugees. However, there is a risk this will backfire. Specific actions and operations which are perceived to disproportionately target the Somali population in Kenya, risk, according to some commentators, to further divide the Kenyan society, forcing refugees underground and driving

the securitization of migration

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198 Gidron, 2015.

199 Washington Post, 2015.

200 UNHCR, 2015a.

201 Washington Post, 2015.

202 Ibid.

203 RMMS, 2015a, p. 2-3.

204 Wilson, 2014.

more people into the arms of Al-Shabaab.²⁰⁵ Reportedly Al-Shabaab have also been capitalizing on the images of huddled Somalis in detention as propaganda to gain new recruits. Moreover, actions that look like collective punishment of a particular minority and faith group will likely marginalise and potentially radicalise some sections of the community further.²⁰⁶

Remittances and security

Security concerns affecting the Somali remittance market

The development potential of remittances will be discussed in the next chapter. Remittances are of great importance, particularly for a country like Somalia with a relatively large overseas diaspora. Remittances to Somalia are estimated at USD 1.3 billion annually.²⁰⁷

However, in the sphere of remittances the securitization of migration also has an impact. For security reasons, Anti-Money Laundering (AMF) and Countering Financing Terrorism (CFT) regulations are applied to international money transfers. According to the World Bank, these regulations should be designed to avoid, to the extent possible, making it more difficult for money service businesses to transact business with correspondent banks. However, a renewed focus on AML/CFT has led many banks to stop offering remittance services and to close the accounts of Money Transfer Operators (MTOs) and as result some MTOs have closed. This problem affects remittance service providers in several countries, but especially those serving Somalia, because of fears that remittances are used to finance terrorism. This has increased remittance costs and possibly encourages the use of informal channels.²⁰⁸

Somalia has been affected by what is called de-risking - the closing of bank accounts of MTOs by banks due to perceived legal, regulatory, sanctions, and AML/CFT risks. The UK government, in conjunction with the World Bank, is developing the Safer Corridor Initiative. This initiative aims to tackle key deficiencies in the UK-Somalia remittance corridor until a sounder financial system is in place in Somalia, and to accelerate and support the development of that financial system. However, Somalia's financial sector has not developed in a formal way, and the country remains extremely isolated from the global financial infrastructure. Nevertheless, in 2014, the Federal Government of Somalia took measures to formalize its financial sector. The Central Bank of Somalia has licensed and registered four money transfer businesses and has registered nine money transfer businesses.²⁰⁹

The closure of Somali money transfer agencies in Kenya

However, a recent example shows Somalia still has a long way to go with regard to developing safer corridors. In early April 2015, shortly after the Al-Shabaab terrorist attack on Garissa, Kenya suspended the licences of 13 Somali money transfer agencies in an effort to curb the financing of insurgents. While it is not possible to assess whether some of these agencies were actually facilitating the financing of terrorism, shortly after

205 Wilson, 2014.

206 Barnes, 2014.

207 AfDB, OECD, UNDP, 2015b, p. 3.

208 World Bank, 2015c, p. 11.

209 Ibid.

this decision a group of aid agencies (including Oxfam, CARE, Mercy Corps, Adeso and World Vision Somalia) urged Kenya to allow Somali money transfer firms to resume operations. The aid agencies expressed concern that halting remittances would hurt struggling families, who are losing their only formal, transparent and regulated channel through which to send and receive money. As described above, each year Somalis abroad use money transfer operators to send home an estimated USD 1.3 billion, more than all humanitarian and development aid to the country combined. Moreover, the decision to close MTOs had the potential of impairing relief operations in Somalia, as aid agencies working in Somalia risked losing their only means of transferring money to sustain their daily humanitarian and development operations. Finally, it could again also hurt the Kenyan economy, as it also affects Kenya's Somali community, which also receives a large amount of remittances from abroad.²¹⁰ In June 2015, the Kenyan government announced that it would return licences to 13 money transfer firms that were banned.²¹¹

2.5 The illicit migration economy

Migrant smuggling

A wide range of actors profit from mixed migration flows in illegal ways. Due to the lack of legal means for migration, there is a strong demand for the services of migrant smugglers. The migrant smuggling businesses in the Horn of Africa and Yemen is estimated to be worth tens of millions of dollars annually.²¹²

Recruitment agents

Many recruitment agencies and/or public employment agencies make large profits out of labour migration, as they often let migrant workers pay for recruitment costs. According to the World Bank, these fees are a major drain on poor migrants' incomes and remittances, as they divert billions of dollars sent by migrants from the family to illicit recruitment agents.²¹³

Many public employment agencies (PEAs) in Ethiopia, for example, charge female migrant workers going to the Gulf States between USD 200 and 800 for their services, even though travel, visa and insurance costs are supposed to be paid by the employer. RMMS research conducted in Ethiopia in 2013 and 2014 estimated that out of the 400 legally registered PEAs only 20 were fully bona fide; all others were involved in irregular migration activities or even de facto engaged in trafficking their clients.²¹⁴

Corruption

Irregular migration, migrant smuggling, human trafficking – and the criminal migration economy in general – are all strongly connected with corruption in various ways.²¹⁵ Without corruption and the subsequent collusion of certain state officials, migrant smuggling and human trafficking

RMMS research conducted in Ethiopia in 2013 and 2014 estimated that out of the 400 legally registered PEAs only 20 were fully bona fide; all others were involved in irregular migration activities or even de facto engaged in trafficking their clients.

210 Caspani, 2015.

211 Reuters, 2015.

212 RMMS, 2013b.

213 World Bank, 2015c, p. 13-14.

214 RMMS, 2014b, p. 18.

215 UNODC, 2013, p. 9.

operations would not be able to thrive. Corruption makes it easier to get the migrants across the borders. Without employees at border check points turning a blind eye, normally after the payments, migrant smuggling could not operate as it does - an illegal and clandestine activity continuing in full plain view. Payment of bribes can also persuade officials to turn a blind eye to improper documentation or protect against scrupulous checking of vehicles, cargo holders, or vessels holding smuggled migrants.²¹⁶ Research on transnational human trafficking also shows that corruption is a facilitator of human trafficking.²¹⁷

Corruption also makes it difficult to curtail migrant smuggling and human trafficking, as it weakens existing systems and measures to protect borders, control immigration, protect refugees, and enforce the law. On the other hand, migrant smuggling and human trafficking operations also fuel corruption and/or maintain it, as the considerable profits made with these illegal activities make corruption possible on a larger scale, possibly including the collusion of officials in higher positions.²¹⁸

Finally, corruption is also a significant predictor of migrant smuggling out of a country because it may be a push factor for emigration and thus create a market for migrant smugglers.²¹⁹ Corruption can lower the stock of human capital and reduce the returns to education by slowing down growth, generate unemployment and underemployment (or reduce labour force participation), increase inequality and reduce welfare, which all acts as a push factor for migration. However, the research literature which investigates the relationship between corruption and emigration is limited.²²⁰

In short, as UNODC concludes, combating corruption is an essential element of any comprehensive and effective strategy to address the problem of migrant smuggling.²²¹

When migration is organized illegally by criminal groups for profit, the potential positive effects may also be outweighed by the negative impact of transnational organized crime and corruption.²²² Corruption, therefore, also impedes the development benefits of migration, for example:

- when migrants' money is tapped by self-enriching people in origin societies.
- if bribes are required for all kinds of permits, licenses and permissions, the benefits of migrant-driven investment are reduced.
- if remittance recipients are targeted for extortion, migrants' incentive to send money home may be reduced.
- corruption can also block the reintegration of highly skilled returnees in developing countries and obstruct knowledge transfer. Many highly skilled returnees are motivated by a desire to make a contribution to their country of origin, but corruption can be demoralizing.²²³

216 Lungdren and Lappo, 2009, p. 102.

217 UNODC, 2013, p. 9.

218 Ibid.

219 Ibid, p. 1.

220 Cooray and Schneider, 2014, p. 4.

221 UNODC, 2013, p. 1.

222 UNODC, 2015.

223 Carling, Paasche and Siegel, 2015.

A 2013 study on Kenyans in the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada and Ghana found that corruption in Kenya was the most prominent obstacle to their participation in development at home.²²⁴ According to the Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index 2014, Sub-Saharan Africa is the most corrupt region in the world, where 92 per cent of the countries score below 50 out of 100 (with 0 being highly corrupt and 100 very clean). Only 4 countries (Botswana, Cape Verde, Seychelles and Mauritius) score above 50. Within the region, Rwanda scores best, with a score of 49 out of 100, ranking 55th out of 175 countries in the world. Most other countries in the wider East and Horn of Africa region are among the worst countries in the world in terms of corruption: Djibouti (107 out of 175 countries), Ethiopia (110), Tanzania (119), Uganda (142), Kenya (145), Burundi (159), Yemen (161), Eritrea (166), South Sudan (171) and Somalia (174). It is therefore likely that the level of corruption significantly hampers the full utilization of the development benefits of the diaspora from these countries.

Nevertheless, migration might also lead to a decrease in the level of corruption, for example through social remittances, and thereby enabling a better environment for migration to contribute to development. When migrants retain close ties with their countries of origin, they regularly transmit norms and values (social remittances) back to the origin country. Generally, migrants move from high- to low-corruption countries and as such might develop a more critical view of corrupt practices and thus contribute to the spread of anti-corruption norms in their origin countries. Then again, the opposite is also possible, if people who emigrate from countries with widespread corruption are voting with their feet by leaving, as a way to protest against what they find unacceptable. The result would be a 'morality drain', in which migration deprives society of voices that could have contributed to the fight against corruption.²²⁵

Conclusion

Effective implementation of free movement provisions and opportunities for legal migration, as well as a strong approach to curb corruption could be a hard blow for the informal and illegal migration economy. With more opportunities for legal or regular migration, irregular migration is bound to decrease. The need for smugglers operating below the legal radar, often corrupting state officials through collusion with their enterprise would diminish, which might also reduce corruption.²²⁶

2.6 Migration myths

The gap between evidence and politics

This section will summarize some of the main myths surrounding migration. Belief in these myths among policy makers and the general public hampers the utilization of the full potential benefits of migration to development. In a 2014 IOM briefing on the role of migration in post-2015 Development Agenda, it was noted there is a widening gap between evidence and facts on migration and development on the one hand and public perceptions

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224 Mwangi, 2013, p. 215-216.

225 Carling, Paasche and Siegel, 2015.

226 RMMS, 2015a, p. 6.

It is not migration, but rather the xenophobia fuelled by politicians and the media, that is the problem. The related migration panic and the recurrent scapegoating of migrants stands in the way of a nuanced debate about migration.

and policies on the other. The largely positive reality is often overshadowed by negative perceptions and policies.²²⁷ According to migration researcher Hein de Haas, much conventional thinking about migration is still based on myths rather than facts. Migration is clearly an issue that raises high hopes (among migrants and some policy makers) and deep fears (among the general public and most policy makers). As Hein de Haas argues, migration is an intrinsic and therefore inevitable part of the broader processes of societal change and globalisation instead of a problem to be solved. “It is not migration, but rather the xenophobia fuelled by politicians and the media, that is the problem. The related migration panic and the recurrent scapegoating of migrants stands in the way of a nuanced debate about migration”.²²⁸ IOMs Director General, William Lacy Swing, also noted that racist and xenophobic rhetoric on migrants and migration are harmful and need to be addressed and that greater political courage, as well as more balanced discourse on the issue is the way forward.²²⁹

This section aims to contribute to a balanced discourse by debunking some of the migration myths.

Relation between migration and development

The most persistent myth revolves around the relation between migration and development. Intuition and basic economy theory would suggest that rising incomes in developing countries will deter migration from these countries. As will be discussed below, this idea has been captivating policy makers in international aid.²³⁰ However, historical and current empirical evidence shows that human and economic development is associated with higher levels of mobility and migration.²³¹ Emigration generally rises with economic development until countries reach upper-middle income level, and only thereafter do emigration rates fall.²³²

This is not an entirely new concept and different names have been used in the past 40 years to describe this relationship between economic development and migration, such as the ‘mobility transition’ (Zelinsky 1971), the ‘migration curve’ (Akerman 1976), ‘migration transition’ (Gould 1979), ‘migration hump’ (Martin 1993), and ‘emigration lifecycle’ (Hatton and Williamson 1994).²³³

In 2014, researcher Michael Clemens surveyed 45 years of research on the association between economic development and emigration, which again confirmed what he called the inverted U-relationship.²³⁴ He found no hint of a negative relationship – meaning rising incomes leading to less migration – between income and emigrant stock between PPP (Purchasing Power Parity) income per capita of roughly USD 600 (that of Niger or Ethiopia) and about USD 7,500 (today’s Albania or Colombia). In this range the relationship

227 IOM, 2014, p. 3-4.

228 De Haas, 2014.

229 IOM, 2014, p. 2.

230 Flahaux and de Haas 2014, p. 24; Clemens, 2014a, p. 1.

231 Massey, 1988 and Skeldon, 1997; quoted in RMMS and Oxford University, 2012, p. 9.

232 Flahaux and de Haas 2014, p. 24; Clemens, 2014a, p. 1.

233 Clemens, 2014a, p. 11.

234 Flahaux and de Haas 2014, p. 24; Clemens, 2014a, p. 1.

is positive, meaning that rising incomes led to higher emigration rates.²³⁵ Only at higher levels of income, did the pattern reverse. For countries with per capita incomes above USD 7-8,000 there is a negative relationship in all years. In these countries, higher incomes are associated with reduced migration. All countries in this range of income are classified as upper-middle-income or high income countries.²³⁶

This analysis contradicts conventional interpretations of African emigration as essentially driven by poverty alone. Generally, African countries with comparatively higher levels of development (such as in the Maghreb or coastal West Africa) also tend to have higher extra-continental (leaving the African continent) migration rates, while the poorest countries (such as many Sub-Saharan countries) have lower levels of overall emigration and most international migration from these countries entails short-distance migration to nearby countries.²³⁷ Thus, poor people also migrate, but they tend to do so less often and if they migrate, they do so within countries (rural-urban migration) or over short distances within the region. This also explains why the skilled and relatively wealthy are overrepresented among long-distance international migrants. It is likely migration becomes less selective if societies as a whole become wealthier and more developed, as this will also lift the relatively poor above the threshold needed to migrate internationally.²³⁸

The analysis also reveals why middle-income countries (like Mexico and the Philippines) have the highest relative levels of emigration. It also suggests that the Horn of Africa and Yemen region stands at the very start of a migration transition. With economic development and greater political stability, the capabilities and aspirations of people to migrate are likely to increase. This suggests if the Horn of Africa and Yemen region complies with the development path from other regions a considerable rise in emigration from the region should be expected in the future. The insight that development is likely to result in more migration in and from this region, leads to fundamentally different conclusions on the future of migration than if conventional push-pull model and neoclassical theories were applied.²³⁹

There are several reasons why development initially leads to more migration, but the main reasons can be summarized as follows:

- Rising incomes can help potential migrants to finance the costs of international migration (which is more costly than internal or short-distance international migration). As development of the origin country takes off, more and more households are able to finance the costs, because growth brings them more disposable income. Moreover, previous migrants often help finance the costs of migration by their family and friends, which means that migration will lead to more migration, so-called chain migration.²⁴⁰

235 Clemens, 2014a, p. 5-6.

236 Ibid, p. 6.

237 Flahaux and de Haas, 2014, p. 26.

238 Ibid, p. 6.

239 RMMS and Oxford University, 2012, p. 9-10.

240 Clemens, 2014a, p. 13.

- Migration can be seen as a function of people's aspirations and capabilities to migrate. Development expands people's access to material resources, social networks, education, media and knowledge, which increases their aspirations to migrate.²⁴¹
- Development usually leads to improvements in infrastructure and transportation, which makes travel less costly and risky, enabling migration over increasing distances.²⁴²

Box 6: The relation between migration and development: the example of Ethiopia

Ethiopia provides an interesting example of the analysis above. Intuitively, it seems Ethiopians are leaving their country in large numbers, and absolute numbers are indeed high, especially for some receiving countries. However, even if the numbers of Ethiopians that are annually migrating to Yemen, the Gulf States, Kenya, Southern Africa, Israel, Sudan, Libya and Europe – both regularly and irregularly - are added up, the total Ethiopian emigrant population will most likely not exceed 1 per cent of the total population of 94 million. This is a relatively low percentage compared to typical emigration (and middle-income countries) like Mexico and Morocco, with emigration rates between 5 and 10 per cent.²⁴³

Merely looking at Ethiopia's economic growth over the last couple of years and relying on the myth that the need to migrate would disappear with economic development, would lead to a belief that out-migration from Ethiopia will decrease in the coming years. However, the analysis above would suggest exactly the opposite. Any take-off development in Ethiopia is likely to lead to accelerating take-off emigration for the coming decades.²⁴⁴

Despite being dubbed an African Tiger, with an estimated population of 96 million in 2015, and having consistently high annual economic growth rates, Ethiopia is still a poor country which explains, in line with the analysis above, the relatively low emigration rates. FAO estimates that about 29 per cent of the Ethiopian population lives below the national poverty line.²⁴⁵ According to the World Bank, 37 million Ethiopians are either poor or vulnerable to falling into poverty in the wake of shock. The very poorest in Ethiopia have become even poorer. The majority of Ethiopians still live in rural areas and in subsistence agriculture.²⁴⁶ Ethiopia ranks at 174 out of 187 countries on the UNDP Human Development Index. The average unemployment rate stagnated at 20.26 per cent from 1999 to 2014.²⁴⁷ While most Ethiopians cannot afford the costs of migration, not even of internal, rural-urban migration, the situation is improving.

241 De Haas, 2010; Flahaux and de Haas, 2014, p. 6.

242 Flahaux and de Haas, 2014, p. 6.

243 RMMS and Oxford University, 2012, p. 11.

244 Clemens, 2014a, p. 37.

245 Tadesse, 2015.

246 World Bank, 2015b.

247 Tadesse, 2015.

Poverty in Ethiopia fell from 44 per cent in 2000 to the 29 per cent. Health, education, and living standards have also improved, with undernourishment down from 75 per cent to 35 per cent since 1990 and infant and child mortality rates falling considerably since 2000.²⁴⁸

In line with these developments, rural-urban migration in Ethiopia is currently increasing, but even rural-urban migration rates remain relatively low compared to other African countries. When rural-urban migration does occur it is more educated individuals that migrate from rural households that are more agriculturally productive, and thus wealthier, than their neighbours. Rural-urban migrants experience improvements in welfare and sending households experience little loss in production, suggesting that migration can reduce poverty and encourage development in Ethiopia.²⁴⁹ Rural-urban migration is often a first step towards international migration, as urban migrants usually experience welfare improvement, which might accumulate to having the means (and aspirations) to pay for international migration. Moreover, rural-urban migrants send internal remittances to their families in rural areas, enabling relatives to migrate to the cities as well. The pattern of people first moving from rural areas to cities and then from cities to foreign destinations has been observed in all of Africa.²⁵⁰

Both migration within and from Ethiopia are on the rise and are likely to keep increasing. Even with continuing economic growth, it will take a long time before Ethiopia reaches a GDP per capita of USD 7,000 or 8,000 up from the current USD 500-600 (i.e. the level suggested by researchers as the tipping point when people refrain from migrating). According to the analysis above, in the years it will take Ethiopia to reach this level of economic development, migration is likely to increase. If by that time Ethiopia will reach the emigration rates of some (lower) middle income countries (between 5 and 10 per cent), it could be possible that between 4.7 and 9.4 million Ethiopians will be on the move within and beyond the region.

Despite the consensus in academic circles that development leads to more migration, there is still a strong belief among politicians and development professionals alike, that development leads to less migration. Although this is true in the long term and with accelerated and sustained development, providing aid and supporting development will not automatically lead to reduced migration.²⁵¹ In 2011, Oliver Bakewell wrote: "In the context of Sub-Saharan Africa, the virtuous circle - whereby migration from the region stimulates development processes (through remittances, other transfers, and return migration), resulting in reduced migration - seems likely to remain a chimera. Unfortunately, it appears to be on such a fantasy that

248 World Bank, 2015b.

249 World Bank, 2015a, p. 106.

250 ACP/IOM, 2013, p. 21.

251 Foresti, 2015.

many of the current policies on migration and development in Africa are based".²⁵² For example:

- In 2005, when the European Commission launched a massive aid package for Africa, then President José Manuel Barroso stated that "the problem of immigration, the dramatic consequences of which we are witnessing, can only be addressed effectively in the long term through an ambitious and coordinated development cooperation to fight its root causes".²⁵³
- In 2008, the European Commission recommended that EU migration policy should focus on improving the socioeconomic situation in low-income and middle-income countries, and in regions characterized by high emigration pressures.²⁵⁴
- In the Khartoum Process (an EU-Horn of Africa Migration Route Initiative that was launched in 2014) one of the key areas is to "promote sustainable development in countries of origin and transit in order to address the root causes of irregular migration". Countries also expressed "political commitment to expand the Khartoum Process into a sustainable regional dialogue on migration and mobility which will address the root causes of irregular migration and mixed migration flows in a comprehensive and balanced way, including through efforts aimed at eradicating poverty and realizing Millennium Development Goals".²⁵⁵
- Even more recently and partly in response to the Mediterranean migration crisis, the Dutch government in May 2015 announced its intention to immediately invest 50 million Euro in the development of African economies to stop migrants from countries like Senegal, Ghana and Tunisia from coming to Europe. While the responsible minister acknowledged that 50 million is not a very large amount to be invested in the African economies as a whole, it was presented an "important signal for a structural solution" to reduce migration flows from Africa to Europe.²⁵⁶

Box 7: Eritrea: rising emigration in spite of reaching several of the Millennium Development Goals

Eritrea provides another interesting example from the region. In an April 2015 article in *Foreign Policy* called "when migrants flee progress, not war" author Michela Wrong focused on migration from Eritrea. This small country of 6 million people accounted for the largest number of refugees and migrants to Europe after Syria in 2014 and the first months of 2015. In 2014, 34,561 Eritreans crossed the Mediterranean and as of July 2015, 23,820 Eritreans arrived in Europe by sea. Yet, in 2013 the government of President Isaias Afewerki, in the words of Michela Wrong, "patted itself on the back" for achieving three health Millennium Development Goals ahead of schedule: reducing infant mortality, improving maternal

252 Bakewell, 2011, p. 157.

253 Clemens, 2014a, p. 2-3.

254 Ibid.

255 EU-Horn of Africa Migration Route Initiative, 2014.

256 Volkskrant, 2015.

health, and combating HIV, malaria, and other diseases. It expects to reach three more by the end of 2015.²⁵⁷ Yet, even such developments are not sufficient to keep people at home. Obviously, there are other reasons Eritreans are leaving their country. In September 2001 the ruling People's Front for Democracy and Justice (PFDJ) led by President Afewerki seized power. Individuals suspected of opposing the PFDJ were detained, private media was shut down, the constitution set aside, elections postponed, and an indefinite/extended military service was introduced for everyone between the ages of 18-50. Eritrea became a one-party state, using roadblocks and undertaking random searches (giffa) to round up youth for conscription and to arrest deserters.²⁵⁸ There is no political opposition in the country, religious freedom is narrowly curtailed and a multiparty constitution has never been implemented. Eritrean youngsters are aspirational and want a better future. Even some impressive developments within Eritrea cannot keep nationals at home.²⁵⁹

As long as other essential needs and aspirations cannot be met in Eritrean society, even strong economic development will prevent Eritreans from leaving the country. Yet, for policy makers outside Eritrea, the idea that development will lead to less migration is still strong. In March 2015 the EU announced it is planning a multi-million euro development package that Eritrea will be allowed to spend on energy and other sectors. The EU said it hopes development aid to Eritrea will stem a growing exodus of Eritreans attempting the dangerous journey to Europe to claim asylum there.²⁶⁰

The 'root causes' argument that is often used as the rationale for new intervention links support to further regional economic integration, the creation of jobs and alternative opportunities for young Africans at the regional level. Policymakers suggest this serves both sides' interests with a reduction of migration pressures for the EU and support for the economic development agenda of African countries. However, all the evidence points in the opposite direction. Development is an important driver of migration both within and across continents.²⁶¹ As Hein de Haas wrote in 2007: "In the poorest countries, especially (such as the Sub-Saharan African countries which are the target of much international aid), any take-off development is likely to lead to accelerating take-off emigration for the coming decades, which is the opposite of what 'development instead of migration' policies implicitly or explicitly aim to achieve".²⁶²

257 Wrong, 2015.

258 Campbell, 2009, p. 6.

259 Wrong, 2015.

260 Reuters, 2015.

261 Knoll and Abebe Bekele, 2014.

262 De Haas, 2007, quoted in: Clemens, 2014a, p. 37.

Key points for the region

- Until countries reach higher middle-income levels, economic development will lead to more migration. Migration within and from the Horn of Africa region is still relatively low, but is bound to increase in the next decades. Ethiopia in particular may witness rising emigration rates in the next few decades.
- Policies aimed at reducing migration flows from region through development cooperation and economic development are likely to achieve the opposite and will result in more migration.

The invasion myth

The myth exists that migration is at an all-time high and Europe is being invaded by refugees and irregular migrants from Africa that threaten Europe's social and economic and cultural systems. Notwithstanding the rapid rise in numbers of migrants and asylum seekers entering Europe irregularly in 2014 and 2015 global figures of migration are relatively modest. The proportion of world's population identified as international migrants by the United Nations has not changed significantly since 1995, at around 3 per cent even though the absolute number of migrants has increased rapidly.²⁶³

Studies also show that, contrary to popular belief, most African migration is not directed towards Europe, but towards other African countries and that those moving out of Africa do not only move to Europe but also to the Gulf countries and the Americas.²⁶⁴ Moreover, contrary to the common idea that African emigration is essentially about irregular movement, research suggests that most Africans migrate out of the continent in possession of valid passports, visas and other travel documentation.²⁶⁵

About 86 per cent of international migration within Africa in 2011 was not primarily related to conflict. As in other regions in the world, most Africans migrate for family, work or study.²⁶⁶ This also contradicts conventional interpretations of African migration being essentially driven by poverty, violence and underdevelopment. Migration out of Africa seems rather to be driven by processes of development and social transformation which have increased Africans' capabilities and aspirations to migrate.²⁶⁷

Nevertheless, there is a strong belief among part of the general public and some politicians, that Europe may be swamped with refugees and migrants if it would loosen immigration controls.²⁶⁸ This is further fuelled by media reports quoting officials saying "800,000 migrants are waiting to cross to

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263 Skeldon, 2013, p. 7.

264 Schoumaker et al., 2015; Sander and Maimbo, 2003; Bakewell and De Haas, 2007. all quoted in: Flahaux and de Haas, 2014, p. 4-5.

265 Schoumaker et al., 2015; Bakewell and Jónsson, 2011; both quoted in: Flahaux and de Haas, 2014, p. 5.

266 Schoorl, et al., 2002, quoted in: Flahaux and de Haas, 2014, p. 5.

267 Flahaux and de Haas, 2014.

268 Legrain, 2015.

Europe²⁶⁹ or politicians who are warning “against “waves of millions” of people from Africa coming to Europe if the EU agrees a common policy for tackling migrant deaths in the Mediterranean”.²⁷⁰ This contradicts the fact that most people do not want to leave their home countries and that many cannot as they do not have the means.²⁷¹ After all, there are only 250 million international migrants globally of a total population of currently 7.3 billion. In other words, in what has been called by some, the Age of Migration²⁷², only 3.4 per cent of the world’s population is on the move and most, Africans in particular, stay within their own region.

Several examples show that the loosening of immigration restrictions or the implementation of free movement agreements would not necessarily lead to a sudden and large increase in migration movements within regions:

In 2004 and 2007, the European Union gave membership to 10 much poorer, ex-Communist countries on the continent giving citizens the right to move freely across the Union and between Central and Eastern Europe states and richer North Western European countries, where in some cases average incomes were about eight times higher. However, only four million Eastern Europeans have migrated since 2004, and many come and go.²⁷³ The flow of immigrants from Poland to the existing EU countries after Poland joined the EU in May 2004 was much lower than feared. In 2006 (a peak year) about 47,000 people emigrated, approximately 38 million Poles did not.²⁷⁴ Despite genuine free movement regulations, just 0.5 per cent of Europeans circulate within Europe, far less than many observers predicted.²⁷⁵

In the ECOWAS region of West Africa, free movement of persons across the block is one of the main provisions within the ECOWAS Treaty. It is estimated that about 7.5 million West Africans (about 3 per cent of the region’s population) circulate within the sub-region.²⁷⁶ In the IGAD region, where free movement has not been implemented, the number of international migrants (with the exception of Djibouti) as a percentage of the total population in 2010 was less than 2 per cent, as many as forced migrants/refugees.²⁷⁷ This implies that, although free movement regulations might result in increasing migration flows (especially towards certain sub-regional economic centres, for example Nairobi, Kampala or Addis Ababa), it does not necessarily lead to a sudden and/or sharp increase in the volume.

There are only 250 million international migrants globally of a total population of currently 7.3 billion. In other words, in what has been called by some, the Age of Migration, only 3.4 per cent of the world’s population is on the move and most, Africans in particular, stay within their own region.

269 Such as the head of Italy’s Immigration and Border Police agency in April 2014 who was widely quoted in the media. He later admitted the figure was not a concrete project (Siegfried, 2014).

270 Such as UKIPs leader Nigel Farage in *The Guardian* in April 2015 (Mason, 2015).

271 Legrain, 2015.

272 The Age of Migration is the title of a standard work on migration by Stephen Castles and Mark Miller, first published in 1993.

273 Legrain, 2015.

274 Kennan, 2014, p. 4.

275 RMMS, 2015a, p. 3.

276 African Development Bank, 2013a.

277 ICMDP, 2013, p. 95; Djibouti has a particularly high migrant stock, which suggests its importance as a transit country for migrants en route to Yemen and the Gulf states.

Comparing the two regions, it seems migration is only slightly higher in the free movement region.²⁷⁸

Key points for the region

- Relatively, migration has not increased significantly, only a fraction of Africans are migrating and not all are migrating to Europe as most stay within the region.
- The implementation of free movement provisions (such as in the East African Community Common Market Protocol) will not necessarily lead to more migration within regions. Migration rates are relatively stable over the years and when compared between regions (whether there is free movement or not). However, although data is unavailable, implementation of free movement provisions between regions (for example, between West Africa and Europe or between the Horn of Africa and Europe) could lead to increased migration flows between these regions.

Relation between restrictive immigration policies and migration

The third myth centres around the effects of immigration policies on migration. Politicians in Europe like to give the impression that immigration policies have become more restrictive. However, research shows that policies have become less restrictive for most migrant groups. It seems that tough talk on migration is mainly rhetoric aimed at making political gains.²⁷⁹

A 5-year research project on the Determinants of International Migration (DEMIG) at the International Migration Institute at Oxford University looked into the effects of immigration policies on migration flows. The main findings of the project showed that while immigration restrictions often reduce immigration, these effects tend to be rather small. Additionally, restrictions often have four potential side-effects (substitution effects) which undermine the effectiveness or can even make them counter-productive:²⁸⁰

- Restrictions often compel migrants to 'jump categories', by finding other legal or irregular channels to migrate (categorical substitution).
- Second, restrictions affect the timing of migration, in the expectation of future tightening of policies. This can lead to huge surges of 'now or never migration' (inter-temporal substitution). It has been argued that this is currently the case in the UK, where the possibility of a 'Brexit' (Britain's exit from the European Union) leads to now or never migration, causing larger than usual immigration flows into the UK and reducing return migration (see the fourth effect).²⁸¹
- Restrictions often compel migrants to explore new geographical routes by migrating to or via other countries. For instance, if one European country toughens its asylum policies, this may divert asylum seekers to neighbouring countries. This is what happens in the Mediterranean

278 RMMS, 2015a, p. 3; These figures are to be treated with caution, as the exact numbers of migrants (regularly and irregular) are unknown and figures are from 2010.

279 De Haas, 2014.

280 De Haas, 2015a.

281 De Haas, 2015c.

Sea, where immigration controls do not stop migration but rather compel migrants and smugglers to use other geographical routes (spatial substitution). This is also known as the 'balloon effect', a term often used in the fight against organized crime: squeeze the balloon in one place, and it expands somewhere else.²⁸²

- The fourth and probably strongest side effect of immigration restrictions is that they not only reduce immigration but that they also reduce return migration. Thus, they reduce circulation and push migrants into permanent settlement, although this is the opposite of what most immigration policies aim to achieve (reverse flow substitution).²⁸³

In short, the effectiveness of restrictions is very limited, because it is partly or entirely undermined by these side-effects. Moreover, there is the human cost of immigration restrictions as it creates a market for smuggling, increased suffering of refugees and migrants and a rising death toll.²⁸⁴

The findings above have been replicated in research on the effect of visa policies. While travel visa policies significantly decrease inflows, this effect is to a large extent undermined by decreasing outflows of the same migrant groups. Migration restrictions thus decrease circulation and tend to encourage long-term settlement. This also reduces the responsiveness of migration to economic fluctuations in destination and origin societies.²⁸⁵ Illegal migration is thought to be fairly responsive to economic cycles in host and source countries. As migrants are usually overrepresented in low-skilled occupations that are typically hit hardest during economic downturns, and since many are ineligible for welfare benefits, they suffer particular hardship during recession. Nevertheless, during the economic downturn since 2008, fewer migrants left European countries than could be expected since many migrant workers feared they would not be able to come back to the host country after the recession.²⁸⁶

282 Andersson, 2015.

283 De Haas, 2015a.

284 Ibid; Flahaux and de Haas, 2014, p. 24.

285 Czaika and de Haas, 2014, p. 2.

286 Dadush, 2014, p. 16.

Key points for the region

- Countries in the region appear to be increasingly strict on migration – partly in response to security threats – with, for example, common and mass arrests and detention of irregular migrants in for example Kenya and Tanzania, the closure of the border between Kenya and Somalia and the construction of a wall between those two countries.
- Due to restrictions and the lack of legal means for migration, the regional migrant smuggling business is flourishing, as restrictive immigration policies will not stop migration, but only push migrants into irregular migration, divert the routes, increase the demand for smugglers (which fuels corruption) and increases migrants' vulnerability.

Whereas Kenya is increasingly trying to restrict movement between Somalia and Kenya, this might lead to a temporary but sudden surge in migration from Somalia, as well as prevent the return migration of Somalis, which might hamper the ongoing voluntary return operation of Somali refugees and push more Somalis into permanent settlement in Kenya.

Migration and the welfare state

The fourth myth, again particularly strong in Europe and often used by politicians in anti-immigration rhetoric, is that many migrants rely on and abuse the welfare state. The commonly held belief is that especially unskilled immigrants come to live off the welfare state in advanced countries. However, in a 2013 working paper, it was concluded that it is still an open question whether migrants are a boon or a burden to European welfare states and the answer to this question is likely to differ between countries.²⁸⁷ A 2008 survey, summarizing the European literature, concluded that the general picture to emerge is one of higher immigrant use of welfare programs. However, subsequent country studies in Italy supported but in Denmark contradicted these findings.²⁸⁸ Similarly, in the United Kingdom it was found that immigrants use welfare more intensively than natives, and in Ireland natives are more likely to participate in welfare programs. In Italy, it was found that immigrants from outside the EU are more prone to apply for welfare benefits.²⁸⁹ The evidence that immigrants in Europe are more likely to be welfare recipients than natives is mixed, partly due the difference in the types of benefits offered and the heterogeneity in welfare eligibility criteria across European countries.²⁹⁰

In many countries in Europe, significantly lower net contributions of migrant households to the state budget persist. The reasons for this are primarily lower tax payments of migrant households.²⁹¹ A 2014 paper by KNOMAD, also argued that recently arrived immigrants generally have a less favourable net fiscal profile than natives, but this is mainly because they

287 Huber and Oberdabernig, 2013, p. 4.

288 Studies cited in: Giulletti and Wahba, 2012, p. 16.

289 Ibid, p. 14-16.

290 Giulletti and Wahba, 2012, p. 16.

291 Huber and Oberdabernig, 2013, p. 1.

contribute less to taxes and social security than natives, and their labour force participation rates are lower, not because they use social services more intensively.²⁹² Generally, research shows that most differences in welfare use by immigrants are explained by characteristics such as size of the household and age and education of the household head. If evidence of immigrant welfare dependency is found, it appears to be rather small.²⁹³

Research in 2013 by the OECD in all European OECD countries, as well as Australia, Canada and the United States, suggests that in most countries migrants contribute more in taxes and social contributions than they receive in individual benefits. Contrary to widespread public belief, low-educated immigrants have a better fiscal position - the difference between their contributions and the benefits they receive - than their native-born peers. Labour migrants in particular generate a larger net fiscal contribution than other migrant groups - and thus their net contribution generally tends to be positive, at least in the short run.²⁹⁴ Based on all evidence, the OECD concludes that the impact on the public purse of the cumulative waves of migration that arrived over the past 50 years in OECD countries is on average close to zero, rarely exceeding 0.5 per cent of GDP in either positive or negative terms.²⁹⁵ For most countries migration is neither a major burden nor a major panacea for the public purse.²⁹⁶ Most immigrants, the evidence suggests, do not come for social benefits, but to find work and to improve their lives and those of their families.²⁹⁷ The potential net benefit, however, depends on decisions by policy makers. The net positive fiscal effect of migrants in Norway is twice as large as it is in Denmark. In the United Kingdom, asylum seekers are net takers of benefits because they are banned from working. As argued by Michael Clemens, "part of the UK voters apparently support policies that force asylum seekers not to generate tax revenue. Then some of the same voters complain about asylum seekers because they do not generate tax revenue".²⁹⁸

Research in 2013 by the OECD in all European OECD countries, as well as Australia, Canada and the United States, suggests that in most countries migrants contribute more in taxes and social contributions than they receive in individual benefits.

Key points for the region

- The section above mainly focused on migrants' welfare dependency in European countries. In most African countries, although social security schemes might exist (for example for government workers), these schemes have a very limited coverage and only include formally employed workers. The majority of citizens in African countries are not covered by social security or welfare systems at all.²⁹⁹ Migrants in African countries are, therefore, not a burden on their host countries, as they cannot depend on welfare. As many migrants in African countries work in the informal sector (as do most native workers), they will, however, also not contribute to their host countries in terms of paying taxes.

292 Dadush, 2014, p. 16.

293 Giullietti and Wahba, 2012, p. 16.

294 Liebig and Mo, 2013, p. 161.

295 OECD, 2014b, p. 2-3.

296 Liebig and Mo, 2013, p. 161.

297 OECD, 2014b, p. 2-3.

298 Vice, 2015.

299 Devereux and Cipryk, 2009, p. 10.

Migration and labour markets

Frequent claims among politicians and the general public are that 'migrants displace native workers causing unemployment', 'migrants have a downward effect on wages of native workers' or, conversely, that 'labour migration is the solution for the ageing population in Europe and in addressing labour market shortages'. However, there is not a fixed number of jobs available, new arrivals also create additional demand for others' work and labour influx stimulates investment.³⁰⁰ Migrants also often do the jobs that local populations shun or for which they lack the skills. Migration, therefore, has a positive, but comparatively small, effect on economic growth, although, it is predominantly employers, the middle classes and the wealthy who benefit from migration.³⁰¹

In public debates in Europe, it is often proclaimed there are no jobs available for migrants. However, according to François Crépeau, the UN Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Migrants, the availability of jobs is exactly the reason why migrants keep coming to Europe. Even for irregular migrants, there are many (often very poorly paid) jobs available, for example in agriculture, in construction, in hospitality or in the care of the elderly or care of young people. Migrants are aware of the availability of jobs, which creates a pull factor.³⁰² This shows that immigration is primarily driven by economic conditions. Fluctuations in both legal and illegal immigration are more associated with economic cycles than with immigration policies. Only sustained economic recessions tend to significantly curb immigration.³⁰³

With regard to migration as the solution for an ageing population, migration, if well-managed and organized, could alleviate some urgent labour market needs both in low, medium and high skilled jobs. It is estimated that without immigration, the EUs working-age population will fall from 336 million in 2010 to 300 million in 2030, and the number of people aged 65 and over is set increase from 87 million to 123 million over the same period. Economically active migrants could help to pay for Europeans reaching retirement and provide care for the elderly.³⁰⁴ However, just as migration is not a threat to the employment of native workers or to the welfare state, it is neither a solution to fundamental socio-economic problems such as ageing. The magnitude of migration is too limited (taken into account the numbers above, millions of migrants would be needed) while ageing is becoming a worldwide phenomenon.³⁰⁵ Moreover, permanent migration from developing countries to North would not be a solution, as migrants themselves age.³⁰⁶

300 Legrain, 2015.

301 De Haas, 2014.

302 Jackson, 2015.

303 De Haas, 2011.

304 Legrain, 2015.

305 De Haas, 2014.

306 Hugo, 2012, p. 42-43.

Key points for the region

- As discussed, most migration within Africa is driven by employment. Fluctuations in migration flows are more related to economies than to immigration policies. Ethiopian migration to Saudi Arabia continued despite a major crackdown on irregular migration and mass deportations in 2013/2014 and still continues despite the war in Yemen. As long as there are jobs available in Saudi Arabia or elsewhere, Ethiopians and other migrants groups from the region will continue to migrate to Saudi Arabia and other Gulf States.
- Research on the effects of labour migration within developing regions is limited. However, available research shows that labour migration between developing countries also improves the well-being of people in these countries, leads to rising incomes and has little effect on wages of native workers.³⁰⁷

2.7 Future migration

Possible future and long-term patterns

Based on current and global trends and developments and migration theory, it is possible to describe some general ideas and expectations about future migration patterns. However, it should also be noted that the Horn of Africa and Yemen region can be characterized by a precarious peace and security landscape, high levels of poverty and substantial differences between the countries in terms of development.³⁰⁸ Regular and irregular migration flows take place in a dynamic and constantly changing environment. Predicting short term developments and emergencies causing migration flows is an imperfect and hazardous enterprise.

Several examples illustrate the dynamic nature of mixed migration flows. The conflict in Yemen which escalated in March 2015, led to migration flows from Yemen to the Horn of Africa and Yemen, which refugees and returnees from Yemen arriving in Somalia and Djibouti. In late 2013, a civil war began in South Sudan when fighting erupted between Dinka and Nuer elements within the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM). As a result South Sudanese once again fled their country, with almost 753,000 South Sudanese refugees in the neighbouring countries of Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan and Uganda as of July 2015.³⁰⁹ Demonstrations in the run-up to elections in Burundi, a failed coup attempt and political turmoil, violence and intimidation caused nearly 144,000 Burundians to flee and seek safety in neighbouring Rwanda, Tanzania and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) between early April and end of June 2015. UNHCR expects the number will rise to 200,000.³¹⁰

Regular and irregular migration flows take place in a dynamic and constantly changing environment. Predicting short term developments and emergencies causing migration flows is an imperfect and hazardous enterprise.

307 Kennan, 2014, p. 7-8.

308 RMMS, 2015a, p. 2.

309 UNHCR, 2015j.

310 UNHCR, 2015f.

Such developments cannot be fully predicted. Predicting migration flows is not the purpose of this section though. Rather, it is meant to discuss possibilities of future patterns and key migration drivers. This section discusses 6 important drivers and the way these might affect future migration patterns: Demography, Economy, Environment, Technology, Urbanisation and Chain Migration.

Demography

According to the OECD, worldwide, migration flows are very likely to rise or at least remain constant over the next twenty years or so, much in line – on aggregate – with trends of the last 30 years.³¹¹

Demographic developments play an important role in defining migration patterns. On one hand, the ageing process in OECD countries, generated by slowing population growth and changing age pyramids, is a powerful pull factor for migrants from the developing world. In OECD countries there will be a demand to replace the declining numbers of young workers, replenish retirement funds and raise productivity, as well as demand for caregivers to look after the elderly.³¹²

Moreover, the younger the population, the bigger the share of the population prone to emigrate. Projections suggest that South East Asia and Africa will face big increases in youth populations.³¹³ The Sub-Saharan African population is growing at a very fast rate. With 60 per cent of its population aged under 25 and population growth rate expected to remain high till at least 2050, this might lead to strong migratory pressure out of Sub-Saharan Africa.³¹⁴ Moreover, in the longer term, falling fertility may create a so-called ‘youth bulge’, characterised by a high proportion of (migration-prone) young adults within a population, which can also increase migration propensities, especially if these demographic trends are not matched by accelerated, high and sustainable growth of income and opportunities for the young.³¹⁵ Together with an ageing population and economic attractiveness in OECD countries, this results in a powerful combination of push and pull factors stimulating migration from developing countries in Sub-Saharan Africa to OECD countries.³¹⁶

Economy

Overall the emigration rates are still relatively low across the African continent and in the Horn of Africa and Yemen region. The region, therefore, has a significant future emigration potential. Based on migration theory, it can be expected that, unless unprecedented economic growth and employment opportunities occur, any future economic growth in relatively poor Sub-Saharan African countries is likely to increase emigration because it will give more people the resources they need to migrate. Moreover, economic gaps and regional and inter-regional inequality will remain substantial for decades to come.³¹⁷ It is, therefore, expected that migration from Africa will

311 OECD, 2009, p. 43.

312 Ibid, p. 10.

313 Ibid, p. 11.

314 Ibid, p. 160.

315 RMMS and Oxford University, 2012, p. 15.

316 OECD, 2009, p. 13.

317 RMMS and Oxford University, 2012, p. 22.

rise initially with economic progress.³¹⁸ As highlighted in text box 6, this is particularly true for countries like Ethiopia, where human and economic development will lead to accelerating emigration.³¹⁹ Higher education levels are also likely to increase aspirations and educated people tend to be more mobile, which in combination with the above mentioned 'youth bulge' could create significant migration potential.³²⁰

Economic development and deeper regional integration and interdependence (such as in the Regional Economic Communities in Africa) might further lead to an increase in inter-regional trade and more standardised, modernised and efficient border controls, which may prompt greater regional labour migration and trade-related mobility.³²¹ In June 2015, African leaders signed an agreement in Cairo to create the continent's largest free-trade zone, covering 26 countries in an area from Cape Town to Cairo. This Tripartite Free Trade Area (TFTA) is intended to ease the movement of goods across the member countries, which represent more than half the continent's GDP. Three existing trade blocs - the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the East African Community (EAC) and the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) - are to be united into a single new zone.

By removing trade barriers, the agreement aims to stimulate economic activity across the region of more than 600 million people.³²² It is expected the deal (which still needs to be ratified by the national parliaments of the bulk of the member states before it becomes in force) will be a first step towards the establishment of the even more ambitious Continental Free Trade Area that is expected to cover all of Africa. Observers pointed out that the launch has demonstrated the possibility of collective action among 26 very heterogeneous nations (with GDP per capita ranging from the Seychelles' almost USD 16,000 to Burundi's USD 270) and that it shows the feasibility of harmonizing three very different trade regimes into one unified scheme.³²³ Although free movement of persons is not part of the Cape-to-Cairo agreement, it could be expected it will lead to greater regional labour migration and trade-related mobility. Deeper regional integration is, on the hand, likely to raise the opportunity cost of going to war, making forced migration less likely, thereby reducing migration numbers somewhat.

Migration from Sub-Saharan Africa to wealthy countries in Europe and North America is still relatively low. However, with human and economic development, more potential migrants will have the means needed to afford international migration, may increase migration to new and more distant destinations.³²⁴

Environment

The International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) regards Africa as the continent most vulnerable to climate change. Among the risks the

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318 OECD, 2009, p. 220.

319 RMMS and Oxford University, 2012, p. 11-12.

320 Ibid, p. 20.

321 Ibid, p. 30.

322 BBC, 2015c.

323 Andriamananjara, 2015.

324 RMMS and Oxford University, 2012, p. 42.

continent faces are reductions in food security and agricultural productivity, particularly regarding subsistence agriculture, increased water stress, and increased exposure to disease and other health risks.³²⁵ In the Greater Horn of Africa region, climate change is also anticipated, including increased frequency and intensity of droughts and floods, tropical cyclones, leading to increased water stress, higher temperatures, desertification, decreased agricultural production, increased human and livestock diseases, livestock loss, and famine, while sinking ground water levels and sea level rise cause salinization of land and water sources and may pose threats to seaside settlements. The number of people displaced due environmental circumstances is, as a result, likely to increase. Climate change also exacerbates the potential for conflict associated with weakened resilience to natural hazards and competition over scarce resources such as water and grazing areas, which further fuels displacement.³²⁶ Resource scarcity (and conflict), limited livelihood opportunities and unemployment fuel migration both from the pastoral and agricultural areas of the region and this may continue over the coming years and decades.³²⁷

Urbanisation

The region has great potential in terms of possible future rural-to-urban migration. Within the region, Nairobi is expected to grow by 55 per cent to over 6 million between 2015 and 2025.³²⁸ Dar es Salaam is expected to grow by 103 per cent to almost 7.3 million between 2011 and 2025 and Addis Ababa by 58 per cent between 2011 and 2025.³²⁹

Currently, Eastern Africa is the world's least urbanized, but at the same time fastest urbanizing sub-region. By the end of the current decade, the urban population in East Africa will have increased by 5 per cent. The Africa-wide urbanization level is projected to reach 50 per cent around 2035 and may rise further to almost 58 per cent by 2050. Over a quarter of the 100 fastest-growing cities in the world are now in Africa which, by 2011, already hosted 52 cities exceeding one million inhabitants. Between 2010 and 2050, the number of Africa's urban dwellers is projected to increase from 400 million to 1.26 billion.³³⁰

Rural-urban migration is often a first step towards international migration, as urban migrants experience welfare improvement, which might accumulate to having the means to pay for international migration.³³¹ Moreover, rural-urban migrants send internal remittances to their families in rural areas, enabling relatives to migrate to the cities as well. However, the pace and extent to which this will occur depends on future economic growth, investment, and the development of urban-based industrial and service economies.³³² It is clear though that Eastern Africa will face huge challenges associated with massive urban population increases.³³³

325 International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC, 2007), quoted in OECD, 2009 p. 177.

326 Nansen Initiative, 2015, p. 5.

327 RMMS and Oxford University, 2012, p. 16-17.

328 UN-Habitat, 2014, p. 25.

329 Ibid, p. 150.

330 Ibid, p. 11; p. 23.

331 RMMS and Oxford University, 2012, p. 22.

332 Ibid.

333 UN-Habitat, 2014, p. 11

Technology and social media

Improved telecommunication can have opposite effects on migration. It can increase people's knowledge of opportunities elsewhere and, hence, increase their aspirations to migrate. It can also increase contact with others who have already migrated and facilitate the transfer of remittances in times of need (which might be used for migration of those still in the country of origin). Other migrants can be important sources for information that help reduce risk and uncertainty for those thinking of migrating. However, improved telecommunication can also alleviate the need or desire to permanently migrate, and therefore have a migration-reducing effect.³³⁴

Nevertheless, most evidence seems to point to the direction of a migration-facilitating effect of telecommunication, and in particular of social media. An Oxford University working paper revealed four ways in which this happens:

- using social media helps migrants to maintain strong ties with family and friends, lowering the threshold for migration;
- social media can provide a means of communication with weak ties (links between social groups that harbour different pools of information) that are relevant when organising the process of migration and settlement;
- using social media establishes a new infrastructure consisting of latent ties (ones that exist technically but have not yet been activated);
- social media are a rich source of unofficial insider knowledge on migration;
- The paper concludes that social media are transforming migration networks and thereby lowering the threshold for migration.³³⁵

Social media (like Facebook and Twitter) are in most cases open to everyone. This creates a public sphere in which information can be published and circulated through low-key channels. Information on social media spreads rapidly and can offer the latest news, for example on upcoming rounds of legalization, availability of informal jobs and accommodation, or illegal ways of crossing borders. This can affect migrants' migration strategies. Social media, therefore, not only strengthens people's ability to migrate, but also fuel their aspiration to migrate.³³⁶

334 RMMS and Oxford University, 2012, p. 26.

335 Dekker and Engbersen, 2012.

336 Ibid, p. 7.

Box 8: Social media and migrant smuggling

Social media, such as Facebook pages, are even used by smugglers and traffickers to attract migrants and refugees by advertising illegal boat trips across the Mediterranean to Europe.³³⁷ Some of these Facebook pages read like the websites of travel agencies. One Facebook page of a Turkey-based smuggler for example advertises: “A trip to Italy next week in a big fast tourist yacht, two floors, air-conditioned, prepared for tourists. Recommended for families.” While previously, smugglers could only be contacted through trusted third parties, many smugglers are now openly publicising their phone numbers, prices and schedules on social media.³³⁸ In response to the Mediterranean migration crisis, Facebook and other social media giants are considered a new front in the battle to fight illegal migration to Europe, as the EU is planning to target (and remove) online content used by traffickers to attract refugees. In the EU proposal in response to the crisis, is planning to direct Europol, the EU law-enforcement coordination agency, to seek removal of online content posted by smugglers.³³⁹

Migration network theory assumes that people move to places where they already have contacts and social media allows for quick and easy communication with these contacts. It could be argued, however, that social media not only provides new and fast communication channels within existing migration networks, but that social media is actively transforming the nature of these networks and thereby facilitating migration. Through social media on the internet, it is easier to revive or make new contacts. This provides potential migrants with access to an extensive and extended pool of informal information outside of existing networks and thus widens the horizon for aspiring migrants.³⁴⁰

‘Chain migration’ and the power of successful migration

Typically, linkages between sending and receiving countries are established by pioneer migrants, driven by factors independent of migrant networks. Once connections and migrant networks have been established, other migrants will follow, travelling the beaten paths. This pattern has been referred to as ‘chain migration’. Migration networks help lower the costs and risks that migration entails. Migrants therefore prefer to migrate to places where they already have contacts.³⁴¹

Once started, migration processes tend to become partly self-perpetuating, leading to the formation of migrant networks and systems, resulting in more migration. Migrants will form businesses, remit money, establish transport links and trade patterns.³⁴² A study of the Senegalese diaspora, for example, showed how the success of trading networks between Senegal and Europe

337 Palmeri, 2015.

338 Kingsley, 2015b.

339 Palmeri, 2015.

340 Dekker and Engbersen, 2012, p. 15-16.

341 Ibid, p. 5.

342 RMMS and Oxford University, 2012, p. 11.

encouraged more emigration. Networks may also act to perpetuate migration even after the initial causes have waned. Emigration flows from Ghana were initially spurred by the economic crisis, but appear to continue to increase despite that country's recovery, due to the establishment of networks.³⁴³

In a trend that begun recently (see the next chapter) Somali refugees and migrants are increasingly moving onwards from Nairobi to Kampala in Uganda. Based on the theory of chain migration it is likely this movement will continue. New trading networks set up by Somalis in Kampala will also provide market information and credit to newcomers, stimulating more Somalis to settle in Kampala. Similarly, the large number of Eritreans that are currently migrating to Europe, results in larger Eritrean communities along the migration route to Europe (for example in cities like Khartoum) as well as in destination countries in Europe. Migration from Eritrea (including secondary migration from Eritrean refugee camps in Ethiopia) to Europe will likely continue or even increase.

The current focus in Europe is mostly on those who do not make it while crossing the Mediterranean to Europe. While the number of 3,500 deaths in 2014 is unacceptably high, 219,000 refugees and migrants did make the crossing in 2014, which means more than 98 per cent made the crossing alive. While those who made the crossing face many difficulties and uncertainties in Europe as well, most do succeed in one way or another. They find a job in the informal sector and are able to send some money home. These 'success stories' encourage other people to go as well, even though they are aware of the risks. Despite all the difficulties, for many refugees and migrants and their families, migration can be a way out of poverty and insecurity. As most factors discussed in this chapter point to increasing migration from the wider Horn of Africa region - and as a majority of the refugees and migrants succeed in one way or another - both chain migration mechanisms and the success of others are likely to further stimulate migration both within and out of the region.

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343 Shaw, 2007, p. 11-12.

3. The contribution of migration to development

Despite the routine violations of the human rights of refugees and migrants in the region and the general negative public perception and rhetoric around migration, there are many ways in which migration can positively contribute to development. This chapter will discuss several ways in which migration can contribute to the development of countries in the region, by focussing on five topics: the diaspora, remittances, labour migration, free movement and refugee economies. Finally, the last three sections include examples of migration and development (policy) in three countries in the region: Kenya, Ethiopia and Somalia.

3.1 Diaspora and development

The diaspora

The diaspora can be defined as a group of persons who have migrated and their descendants, who maintain a connection to their homeland. The AU defines its diaspora as “consisting of people of African origin living outside the continent, irrespective of their citizenship and nationality and who are willing to contribute to the development of the continent and the building of the AU.”³⁴⁴

The diaspora can contribute to origin countries in a number of ways beyond remittances. African diaspora are playing a role in helping their homelands develop, and African countries have begun efforts to tap the skills and resources of migrants. The contributions include, apart from monetary remittances, trade and investment, and transfer of skills and technology.³⁴⁵

Although most research on the contributions of diasporas to development in origin countries focuses on highly educated migrants living in Europe and the United States, both low- and high-skilled diaspora members, both inside or outside Africa, can make contributions to their home communities.³⁴⁶ Much less is known about diaspora members who reside in other countries within their region of origin or those who have moved to other developing countries, although almost two-thirds of migrants from Sub-Saharan Africa leave for other countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, with most remaining within the sub-region (for example, West Africans remain primarily within West Africa).³⁴⁷ The table below provides an indication of the main destination countries for refugees and migrants from the region, based on 2013 UN-DESA figures.³⁴⁸

African diaspora are playing a role in helping their homelands develop, and African countries have begun efforts to tap the skills and resources of migrants. The contributions include, apart from monetary remittances, trade and investment, and transfer of skills and technology.

344 Ratha and Plaza, 2011, p. 48.

345 Ibid; The World Bank and African Development Bank, 2011, p. 10.

346 Ratha and Plaza, 2011, p. 48.

347 Ibid, p. 48-49; ACP/IOM, 2013, p. 35.

348 As the UN-DESA figures are based on official statistics, they do not accurately capture all (irregular) migration. Therefore, the table excludes the actual figures and only shows the top-destination countries. To illustrate, the UN-DESA figures put the number of Ethiopians in Saudi Arabia in 2013 at 28,048, while over 160,000 Ethiopians alone were deported from Saudi Arabia to Ethiopia between November 2013 and early 2014, which means the actual figure of Ethiopians in Saudi must have been much higher.

Table 1:
Top-5 destination countries for migrants from the region

| Country | Top-5 destination countries |
|----------|---|
| Burundi | Tanzania; DRC; Rwanda; Uganda; Canada |
| Djibouti | France; Ethiopia; Libya; Canada; Egypt |
| Eritrea | Sudan; Saudi Arabia; United States of America; United Arab Emirates; United Kingdom |
| Ethiopia | United States of America; Sudan; Israel; Italy; Saudi Arabia |
| Kenya | United Kingdom; United States of America; Uganda; Tanzania Canada |
| Rwanda | DRC; Uganda; Burundi; Republic of the Congo; France |
| Somalia | Kenya; Ethiopia; Yemen; Libya; United States of America |
| Tanzania | Rwanda; Kenya; United Kingdom; Uganda; Canada |
| Uganda | Kenya; South Sudan; Rwanda; United Kingdom; United States of America |
| Yemen | Saudi Arabia; United Arab Emirates; Kuwait; United States of America; Israel |

Source: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs (2013). Trends in International Migrant Stock: Migrants by Destination and Origin (United Nations database, POP/DB/MIG/Stock/Rev.2013).

Diaspora skills and technology transfers

Diaspora can transfer skills and technologies to their countries of origin, either from a distance or during visits or upon return. A related concept is that of social remittances, which are the ideas, behaviours, identities and social capital that flow from receiving to sending country communities.³⁴⁹ By transferring innovative ideas, political values and policy reforms, the diaspora can be a driver of socio-cultural change.³⁵⁰ Diaspora can provide firms, organizations and sectors in origin countries with access to technology and skills, for example through professional associations (as the Ghanaian Doctors and Dentists Association does in the United Kingdom), temporary assignments of skilled expatriates in origin countries, distance teaching, and the return (for a short stay or permanent return) of emigrants with enhanced skills. Instead of viewing the emigration of skilled people as a loss, economists and policymakers have increasingly come to the view that it is an opportunity to get trade and investment projects and new knowledge. The skills of the diaspora can also be tapped by establishing knowledge exchange networks, such as mentor-sponsor programs in certain sectors

³⁴⁹ Levitt, 2001, quoted in: Lacroix, 2008, p. 4.

³⁵⁰ ACP/OM, 2014, p. 50.

or industries, joint research projects, peer reviewer mechanisms, virtual return (through distance teaching and e-learning), and short-term visits and assignments. For example, small pilot initiatives exist that invite diaspora members to teach courses in African universities.³⁵¹

Social remittances – a term first coined by Peggy Levitt in 1998 referring to the ideas, behaviours, identities and social capital flowing from receiving- to sending-country communities³⁵² - can also have a positive impact on friends and family members of migrants. A study in Tanzania shows that among friends and relatives left behind by migrants, the attitudes and practices related to education, health, employment and business, gender, the environment, politics, human rights and the distribution of wealth can positively change as a result of the social remittances.³⁵³

Diaspora and trade

Growing empirical literature has provided evidence that migrant networks could facilitate bilateral economic transactions.³⁵⁴ Migrants often have a preference for their native country's goods and services, thus supporting nostalgic trade in ethnic products. Migrants also facilitate bilateral trade and investment flows between their country of residence and their home country by matching producers of consumer goods in one country with distributors in the other country. The shared language and similar cultural background eases communication and facilitates understanding of procedures, and regulations.³⁵⁵

The World Bank recently studied this so-called pro-trade effect of migration in the context of Africa. African trade has grown significantly over the last decade, but African exports still represent a negligible portion of global exports. Generally, African products suffer from significant trade barriers (time to export, transportation difficulties, weak legal institutions) and limited information about international trading opportunities. At the same time African migration has increased. The World Bank found a substantial positive effect of the African diaspora on African exports that is higher than the average effect of migration on exports at the world level. The positive effect of the African diaspora on intra-African exports also appears to be stronger when migrants are established in geographically and ethnically distant countries. The World Bank, therefore, suggests that through migration, trade barriers hampering African trade could be further reduced, namely that it would help enforce contracts, reduce information costs, and lower cultural barriers.³⁵⁶

Diaspora investments, bonds and savings

Members of the diaspora can increase investment flows between sending and receiving countries because they possess important information that can help identify investment opportunities and facilitate compliance with regulations. Migrants are also often more willing than other investors to take on risks in their origin countries, because they understand their

Members of the diaspora can increase investment flows between sending and receiving countries because they possess important information that can help identify investment opportunities and facilitate compliance with regulations.

351 Ratha and Plaza, 2011, p. 50.

352 Levitt, 1998.

353 ACP/IOM, 2013, p. 49-50.

354 Ehrhart, et al., 2014, p. 2-3.

355 Ratha and Plaza, 2011, p. 49.

356 Ehrhart, et al., 2014, p. 2-3.

countries and are better able to evaluate investment opportunities. In many cases, they also still have the contacts to facilitate the investment process. Diaspora members can thereby act as catalysts for the development of capital markets in their countries of origin by diversifying the investor base, introducing new financial products, and by providing sources of funding.³⁵⁷

Box 9: Diaspora investment by Somalis in Kampala

Diaspora investments can also make an important difference on a small scale. Research on refugees in Kampala, Uganda, identified how diaspora investments contributed to the livelihoods of refugees and facilitated setting up small businesses by refugees. Some, particularly Somali, diaspora members are heavily connected with refugee businesses in Kampala as investors and/or partners. Diaspora members for example provide the initial capital by remittances to begin a business and hire Somali (refugees) in Kampala to run the business on the ground.³⁵⁸

A particular avenue for mobilizing diaspora funds for investment are the so-called diaspora bonds, which are saving instruments marketed to diaspora members. A developing country government (or a private corporation in that country) can tap into the wealth of the diaspora by selling bonds in small denominations (for example from USD 100 to USD 1,000) or in larger denominations to wealthier migrants, diaspora groups, and institutional investors. The money raised can then be used to finance projects that interest overseas migrants, for example housing, schools, hospitals, and infrastructure projects that can benefit their families or their communities back home. As many diaspora savings are held as cash or in low-yielding bank accounts in the countries of destination with near-zero interest rates, offering an annual interest rate of 4 or 5 percent on diaspora bonds makes it an interesting investment. According to the World Bank, diaspora investors can be a more stable source of funds than other foreign investors, because of their familiarity with the home country often gives them a lower perception of risk. Moreover, diaspora members are generally less concerned with devaluation risk because they are more likely to have a use for local currency.³⁵⁹

In 2011, the World Bank estimated that African diaspora members save USD 53 billion annually, while for Sub-Saharan Africa diaspora savings amounted to USD 36 billion.³⁶⁰ The World Bank calculated that if one in every 10 members of the African diaspora could be persuaded to invest USD 1,000 in his or her country of origin, Africa could raise USD 3 billion a year for development financing.³⁶¹ Many countries, including countries in fragile situations have sizeable diaspora savings as a share of their GDP, such as Somalia (81 per cent) and Liberia (29 per cent). These countries

Diaspora investors can be a more stable source of funds than other foreign investors, because of their familiarity with the home country often gives them a lower perception of risk.

357 Ratha and Plaza, 2011, p. 49.

358 Omata, 2012, p. 18.

359 Ratha and Plaza, 2011, p. 50.

360 Ibid, p. 50.

361 Ibid, p. 50.

could potentially use diaspora bonds for reconstruction and development, provided that they put in place proper oversight for the use of funds.³⁶² Several countries in the region, most notably Ethiopia have been issuing bonds to their diaspora.

Barriers to diaspora investment

As with other potential investors and trading partners, migrants who want to invest in or trade with African countries are often constrained by the poor business environment in these countries, which might include excessive red tape, customs delays, bad infrastructure, corruption, lack of macroeconomic stability, trade barriers, lack of legal security, political instability, lack of accountability, poor governance, and mistrust in government institutions. This affects migrants' decisions to invest in their home countries. A favourable business environment, therefore requires a sound and transparent financial sector, rapid and efficient court systems, and a safe working environment to mobilize diaspora contributions to trade, investment, and technology.³⁶³ Without rule of law and a business-friendly environment the development potential of mobility – including diaspora investments - will be difficult to realize and unsustainable.³⁶⁴

Moreover, any policies aiming to mobilize diaspora funds should take into account that most migrants from countries in the South are rather poor compared to other groups of migrants and that most remittances are not used for investment, but are more important in poverty reduction, survival and livelihood security at the household level.³⁶⁵

Diaspora policies

Acknowledging the potential contribution of their diasporas, African governments are increasingly trying to implement policies to boost flows of financial resources, skills, and technology from the diasporas. They are, for example, reorienting their embassies abroad to engage with the diaspora community and a few African countries have established government agencies to encourage diasporas to invest, assist local communities, and provide policy advice. These initiatives have taken various forms, from the creation of dedicated ministries to deal with migrant communities to the addition of specific functions to existing ministries (such as foreign affairs).³⁶⁶

Diaspora engagement plays a key role in Europe's external migration policy as well. In the 2011-2013 2nd Action Plan of the Africa-EU partnership on Migration, Mobility and Employment, a 'diaspora outreach initiative' was launched with the objective of engaging the diaspora and migrant communities in Europe in the development of Africa, and to build capacity and transfer skills and knowledge from the diaspora to the African continent. The EU supported a diaspora-led initiative to create a platform of African diaspora organisations in Europe active in the development of their country of origin: the Africa-Europe Platform (AEP) was established in 2011. The key priorities of the partnership are to strengthen EU and Africa policy frameworks and institutional capacities for enhancing diaspora

362 World Bank, 2015c, p. 13.

363 Ratha and Plaza, 2011, p. 51; ACP/IOM, 2013, p. 44.

364 ACP/IOM, 2013, p. 44.

365 Ibid, p. 39.

366 Ratha and Plaza, 2011, p. 50-51.

engagement; to support capacities of diasporas as development actors in areas such as volunteering and network building; and to support initiatives aimed at developing a better knowledge of the African diaspora.³⁶⁷

With an eye on the links between diaspora and trade, African countries have also begun efforts to tap their diasporas to provide market information about their destination countries. These activities include the establishment of diaspora trade councils and participation in trade missions and business networks. For example, the Ethiopian, Kenyan, and Ugandan embassies in London and Washington support business and trade forums to attract diaspora investors and to match suppliers with exporters.³⁶⁸

Nevertheless, a World Bank survey of African embassies in France, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom, and the United States found that several embassies have little information on the number of diaspora members, that coordination between the embassies and government ministries needs to improve, and that there is an urgent need for training embassy staff on how to work with diaspora members.³⁶⁹ Taking into account the critical role diaspora can play in opening export markets for products from their home countries, the World Bank suggests that their support should be more actively sought and a whole policy agenda would need to be developed to reach out more effectively to the diasporas and tap to a greater extent into these resources.³⁷⁰

Dual citizenship

According to the World Bank and the African Development Bank, one way to encourage greater diaspora participation in their countries of origin is to allow dual citizenship, as this facilitates travel, removes the constraints foreigners face on some transactions (for example, temporary work or land ownership), and provides access to public services and social benefits.³⁷¹ Dual citizenship can also help to maintain emotional ties with the origin country, which encourages continued contact and investment.³⁷² Granting voting rights to the diaspora is also an important means of encouraging greater engagement with origin countries.³⁷³

Dual citizenship is a sensitive subject though, especially among policy-makers and the general public, although most research points to clear benefits. Recognition of dual citizenship allows the free movement of people and goods and services which generates economic gains.³⁷⁴ Dual citizenship legislation promotes economic development through the transfer of new ideas and technologies to countries of origin and destination, encouraging 'brain circulation'. Research indicates that dual citizenship recognition positively impacts foreign remittance inflows, helps countries attract both physical and human capital, raises GDP and household consumption and increases international labour migration in developing countries. In the

Dual citizenship legislation promotes economic development through the transfer of new ideas and technologies to countries of origin and destination, encouraging 'brain circulation'

367 Africa-EU partnership on MME, 2014.

368 Ehrhart, et al., 2014, p. 20.

369 Ratha and Plaza, 2011, p. 50-51.

370 Ehrhart, et al., 2014, p. 20.

371 The World Bank and African Development Bank, 2011, p. 10.

372 Ibid, p. 10.

373 Ratha and Plaza, 2011, p. 51.

374 Siaplay, 2014, p. 265.

ECOWAS region it was found that dual citizenship recognition increases Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) net inflow and gross capital formation, raises household consumption, and improves child survival. Despite these benefits, many countries, also in the ECOWAS region, still do not recognize dual citizenship.³⁷⁵

In the East African region, Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda have historically been among the countries most opposed to dual nationality, partly because of suspicions about their large populations of Asian descent. The growing diaspora of people of African origin and the economic significance of their remittances to and investments in their countries of origin, have however increased the political pressure to change the law. Uganda has changed its constitution and law to allow dual citizenship, Kenya amended its constitution to the same effect in 2010 and Tanzania is considering doing so. Burundi adopted a new law allowing dual nationality in 2000 and Rwanda changed its law in 2004. These steps towards the legalisation of dual citizenship illustrate a continental trend.³⁷⁶

Return of diaspora

Another way to increase diaspora participation is to encourage the (temporary) return of diaspora. Several destination countries in Europe, such as the Netherlands and Germany, have actively engaged diaspora members residing in their territories to establish links to their home communities abroad and encouraged the temporary return of skilled migrants.³⁷⁷ Various schemes have been implemented; for example the UK-based diaspora organization African Foundation for Development (AFFORD) has established a Diaspora Development Professionals Network, with the aim of supporting Africans who are working in development organizations. The UNDP program for the Transfer of Knowledge Through Expatriate Nationals (TOKTEN), which started in 1977, has operated in various African countries with the aim of mitigating the effects of brain drain by assigning migrants with appropriate expertise for short-term consultancies in their countries of origin. In 2001, IOM established Migration for Development in Africa (MIDA) as a capacity-building program, to mobilize competencies acquired by African nationals abroad for the benefit of Africa's development³⁷⁸ (see for example the section on Somalia).

However, according to the World Bank, many of these initiatives have been largely disappointing because of the limited number of migrants affected, resentment over the preferential treatment of returnees, and concerns that funds are devoted to attracting workers who would have returned anyway.³⁷⁹

Moreover, what seems to be missing in both research and policy initiatives as mentioned above is, according to Oliver Bakewell, a consideration of the African diasporas within Africa, which includes a much larger number of

375 Siaplay, 2014, p. 255-265.

376 Manby, 2010, p. 60-61.

377 ACP/IOM, 2013, p. 35; Ratha and Plaza, 2011, p. 51.

378 Bakewell, 2011, p. 154-155.

379 Ratha and Plaza, 2011, p. 51.

people. The focus is almost exclusively on Africans living beyond the continent. It has been noted, for example, that in the case of Somalia the diaspora seems to refer to Somalis living in the West and the Gulf states and not to the hundred thousands of Somali refugees in neighbouring countries.³⁸⁰

Key points for the region

- Diaspora bonds are one way to facilitate investment and mobilize diaspora savings for development. Although some countries in the region (such as Ethiopia and Kenya) have been issuing bonds, there might be a lot of untapped potential.
- However, for diaspora to become engaged in their origin countries, for example through buying bonds, making investments or starting a business or even return, it is important these countries have a favourable business environment and low levels of corruption. On the World Bank's Ease of Doing Business ranking (a high ease of doing business ranking means the regulatory environment is more conducive to the starting and operation of a local) most countries in the region score relatively low. Only Rwanda scores relatively well, with the 46th position out of 187 countries. All other countries are between position 131 (Tanzania) and 187 (Eritrea).³⁸¹ Moreover, most countries score relatively low on the Transparency International Corruption index. Without improvements with regard to the business environment and corruption it will be difficult for countries in the region to fully benefit from the economic and development potential of the diasporas.
- The recognition of dual citizenship for the diaspora has many economic benefits for origin countries. Although most countries in the region – with Tanzania as a notable exception - now allow dual citizenship, it is important these laws are implemented and that the process of applying for dual citizenship is an easy and efficient process.
- Although the embassies of some countries in the region try to reach out to their diasporas, they generally have little information about their diaspora members, little expertise on how to work with the diaspora and do not effectively cooperate with ministries and other embassies. In order to benefit more from the diaspora's resources, countries in the region and their embassies should acquire more knowledge and information about the diaspora, build capacity and improve coordination.

3.2 Remittances

Remittances to Africa and the East and Horn of Africa region

Remittances – private transfers from migrant workers in a host country to recipients in the workers' country of origin – reached USD 414 billion in 2013. This is four times the level in 2000 and around three times the

³⁸⁰ Bakewell, 2011, p. 154-155.

³⁸¹ World Bank, 2014d.

level of foreign aid. Moreover, unlike foreign aid, remittance transfers are on an upward trajectory and projected to reach USD 540 billion by 2016, according to World Bank figures.³⁸² Remittances are also less volatile than foreign direct investment (FDI) and other private capital flows and remittances go directly to recipient households, augmenting the resources households have at their disposal and potentially generating multiplier effects across local markets.³⁸³ Not surprisingly, remittances have probably received the greatest attention in the migration and development debate.³⁸⁴

According to the most recent World Bank figures, remittances to Sub-Saharan Africa are estimated to have increased by 2.2 per cent in 2014, about twice the average of the previous two years. Stagnation in remittances to Nigeria was balanced by strong growth in Kenya, South Africa, and Uganda.³⁸⁵ The table below provides an overview of: total (official) remittance inflows into countries in the region in 2013; remittance flows as a percentage of GDP; and the top-5 source countries.³⁸⁶

Table 2:
Migrant remittance inflows (total and percentage of GDP)
in countries in the region and top source countries

| Country | Migrant remittance inflows in 2013 (USD million) | Remittances as a share of GDP in 2013 (%) | Top-5 source countries |
|----------|--|---|--|
| Burundi | 51 | 1.8 % | Tanzania, Rwanda, DRC, Uganda, Canada |
| Djibouti | 36 | 2.4 % | France, Ethiopia, Libya, Kenya, Canada |
| Eritrea | Not available in World Bank figures; estimated at 411 million in 2007. | Estimated at 30 % in 2007. | Sudan, Saudi Arabia, United States, United Kingdom, Ethiopia |
| Ethiopia | 646 | 1.3 % | United States, Saudi Arabia, Israel, Sudan, Italy |
| Kenya | 1,481 | 2.4 | United States, United Kingdom, Tanzania, Uganda, Canada |
| Rwanda | 179 | 2.3 % | DRC, Uganda, Burundi, Tanzania, Republic of the Congo |
| Somalia | Not available in World Bank figures. Estimated at 1.3 billion in 20151 | Not available | Kenya, Ethiopia, Yemen, Libya, Djibouti |
| Tanzania | 64 | 0.2 % | Rwanda, United Kingdom, Kenya, Uganda, United States |
| Uganda | 994 | 4.3 % | South Sudan, Rwanda, United Kingdom, Kenya, United States |
| Yemen | 3,455 | 9.3 % | Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, United States, Qatar |

382 Watkins and Quattri, 2014, p. 10.

383 Ibid, p. 14.

384 ACP/IOM, 2013, p. 12.

385 World Bank, 2015c, p. 8.

386 World Bank figures, April 2015.

In 2007/2008, remittances to Eritrea were estimated at USD 411 million, which then amounted to approximately one-third of GDP.

Figures for Somalia and Eritrea are not provided by the World Bank. As of 2015, remittances to Somalia are estimated at USD 1.3 billion.³⁸⁷ Recent estimates for Eritrea are not available, given the lack of published budgets from the government and a scarcity of international economic reporting on Eritrea.³⁸⁸ In 2007/2008, remittances to Eritrea were estimated at USD 411 million, which then amounted to approximately one-third of GDP.³⁸⁹ If these figures still hold, relative to the country's size and economy, remittances to Eritrea are proportionally among the highest in the world.³⁹⁰

Although the remittance inflows to all countries in the region are substantial, except for Yemen (and potentially Eritrea) these flows are still low compared to some well-known migrant sending countries elsewhere, such as Nepal (5.5 billion or 28.8 per cent of GDP), Bangladesh (13.8 billion or 9.2 per cent), Sri Lanka (6.4 billion or 9.6 per cent), the Philippines (26.7 billion or 9.8) or Senegal (1.6 billion or 10.9 per cent).

The figures in the table above are likely to be an underestimation of the total remittances flows, as many transfers, especially South-South transfers are made through informal channels.³⁹¹ For example, while the World Bank estimates official remittances to Ethiopia to be only USD 646 million, in another World Bank publication in 2011, the actual volume of remittances in Ethiopia, including flows through formal and informal channels, was estimated to be in the range of USD 1 billion to 2 billion annually.³⁹² A 2015 African Economic Outlook even estimates that remittances to Ethiopia are reaching USD 3 billion annually.³⁹³

The table also shows that in many countries remittance flows to a large extent come from refugees and migrants in other countries in the region, in addition to some well-known immigration or resettlement countries (United States, Canada) or countries with which there exist colonial ties (United Kingdom). In a number of cases, the table shows the potential negative impact in terms of remittance flows when certain migration routes become blocked as a result of government policies or conflict. Examples include Uganda (with many Ugandans who were working in South Sudan are likely to be affected by the civil war in South Sudan), Somalia (with conflicts in Yemen and Libya and an increasingly restrictive environment in Kenya) and Ethiopia (with the deportation of over 160,000 Ethiopians from Saudi Arabia during 2013 and 2014, while Saudi Arabia ranks second in the top-5 of remittance sending countries).

387 AfDB, OECD, UNDP, 2015b, p. 3.

388 Poole, 2013, p. 74.

389 Healy, 2007, p. 15; Oucho, 2008, p. 6; Poole, 2013, p. 74.

390 Healy, 2007, p. 13.

391 ACP/IOM, 2013, p. 12.

392 Geda and Irving, 2011, p. 113.

393 AfDB, OECD, UNDP, 2015a, p. 7.

Box 10: Remittances to Somalia

Although Somalia is not included in these recent World Bank figures, it is well known that remittances have been extremely important in helping to sustain the country's economy and provide support for families.³⁹⁴ Remittances to Somalia are estimated at 1.3 billion annually.³⁹⁵ This is more than double Somalia's reported export earnings and 57 per cent more than average annual aid (for 2008-2011). Research by the Overseas Development Institute in 2014 showed that 41 per cent of households in Somalia receive remittances, with typical annual values ranging from USD 1,000 to USD 6,000. Households use remittances for (in order of importance): food purchases, non-food expenses (including house rent), school fees and medical expenses. Additionally, some 80 per cent of all new business ventures in Somalia are funded by remittances.³⁹⁶ International concerns about the use of remittances to finance terrorism means that banks are closing or threatening to close Somali Money Transfer Operators (MTOs), which are a vital channel for Somali remittances.³⁹⁷

Impact of remittances

When discussing the impact of remittances, one important caveat that is often made is that remittances are private capital and that recipient households cannot be obliged to use private money for the development of the country. As discussed by the ACP Observatory on Migration and IOM, remittances cannot replace policies promoting development, providing employment opportunities and strengthening the local economy and are not a substitute for public flows such as Official Development Assistance (ODA) targeted at the poorest parts of societies, debt relief or Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in the private sector.³⁹⁸ Although remittances can reduce poverty, foster human development and increase income, as argued by ACP Observatory on Migration and IOM, it cannot be a sustainable solution to promote emigration as a development strategy to increase remittances inflows.³⁹⁹

The ACP Observatory on Migration and IOM summarized the macro- and micro-economic and human development effects of remittances in developing countries:

- Macroeconomic effects of remittances:
- Key source of foreign currencies;
- In some cases, remittances can support an upgrade of a country's creditworthiness for external borrowing and this way facilitating access to global capital markets;
- Promotion of the development of the financial sector if the necessary conditions are in place, which can contribute to economic growth;
- Exports may become less competitive by making the currency more expensive or the exchange rate less favourable;

394 Duale, 2013, p. 46-47.

395 AfDB, OECD, UNDP, 2015b, p. 3.

396 Watkins and Quattri, 2014, p. 15.

397 AfDB, OECD, UNDP, 2015b, p. 4.

398 ACP/IOM, 2014, p. 55.

399 Ibid.

Although remittances can reduce poverty, foster human development and increase income, as argued by ACP Observatory on Migration and IOM, it cannot be a sustainable solution to promote emigration as a development strategy to increase remittances inflows.

- Possible macroeconomic dependence on remittances and source of inflation.

Potential microeconomic and human development effects of remittances: Additional source of income for many householders, with some entirely depending on remittances as income;

- Poverty reduction by improving the standard of living and family welfare, access to food, water, health care and education, in particular for children, and thus impacting on fundamental human rights. In this way, girls can be empowered by being able to attend school in societies where access to education is very limited;
- Potentially decreasing child labour by offering income to use as financial resources for health care, education and for consumption;
- Can provide a source of funding during shocks and after disasters, for unexpected expenditures, such as health emergency care and funerals, and for areas affected by climate change/environmental degradation and can thus help to mitigate the impact;
- Countercyclical, stable source of finance during times of crises, such as 2008–2009 during the global financial and economic turmoil;
- Generating economic activities through (increased) demand for goods and services through more available income, enabling access to micro- and small credits for entrepreneurs and investments in houses and businesses;
- Increased dependence on remittances as sources of income;
- Negative social and economic effects on children and family members due to often decreasing amounts sent over time and possible dependency on remittances;
- The social obligation to remit may lead migrants to live in precarious conditions to save as much money as they can for their families and relatives;
- Remittances may increase or decrease inequality between households receiving remittances and those that do not.⁴⁰⁰

Clearly, remittances can have both positive and negative effects. As Hein de Haas concluded in a 2007 review of the literature: “Notwithstanding their often considerable blessings for individuals, households and communities, migration and remittances are no panacea for solving more structural development problems. If states fail to implement general social and economic reform, migration and remittances are unlikely to contribute to nationwide sustainable development”.⁴⁰¹

Nevertheless, the development impact of remittances cannot be denied. For example, on the basis of an analysis of a data set covering 71 developing countries, it was concluded that international migration and remittances significantly reduce the level, depth and severity of poverty in the developing world. Results suggested that, on average, a 10 per cent increase in per capita international remittances leads to a 3.5 per cent decline in the share of people living on less than one dollar per person per day.⁴⁰²

400 ACP/IOM, 2014, p. 55-56.

401 De Haas, 2007b, p. 27.

402 Adams and Page, 2005, quoted in: Lacroix, 2008, p. 3.

Remittances also have an impact on education and human capital formation. Based on evidence from 89 developing countries, researchers concluded that, on average, an increase in migrant remittance inflows by 1 per cent is associated with a 2 per cent rise in years of schooling at both the secondary and tertiary levels. These findings led to the conclusion that migrant remittances have the potential to alleviate income constraints and generate spill-over effects that facilitate more schooling opportunities in remittance-receiving countries.⁴⁰³

In all discussions on the contribution of remittances from overseas, the contribution of returnees is sometimes overlooked. Transnational migrants also contribute upon return. In many cases returning migrants bring back savings which they can spend or invest in the home country, which can have a positive effect on poverty alleviation and economic improvement.⁴⁰⁴ Moreover, apart from the monetary contribution, returnees also bring human capital back home, which can benefit the home community. While much has been written on brain drain, governments in recent years have increasingly focused on the relevance of brain gain upon return, particularly of the highly skilled.⁴⁰⁵ Related is the focus on so-called 'social remittances', the ideas, behaviours, identities and social capital that flow from receiving to sending-country communities.⁴⁰⁶

Box 11: Collective remittances

Some initiatives have attempted to promote diaspora philanthropy through public finance incentives or so-called institutionalized collective remittances. Probably the best-known example is Mexico's 3X1 programme (Tres por Uno). In this programme, for every USD 1,- contributed by a diaspora member through a dedicated Mexican Home Town Association in the US, municipal, state and federal governments each allocate an additional dollar to fund projects. Established in 1999, it was operating in 28 out of Mexico's 31 states by the end of 2010 and had approved 2,488 projects, ranging from education, health, road paving and drainage to sports programmes. Although there is critique, including an argument that the funds are weakly targeted to the poorest municipalities and that there is evidence of political bias in allocation, the program did support a range of development investments.

Contrary to similar groups of Latin American (or Asian, particularly Filipino) diaspora, little is known about the scope, scale, patterns, and impact of African diaspora associations and collective remittances. There is no data on contributions sent by formal African migrant associations and there is no information on collective remittances by undocumented immigrants. Anecdotal evidence shows however that the African diaspora has also begun to collectively contribute financial and non-financial resources to homeland countries, albeit not yet on a large scale. The African diaspora has cre-

While much has been written on brain drain, governments in recent years have increasingly focused on the relevance of brain gain upon return, particularly of the highly skilled.

403 Ngoma and Ismail, 2013, p. 106.

404 ACP/IOM, 2014, p. 23-24.

405 Ibid, p. 24.

406 Levitt, 2001, quoted in: Lacroix, 2008, p. 4.

ated organizations, based on religion, ethnicity, and geographic ties, which include hometown, ethnic, alumni, religious and professional associations and non-governmental organizations, investment groups, national development groups, welfare/refugee groups, and Internet-based virtual organizations. Some hometown associations and other voluntary associations of migrants have provided substantial funds to some African communities. This financing is often equal to or greater than the municipal budget for public works, particularly in towns with small populations. Some twinning projects have also been established. For example, Burundians in a town in France have partnered with a town in Burundi, to work on small-scale development projects.⁴⁰⁷ Experiences of local authorities engaging with collective remittances exist in Africa as well, although again not on the same scale as between Mexico and the US. In Senegal, for example, the project SPES (operated by the Migration for Development program of the EU, the Swiss Cooperation Agency and the UN) connected migrants associations in Italy with local actors in Senegal to carry out development projects.⁴⁰⁸

It is difficult to gauge the impact of diaspora-financed development projects. Most of these projects are small and the impact has not been evaluated. Many organizations lack capacity, funds, leadership, and information required to manage projects or understand and navigate procedures in their destination and origin countries. Although this is not unique to Africa, the World Bank underlines the difficulties facing development work in Africa by migrant associations, such as a poor investment climate, inadequate ports and customs facilities, excessive red tape, and lack of trust in governments.⁴⁰⁹ Moreover, an important question in the African context is whether national and local governments have the financial resources to provide matching grants to collective remittances, such as in the Mexican example. Governance concerns would also have to be considered in many African countries, especially when transparent public financial systems are lacking.⁴¹⁰ Nevertheless, experiences with collective remittances have been generally positive elsewhere and it would be worthwhile to further explore the opportunities with collective remittances in Africa as well.

According to ACP and IOM, a lack of data still hampers a full understanding of remittances between developing countries, even though, as showed in the table above, for many countries in the region remittances from other countries in the region are more important than overseas remittances. Quantifying remittances in the South is made even more challenging by the fact that, as mentioned above, most South–South transfers are made through informal channels.⁴¹¹ Despite their importance, ACP and IOM concluded that South-South remittances have until now still had a limited

407 The World Bank and African Development Bank, 2011, p. 160-161.

408 FMDV, 2013.

409 The World Bank and African Development Bank, 2011, p. 162.

410 Watkins and Quattri, 2014, p. 27.

411 ACP/IOM, 2013, p. 12.

impact on development, given the limited volume (despite a significant informal flow) and scarce use for productive purposes. However, at the micro level, they are often decisive for the well-being of many families.⁴¹² The lack of access to formal banking services and high transfer costs are among the main challenges in South-South remittances, although innovative technologies, such as mobile transfers, are very promising and even seem to increase savings among users.⁴¹³

Remittance costs

Africa in particular is failing to secure all of the potential benefits of remittances. There is no region in the world with higher charges for remittance transfers. According to the Overseas Development Institute (ODI) African diaspora face a 'remittance super tax' that hurts families and holds back development. In 2013, remittances to Africa were estimated at USD 32 billion (around 2 per cent of GDP) and projects for 2016 suggest remittances to Africa could rise to USD 41 billion. Especially since foreign aid is stagnating, remittances are an increasingly important source of external finance. However, charges on remittances to Africa are well above the global average. On average, Africans pay 12 per cent in charges to send USD 200 home, double the global average. Even though Western governments have pledged to reduce charges to 5 per cent (and it has been included in the finalized text for adoption of the post-2015 Development Agenda to further reduce to 3 per cent), there is no evidence of a decline in fees incurred by African migrants.⁴¹⁴

Moreover, it is not just on inter-continental remittances that Africans face excessive charges. Refugees and migrants who stay within African regions and want to send money home face higher charges than on OECD-Africa remittance corridors. All of the world's top ten remittance-charging corridors are to be found in Sub-Saharan Africa. Ugandans remitting money home from Kenya (which is in the top-5 of remittance sending countries to Uganda) pay charges in excess of 20 per cent if they transfer through banks. If they use Money Transfer Operators (MTOs) they pay less, but still above the OECD-Africa levels. Ugandans sending money from Tanzania pay 25 per cent of the remitted amount in charges, while migrants (when remitting through banks) pay 24 per cent on the corridors between Kenya and Tanzania and Rwanda and Tanzania. Through MTOs migrants pay 8 per cent on average on the Rwanda-Kenya corridor.⁴¹⁵

According to ODI, weak competition, concentration of market power and flawed financial regulation all contribute to high remittance charges in Africa. Two MTOs – Western Union and MoneyGram – account for two-thirds of remittance transfers. ODI estimated that these two companies account for 586 million of the loss associated with the remittance super tax. Exclusivity agreements between MTOs, their agents and banks restrict competition and further drive up prices, as do African financial regulations, which favour banks over other remittance payment options. ODI estimates that Africa is losing between USD 1.4 billion and 2.3 billion annually as a

412 ACP/IOM, 2014, p. 72.

413 ACP/IOM, 2013, p. 12.

414 Watkins and Quattri, 2014, p. 7-8.

415 Ibid, p. 24.

result of high remittance charges. If the remittance super tax would be diverted into education it would provide resources to put around 14 million primary school-aged children into school, which is almost half of the out-of-school population for the region. It could also be used to finance access to improved sanitation for 8 million people, or the provision of safe water for 21 million people.⁴¹⁶

ODI concludes that a deep cut in the charges would have a large development impact, as it would enable Africa's diaspora to make a bigger contribution to the region's development. It would also strengthen self-reliance. Unlike aid, remittances put money directly into people's pockets, providing a source of investment and support for consumption.⁴¹⁷ Strong measures to lower remittance costs could, therefore, have a significant impact.

Measures to lower remittance costs

Several policy measures by development agencies, national governments and multilateral financial organisations such as the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) and the World Bank have focussed on measures to facilitate and channel remittances into formal channels and to enhance their economic impact. This has been done through:

- improving data collection on remittance corridors in order to identify lack of competition and technical inefficiencies in the remittance industry;
- enhancing transparency and competition through creating and enforcing a legal framework for banks and money transfer operators and through publishing remittance costs;
- improving the financial and economic infrastructure in developing countries to facilitate remittances, improve access to financial services and increasing financial literacy;
- fiscal and financial policies by sending and receiving states.⁴¹⁸

As discussed in the action plan for 2014-2017 of the Africa-EU Partnership on Migration, Mobility and Employment (MME)⁴¹⁹, remittance transfer costs represent a particularly acute problem within Africa. The AU has acknowledged the need to put in place mechanisms that allow for a better leveraging of remittances and other diaspora resources for the development of Africa. Supported by the EU and as part of the MME action plan, the African Institute for Remittances (AIR) is currently being established in Nairobi. Significantly reducing the costs of remittances in the EU-Africa corridors and in the intra-Africa corridors remains one of the key priorities in the Africa-EU partnership on MME.⁴²⁰

Significantly reducing the costs of remittances in the EU-Africa corridors and in the intra-Africa corridors remains one of the key priorities in the Africa-EU partnership on Migration, Mobility and Employment.

416 Watkins and Quattri, 2014, p.3; p. 7-8.

417 Ibid, p. 7-8.

418 Lacroix, 2008, p. 8.

419 The Africa-EU Partnership on MME was established in 2007 in Lisbon during Africa-EU summit, under the umbrella of Joint Africa EU Strategy (JAES).

420 Africa-EU partnership on MME, 2014.

Box 12: The African Institute for Remittances

One of the objectives of the AIR – to be established in 2015 - is to develop the capacity of the Member States of the AU, remittance senders and recipients, and other stakeholders to implement concrete strategies and operational instruments to use remittances as development tools for poverty reduction. Activities will include:

- Providing technical assistance to government institutions (central banks, ministries, financial and nonfinancial institutions) on putting in place the necessary regulatory frameworks;
- Carrying out training and capacity building programs of relevant institutions and organizations (e.g. national statistical services departments);
- Studying remittances flows within Africa, which includes North Africa;
- Conducting policy research and dialogue and sharing information on how remittances can contribute to the development of African countries;
- Developing content and technology platforms for country-based payment and settlement systems for remittances;
- Developing partnerships between African central banks and remittance service providers and non-bank correspondent agencies to improve financial access;
- Disseminating data and research findings; and
- Preparing annual reports, conferences and meetings of policy makers.⁴²¹

The adopted text of the post-2015 Sustainable Development Goals proposes a target for reducing remittance costs to 3 per cent by 2030. Reducing remittance costs from the current average of 8 per cent to 3 per cent would translate into a saving of over USD 20 billion annually for the migrants and their relatives. According to the World Bank, this target is achievable and even modest, arguing that the development community could go a step further and set a goal of reducing remittance costs to below 1 per cent by 2030. An important barrier to lowering remittance fees arises from the costs associated with implementing anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terror (AML/CFT) requirements. According to the World Bank, further development at the national level of a risk-based approach to AML/CFT regulation could help reduce these costs. Facilitating the use of more efficient technologies and fostering competition in the remittance market, while still complying with AML/CFT requirements, could also reduce overall costs.⁴²²

Remittance channels

Sending money via banks or MTOs is considered expensive and Africa in particular is one of the most expensive remittance markets in the world. Mobile money transfers are a new, innovative way to lower remittance costs. Mobile money services allow unbanked people to transfer small amounts of money both within and from outside the country at much lower costs

⁴²¹ The World Bank, 2014e.

⁴²² World Bank, 2015c, p. 13.

compared to bank transfers and transfers through MTOs.⁴²³

While mobile money transfer services such as M-Pesa in Kenya have transformed the landscape for domestic remittances, their use in cross-border transactions remains limited, only accounting for 2 per cent (USD 10 billion) of global remittance flows in 2013.

Sub-Saharan Africa continues to lead other regions in the take up of mobile money services, which offers new opportunities for more cost-effective means of sending money. Mobile technology can lower the cost of remittances, as it removes the need for physical points of presence and ensures a timely and secure method of transaction. While mobile money transfer services such as M-Pesa in Kenya have transformed the landscape for domestic remittances, their use in cross-border transactions remains limited, only accounting for 2 per cent (USD 10 billion) of global remittance flows in 2013. The lack of international interoperability of mobile systems and AML/CFT regulations still create barriers to the entering of new players. According to the World Bank, the regulatory framework should be designed to foster competition, simplify the AML/CFT regulations for low-risk and low-value transfers, and ensure that there are no exclusive partnerships between telecom companies and international money transfer operators.⁴²⁴

Kenya is at the forefront of the mobile money revolution with its M-Pesa system. In 2013, it was estimated that 24.8 million subscribers use mobile money services, like M-Pesa, in Kenya. Mobile phones introduced financial services in remote areas where conventional banks have been physically absent or remain too expensive. In many developing countries, restrictive conditions (prices, documentation required) practically exclude rural and low-income populations from accessing the formal financial sector. Mobile transfers are also a more secure method of transferring funds than informal remittance channels, avoiding the need to carry cash during long and expensive trips with the risk of the cash getting lost or stolen. Mobile money transfers made it much easier for internal migrant workers in urban areas to send remittances to their remote rural communities, where there is no or difficult access to transportation and financial services.⁴²⁵ This has led to a large increase in internal transfers. In Kenya (and Ghana and India where mobile money transfers systems also exist) internal remittances actually exceed international transfers (which also reflects the fact that internal migration is three times as large as international migration).⁴²⁶

An interesting side effect of mobile transfers has been an increase in savings among users. Many Kenyans now use their mobile phones to save money, an innovative method known as 'banking the unbanked'.⁴²⁷ Every fourth person in Kenya saves on their mobile phone through M-Pesa.⁴²⁸

423 ACP/IOM, 2014, p. 79.

424 World Bank, 2015c, p. 10.

425 ACP/IOM, 2014, p. 76-79.

426 ACP/IOM, 2013, p. 47.

427 Ibid.

428 ACP/IOM, 2014, p. 59.

Box 13: International money transfers through mobile money services: a small but emerging market

In West-Africa, where the adoption of mobile money has been rapid in recent years, new models are emerging for cross-border remittances with mobile money. Orange Money International Transfer links up Côte d'Ivoire, Mali and Senegal and is the first example of mobile money transfers between three markets, enabling six distinct remittance corridors, including one of the largest flows in Sub-Saharan Africa from Côte d'Ivoire to Mali. Between Côte d'Ivoire and Burkina Faso, MTN Mobile Money and Airtel Money provide the first example of two different operators agreeing to interoperate their mobile money services to facilitate cross-border money transfers. Rep, adoption of international mobile money transfers has been remarkably fast in these regions. Fees are substantially lower than the fees charged by formal MTOs; customers in the Côte d'Ivoire, Mali and Senegal corridors pay on average around 2 per cent of the transaction value. In Côte d'Ivoire, Western Union responded by immediately reducing its prices, but this has not prevented Orange Money from taking a substantial share of the market. In East Africa, Tigo Tanzania and Tigo Rwanda and Safaricom Kenya and Vodacom Tanzania are also experimenting with models for cross-border remittances. Airtel Group is also going to allow transfers between its customers in East Africa, linking Kenya, Rwanda, and Uganda.⁴²⁹

Mobile money services could therefore be considered as a development tool, as it has a wide territorial outreach (accessible where roads are not present, as long as there is mobile phone reception), is potentially transparent, accessible to many people including the rural poor and it leads to a reduction of the costs of money transfers. It would encourage more migrants to remit money, which would improve households' income and thus facilitate savings and investments.⁴³⁰ However, the opportunities for international money transfers through mobile money services are still limited.⁴³¹ In line with the ODI findings discussed above, an expansion of mobile money services from domestic to international services has a great development potential.

429 Scharwatt and Williamson, 2015.

430 ACP/IOM, 2014, p. 82.

431 World Bank, 2014c, p. 13.

Key points for the region

- Compared to other migration corridors, there is lack of knowledge on collective remittances in the region and it appears there are not many initiatives in the region with regard to mobilizing collective remittances for development initiatives. However, as with diaspora investments, a positive investment climate, trust in the government and low levels of corruption and bureaucracy are important prerequisites for the mobilization of collective remittances.
- Although Sub-Saharan Africa, and Kenya in particular, leads with the up-take of mobile money services, the opportunities for international money transfers through mobile money services are still limited. An expansion of mobile money services from domestic to regional and international services has a great development potential, especially since the remittance costs in the region are among the highest in the world.
- There is no region in the world with higher charges for remittance transfers, and remittance corridors in East Africa (for example Uganda-Kenya and Uganda-Tanzania) are among the most expensive in the world. To increase the development potential of remittances in the region, the most important step would be to lower the remittance costs and this could lead to enormous savings for refugees and migrants and their families.

3.3 Labour migration

Introduction and overview

International migration is mostly an issue of labour mobility, of people moving in search of better opportunities.⁴³² According to the ILO, approximately 50 per cent of the 232 million international migrants in the world today are economically active, and 90 per cent if the families of active labour migrants are counted. Even those fleeing persecution, conflict, violence and environmental disasters may, despite restrictions on free movement and employment eventually end up in the labour market of host countries. Family members joining migrant workers abroad may also wish to work, either as employees or in self-employment.⁴³³ Migrant work and labour migration governance are at the centre of development issues, as many migrant workers contribute to the economic and social development of both countries of origin and destination.⁴³⁴

Two decades ago, South-North labour migration predominated. These days, regional migration between developing countries exceeds migration to developed countries. According to the ILO, 57 per cent of the increase in total migration between 2000 and 2013 was due to higher levels of South-South migration.⁴³⁵ Moreover, not only low-skilled migrant workers move

432 ACP/IOM, 2014, p. 39.

433 ILO, 2015, p. 2.

434 Ibid; ILO, 2013, p. 3.

435 ILO, 2015, p. 2.

within the South; migration of high skilled migrants between developing countries is also increasing. Movements of the tertiary-educated are high within and towards certain sub-regions, such as in East Africa and to regional hubs like South Africa. Relatively stable countries such as Kenya and South Africa are regional power and economic centres, dominating the regional skills markets.⁴³⁶

Nevertheless, in research on labour migration, most focus has been on emigration of migrant workers to developed countries and labour migration in the South tends to be forgotten.⁴³⁷ Even though many developing countries are also countries of destination for labour migrants, the economic contribution of labour migration to developing countries as countries of destination has been scarcely examined.⁴³⁸ In discussing the potential positive contribution of labour migration to development below, the focus is therefore more on the effects on labour migration from developing to developed countries, although increasingly evidence is becoming available of the positive impact of labour migration to developing destination countries.

The effect of labour migration to developed countries

Labour and skills of migrant workers are a valuable resource for both destination and origin economies and societies, which help to ensure the functioning of labour markets. Migrant workers help to create additional jobs by consuming goods and services and paying taxes and help to sustain social security systems with their contributions. When establishing enterprises they further contribute to development and they strengthen the ties between origin and destination countries through the transfer of technology and skills, opening of trade opportunities for new goods, and sending remittances.⁴³⁹

Nevertheless, migration of low-skilled workers into advanced countries remains a contentious issue, despite the demand for such workers to carry out a range of essential tasks, especially services. A systematic survey in 2014 on the effect of low-skilled migration on host countries suggests that fears of an adverse impact on the wages, unemployment and living standards of native low-skilled workers are largely misplaced, while the positive effects on the broad economy are significant and typically underestimated. Literature suggests that migration will spur investment, induce task specialization of natives and, under certain plausible conditions, ultimately raise the demand for all workers.⁴⁴⁰

As was concluded in a paper by the Centre for Economic Performance and the London School of Economics in the run-up to the 2015 UK General Election: "There is still no evidence of an overall negative impact of immigration on jobs, wages, housing or the crowding out of public services. Any negative impacts on wages of less skilled groups are small. One of the largest impacts of immigration seems to be on public perceptions."⁴⁴¹

436 ACP/IOM, 2013, p. 24.

437 ACP/IOM, 2014, p. 42.

438 OECD, 2014a.

439 ILO, 2013, p. 4.

440 Dadush, 2014, p. ii.

441 Wadsworth, 2015.

Moreover, many destination countries are in need of migrant labour. In its new Agenda on Migration published in May 2015, the European Commission describes that the EU's working age population will decline by 17.5 million in the next decade and acknowledges that "migration will increasingly be an important way to provide the EU economy with the talent it will need for sustainable growth. The case for legal migration will always be difficult at a time of high unemployment and social change. That is why it is important to have in place a clear and rigorous common system, which reflects the EU interest, including by maintaining Europe as an attractive destination for migrants."⁴⁴²

Reflected in this statement by the EU, is that most developed economies need and want skilled workers and need but do not want unskilled migrants. Yet, as argued by Ronald Skeldon in a paper for UN DESA, these two systems are closely linked as skilled workers generate increased demand for low-skilled workers employed in the service economy.⁴⁴³ In a Global Knowledge Partnership on Migration and Development (KNOMAD) working paper it is, therefore, argued that host countries should recognize that they also need low-skilled migrants and adjust their policies accordingly.⁴⁴⁴

In a Global Knowledge Partnership on Migration and Development (KNOMAD) working paper, it is argued that host countries should recognize that they also need low-skilled migrants and adjust their policies accordingly.

Generally speaking, unskilled migration has many benefits:

- unskilled migrants complement native skilled workers, enabling them to specialize in more highly paid jobs;
- they raise demand in key sectors such as housing, health care, travel;
- they reduce the cost of providing non-traded services enabling, for example, the highly educated to participate in the labour force instead of carrying out household chores or caring for children and the elderly;
- they are essential to firms competing in labour intensive activities such as agriculture and garments; they appear to boost economy-wide productivity in the long term because of the scale, specialization, and flexibility they contribute to production;
- most arrive young, single, and eager to work, and become net contributors to the government budget over decades, and though most stay, many return to their home country, often without benefiting from pensions available to native workers.⁴⁴⁵

Comprehensive and very recent research in the US and in Denmark also counters the negative public perception that the immigration of low-skilled migrants would have a negative effect on native workers. The study in the US looked at the effects of immigrants on local labour demand, due to the increase in consumer demand for local services created by immigrants. The research found that this effect can attenuate downward pressure from immigrants on non-immigrants' wages, and also benefit non-immigrants by increasing the variety of local services available. Immigrants can, therefore, raise native workers' real wages, and each immigrant could create more than one job. Based on data running from 1980 to 2000, the researchers conclude that each immigrant creates 1.2 local jobs for local workers, most of them going to native workers. Immigrants also appear to raise local wages.

442 European Commission, 2015a, p. 14.

443 Skeldon, 2013, p. 23.

444 Dadush, 2014, p. ii.

445 Ibid, p. 19.

Overall, the conclusion is that local workers benefit from the arrival of more immigrants.⁴⁴⁶

Another recent study tracked the labour market outcomes of low skilled natives in response to an inflow of low skilled refugees and immigrants in Denmark between 1991 and 2008. The authors specifically considered immigration flows from eight refugee-countries (Bosnia, Afghanistan, Somalia, Iraq, Iran, Vietnam, Sri Lanka and Lebanon). Moreover, the researchers specifically analysed details about the individual response of native workers within and across establishments and municipalities in Denmark where refugees ended up. The study found robust evidence that less skilled native workers responded to refugee immigration - mainly composed of low-educated individuals in manual-intensive jobs - by increasing significantly their mobility towards more complex occupations and away from manual tasks. Immigration also increased native low skilled wages and made them more likely to move out of the municipality. They did not observe an increased probability of unemployment, nor a decrease in employment for unskilled natives.⁴⁴⁷

Both studies clearly show that common fears about the immigration of low-skilled workers to developed countries – e.g. displacement of low-skilled natives and negative effects on the wages of natives – do not hold. According to migration researcher and economist Michael Clemens, immigration has had a positive effect on economic growth in Europe overall. All the serious evidence points to large gains in overall economic activity from reduced barriers to labour mobility and research shows that the balance between low-skill immigrants taking jobs and creating jobs has been positive in Europe. Yet, public perception and politicians' statements would suggest otherwise. The permanent challenge, according to Michael Clemens, is to communicate the fact that "the ways that immigrants fill jobs are direct and visible; [and] the ways that they create jobs are indirect and invisible".⁴⁴⁸

The effect of labour migration on developing countries as destination

The discussion above has mainly focused on the effects of (low-skilled) labour migration on the economies and labour markets of host countries in the global North. There are other effects as well, most notably the effect on migrants themselves, who can treble their wages or more. With regard to the effects on countries of origin, most focus has been on remittances and role of diasporas.⁴⁴⁹ Even though regional migration between developing countries exceeds migration to developed countries, impacts of migration in developing countries as destination countries tends to be overlooked.⁴⁵⁰

Nevertheless, labour mobility in the South provides many opportunities. It usually entails less distance and less costs, which means migrants can save more of their earnings. Although labour migrants who move to other developing countries are likely to earn less than those who move

labour migration

Less skilled native workers respond to refugee immigration - mainly composed of low-educated individuals in manual-intensive jobs - by increasing significantly their mobility towards more complex occupations and away from manual tasks.

Even though regional migration between developing countries exceeds migration to developed countries, impacts of migration in developing countries as destination countries tends to be overlooked.

446 Hong and McLaren, 2015.

447 Foged and Peri, 2015.

448 Vice, 2015.

449 Dadush, 2014, p. 19.

450 OECD, 2014a.

to developed countries, given that the number of migrants who move between developing countries is larger, South-South labour migration still entails a large poverty reduction potential through (albeit per person smaller) remittances.⁴⁵¹

Labour migration represents a large share of the workforce in key economic sectors in many low-income and middle-income countries and is such of importance for the economies and development of these countries. However, the economic contribution of labour migration to developing countries as countries of destination has been, according to the OECD, scarcely examined and is poorly considered in economic and employment policy making.⁴⁵²

The OECD, together with the ILO, therefore initiated a three-and-a-half-year project aimed at assessing the economic contribution of labour migration in developing countries as countries of destination. The project seeks to arrive at a reliable and evidence-based understanding of how immigration affects the economies of ten low-income and middle-income countries (across Asia, Africa and Latin America) and will particularly consider: contribution to GDP and growth; impact on the labour market and impact on public finances and social services. According to the OECD a better understanding is essential to designing evidence-based labour and migration policies, improving labour management and securing the appropriate protection of migrant rights.⁴⁵³

Despite the general lack of evidence, a 2014 paper by the Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in Germany, did look at the effect of labour migration on developing countries and reached the following conclusions:

- Immigrants can greatly improve their standard of living, even after allowing for the costs of living away from home.
- If workers are much more productive in one country than in another, lifting the restrictions on immigration would produce large efficiency gains.⁴⁵⁴
- Allowing workers to move freely across countries could yield large gains, comparable to a doubling of labour income in developing countries.
- Although the immigrant flows would be large as a result free movement, the wage effects would be small since increases in labour supply would induce investment.
- Relaxing immigration restrictions could greatly improve the wellbeing of people in developing countries, with little effect on wages.⁴⁵⁵

In short, the author concludes that the results indicate that the gains from open borders would be enormous. As in developed countries (as described above), the standard argument against the relaxation of immigration restrictions is that a large inflow of immigrants is likely to depress wages in the host country and causes unemployment among native workers. However, similarly as in developed countries, empirical evidence suggests the logic of this argument is flawed and that large immigrant flows – if they happen at all – in fact do not lead to substantial effects on wages (except

451 ACP/IOM, 2014, p. 43.

452 OECD, 2014a.

453 Ibid.

454 Kennan, 2014, p. 1.

455 Ibid, p. 7-8.

perhaps for the wages of previous immigrants). Nevertheless, proposals to relax restrictions on immigration remain generally unpopular, in part, according to IZA, because economists have failed to explain the social losses associated with these restrictions and the benefits of free migration.⁴⁵⁶

Box 14: The effect of migration on the employment of local workers in South Africa

The participation of foreigners in the South African economy is an important political and economic issue in South Africa. In a context of high unemployment rates and insufficient job creation, the access of foreign workers to national labour markets has become a politically sensitive question.⁴⁵⁷ The perception that African foreigners are stealing the jobs of local South Africans has been one of the triggers in repeated waves of xenophobic violence in South Africa.⁴⁵⁸

While research in developed, Western economies generally shows that migration does not cause more unemployment among native workers⁴⁵⁹, not much research is available on the impact of South-South migration on employment of native workers. Recent research from South Africa does, however, show that fears about migrants taking the jobs of locals are not entirely misplaced. Contrary to findings in OECD countries, research by the Migrating for Work Research Consortium (MiWORC)⁴⁶⁰ found that people born in other countries were more likely than non-migrants to be employed in South Africa, and unemployment rates for the foreign-born were noticeably lower than for those born in South Africa. A foreign-born migrant with the same age, gender, and level of education, belonging to the same population group and residing in the same place as a South African, has a higher probability of being employed than a South African non-migrant.⁴⁶¹

However, this advantage of foreign-born workers was mitigated by the fact that they were much more likely than locally-born to work in the informal sector, in precarious employment, and accessed far fewer benefits. Migrants were more likely than locally-born to be found in construction, trade, agriculture and private households. The latter two are well-known as generally low-paying occupations often with poor working conditions. The researchers concluded that foreign-born migrants are more likely to have poor working con-

456 Kennan, 2014, p.7-9.

457 Landau, 2014.

458 Mail and Guardian, 2015.

459 Dadush, 2014, p. ii.

460 A partnership between the African Centre for Migration & Society (ACMS) at Wits University with a range of academics (Centre for the Study of Governance Innovation, University of Pretoria; United Nations University, Centre for Comparative Regional Integration Studies; UNESCO Chair on Free Movement), government agencies (Department of Labour; South African Local Government Association; Statistics South Africa), and international organizations (ILO; International Organisation for Migration (IOM))

461 Landau, 2014.

ditions and to occupy positions that locally-born workers are not ready to accept.⁴⁶²

Other research from Gauteng Province in 2011 (the South African province that has the largest number of migrants and includes Johannesburg), also found that migrant respondents were least likely to be unemployed (29 per cent) compared to internal migrants (36 per cent) and the Gauteng born (34 per cent). For black South Africans, 41 per cent of the Gauteng born and 40 per cent of internal migrants were unemployed, while 33 per cent of black African cross-border migrants were unemployed. The same research also found that 12 per cent of all migrant respondents owned their own formal business, compared to 10 per cent of respondents born in Gauteng. However, according to the author, this also suggests Gauteng province is attracting entrepreneurial migrants who help the economy grow.⁴⁶³

More recent research from Gauteng Province revealed that of those who operated an informal business, 82 per cent had been born in Gauteng or migrated to the province from elsewhere in South Africa, while only 18 per cent of informal business owners in Gauteng are foreign-born. Of the 618 migrants interviewed who owned a business, 31 per cent rented property from South Africans and 503 of them employed South Africans, which indicates migrants starting and owning (informal) businesses also create jobs for South Africans.⁴⁶⁴

Brain migration

One specific effect on countries of origin that has elicited much debate is that of brain drain, or what is increasingly called 'brain migration' or 'brain circulation'. Brain drain refers to the movement of people with skills from poor to rich countries, which might negatively impact the development countries of origin as they lose their 'best and brightest'.⁴⁶⁵

In the early 2000s the sentiment switched from the negative, alarmist view about brain drain to a more optimistic perspective of brain gain.⁴⁶⁶ Countries of destination that reap the skills and experience of migrants experience brain gain. Similarly, brain drain might turn into brain gain for countries of origin, for example, through return migration of highly educated workers or when openness to international migration may increase the opportunities for people in poor countries and increase their incentives to get education.⁴⁶⁷ Governments in recent years have increasingly focused on the relevance of the human capital returnees bring back home, which benefits the home community.⁴⁶⁸

462 Landau, 2014.

463 Peberdy, 2013, p. 18.

464 Peberdy, 2015.

465 Kapur and McHale, 2005, p. ix

466 Ibid, p. x.

467 Mayr and Peri, 2008.

468 ACP/IOM, 2014, p. 24.

Acknowledging that neither brain drain nor brain gain tells the whole story, increasingly the terms brain circulation or brain migration are used.⁴⁶⁹ Diaspora engagement can also take the form of brain circulation, or human capital transfer, through return, diaspora tourism, trade opportunities and diaspora philanthropy.⁴⁷⁰ Another related term is 'brain waste'. Brain waste occurs when the credentials of highly skilled immigrants are not recognized in destination countries and they are working at a lower level than they are qualified for. Brain waste is, however, also applicable when they are no jobs available at the appropriate level in the origin country and those staying behind are wasting their talents.⁴⁷¹

A 2008 publication by the Brookings Institution summarized some of the minuses and pluses of brain drain from Africa. The minuses include:

- Skills are necessary for long-run development of the source country, therefore skilled workers should stay at home.
- The human capital of the migrants may have had a positive effect on the income or the growth of income of those left behind if they had stayed.
- The human capital of the migrants may have had a positive effect on institutions or political leadership of the home society if they had stayed.
- Family separation due to migration may cause both the migrants and those left behind to suffer in nonmonetary ways.

Pluses on the other hand include:

- Migrants themselves are better off.
- Migrants may send remittances back to boost the incomes of those left behind.
- The home country population may have stronger incentives to invest in human capital if they have the opportunity to migrate.
- Migrants may have a positive effect on politics or institutions from abroad.
- Migrants may return home permanently or temporarily, bringing back technology and skills.
- Migrants may facilitate trading networks that increase source country exports to the destination country.⁴⁷²

The authors of the article concluded that brain drain is probably a net benefit to source countries in Africa because, among other things, the gains to the migrants themselves and their families who receive indirect utility and remittances more than offset the losses of the brain drain. Another reason is that brain drain had a positive effect on skill accumulation that appears to offset one for one the loss of skills to the brain drain. The researchers failed to identify any negative growth effect of the brain drain.⁴⁷³

However, the debate is still ongoing and it is difficult to assess the exact balance between brain drain and brain gain. Not all movement of high-skilled emigrants from developing to developed countries causes brain drain, as it depends on the social, political and economic situation of the

469 Kapur and McHale, 2005, p. 2.

470 ACP/IOM, 2013, p. 49-50.

471 Kapur and McHale, 2005, p. 183-184.

472 Easterly and Nyarko, 2008, p. 3.

473 Ibid, p. 1.

sending country how emigration has an impact on the labour market. For example, in the context of the Philippines, it seems that remittances made by Filipino doctors, more than compensate for the cost paid by the state for their education.⁴⁷⁴ Research in Africa showed, for example, that the skills of labour migrants in the South are fully utilized and that, as such, brain waste in South-South migration is not an issue. Research on Kenyans living in the United Republic of Tanzania and South Africa, has shown that most are employed in their chosen skilled professions. It seems brain waste is more of an issue in skilled immigration to Europe and other destination countries in the West.⁴⁷⁵

One in every nine tertiary educated persons born in Africa resides in OECD countries, while corresponding figures are much lower for Latin America and the Caribbean (one in 13), Europe (one in 20) and Asia (one in 30).

OECD figures do point to brain drain from African countries though. One in every nine tertiary educated persons born in Africa resides in OECD countries, while corresponding figures are much lower for Latin America and the Caribbean (one in 13), Europe (one in 20) and Asia (one in 30). According to 2010/2011 figures, five countries in Africa have high skilled emigration rates of more than 30 per cent: Zimbabwe (44 per cent) Mauritius (44 per cent), the Republic of the Congo (37 per cent), Sierra Leone (33 per cent) and Zambia (30 per cent).⁴⁷⁶ The emigration rate of highly educated persons from Zambia and Zimbabwe increased by more than 10 percentage points between 2000 and 2011. In 2010/2011, Burundi, Lesotho, Malawi, Maldives, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Tanzania, and Zambia had emigration rates of the highly-skilled which were more than 20 times the total emigration rates.⁴⁷⁷

Rising educational attainment of the African population has, however, mitigated the negative effects of the increase in emigration rates of the high-skilled.

Rising educational attainment of the African population has, however, mitigated the negative effects of the increase in emigration rates of the high-skilled. Although the number of tertiary educated African migrants in OECD countries increased sharply (80 per cent) between 2000/01 and 2010/11, the emigration rate of the highly educated of the region went down. This is explained by the increase - almost doubling - in the population with tertiary education between 2000/01 and 2010/11.⁴⁷⁸

A lot has been written about brain drain from the health sector in Africa. When health workers (including doctors, nurses, midwives, pharmacists, lab technicians, hospital managers), leave their home countries to work elsewhere, the home country loses the return on the investment in their education and they leave a shortage in the health workforce, which results in an understaffed and overburdened healthcare system. Developing countries are particularly hard hit by emigration of health workers and Sub-Saharan Africa has the most notable shortage of health workers.⁴⁷⁹ In 2010, the World Health Organization (WHO) Global Code Of Practice On the International Recruitment Of Health Personnel came into force. The Code is a voluntary protocol setting principles and recommendations for health workers and associated stakeholders concerning migration. The key components are:

474 Dayton-Johnson, et al., 2009, p. 155.

475 ACP/IOM, 2013, p. 25-26.

476 Arslan, et al., 2014, p. 43.

477 UN-DESA and OECD, 2013.

478 Arslan, et al., 2014, p. 12.

479 Kissick, 2012, p. 1.

- Commitment to assisting countries facing critical health workforce shortages;
- Investment in information systems to monitor international migration of health workers;
- Emphasis on education and efforts to retain health workforces in member states;
- Protection of migrant worker's rights;
- Responsible recruitment policies by destination/receiving countries and fair treatment of migrant health workers.⁴⁸⁰

Evidence from Africa also suggests that many emigrants trained as health care workers were not working in that sector at the time of their departure, which means they had already left the health care sector before they emigrated from their countries. According to an OECD study, their decision to leave the sector in which they were trained reflects dissatisfaction with working conditions, infrastructure and pay.⁴⁸¹ Moreover, brain drain also occurs from the public to the private health sector within countries, and in some cases this brain drain might be greater than the brain drain of skilled personnel moving to other countries. As it is mainly the public health sector serving areas critical for the poor, namely, poor neighbourhoods and rural areas, this might have a greater impact on healthcare delivery to the poor than the migration of health workers to other countries.⁴⁸²

The organization of labour migration

Labour migration has the potential to greatly contribute to development, however it is often not used to its full potential. Moreover, the lack of an effective legal and institutional framework to govern well-managed labour migration also significantly increases the risks and costs facing migrants. As such, many migrants from Africa are vulnerable to traffickers, in physical danger during desert or sea crossings, and largely at the mercy of exploitative practices in destination countries. Within the region, Ethiopian migrants moving irregularly to Saudi Arabia to find employment provide a particular example of this.

Inadequate legislation and poor enforcement and implementation make trafficking difficult to combat. Engaging in stricter law enforcement, providing information on the dangers of migration and improving regulation of intermediaries would help in organizing well-managed labour migration flows and fight trafficking. However, in several cases rules that seek to protect or control potential migrants by restricting their right to migrate, forces them into using illegal channels, which increases rather than decreases their vulnerability to traffickers.⁴⁸³ In Ethiopia for example, in an effort to combat abuse and human trafficking the government has tried to regulate the labour migration sector through several measures and procedures, such as the registration of employment agencies and vetting and training of prospective migrants, including pre-departure training and orientation.⁴⁸⁴ However, increased regulation often results in migrants simply attempting to navigate these restrictions, with Ethiopian

Inadequate legislation and poor enforcement and implementation make trafficking difficult to combat.

480 Kissick, 2012, p. 2.

481 Dayton-Johnson, et al., 2009, p. 154.

482 ACP/IOM, 2013, p. 35.

483 The World Bank and African Development Bank, 2011, p. 3.

484 Ngunyi and Oucho, 2012.

women increasingly going to neighbouring countries before heading to the Gulf, instead of flying directly from Addis Ababa airport. This makes it more difficult for the government to track their movements.⁴⁸⁵ In a 2011 research on trafficking of Ethiopian domestic workers, the ILO concluded that “poverty on one hand, and the increasing demand for cheap labour, on the other, with the cumulative effect of strict border controls and entry requirements of some countries, have fuelled irregular migration in general and trafficking in persons in particular”.⁴⁸⁶

Bilateral agreements supporting temporary migration programs could be used to increase legal migration from African countries. But these programs require careful monitoring to protect migrants from exploitation by employers and intermediaries. The resources required to oversee such programs mean that they can cover only a small proportion of undocumented migrants.⁴⁸⁷

Recruitment costs paid by migrant workers to recruitment agents, on top of the fees paid by the employers, are generally high and are a major drain on migrants’ incomes and remittances. Illicit recruitment agencies and money lenders make large profits out of the money that should have reached migrants’ families. According to the World Bank, almost 10 million migrants use regular channels in search of employment every year. With recruitment costs averaging around USD 5,000, a reduction of USD 1,000 per migrant worker would amount to costs savings of USD 4 billion for every 1 million migrant workers. If only half of the estimated 10 million would benefit from this cost reduction, savings could amount to USD 20 billion per year.⁴⁸⁸ As such, efforts should be made to lower recruitment costs of regular labour migration. Together with reducing remittance costs, this would lead to saving billions every year, which could be used by migrants and their families to save money, invest, to spend it on education and household needs or used for development purposes.

Development friendly’ approaches to labour migration would also encourage dual citizenship/residence and facilitate free movement to and from origin countries,⁴⁸⁹ but both are not widely available options. Moreover, as described above, high skilled migrants also migrate between developing countries. While temporary return and skills transfer programme only exist in the context of South–North migration, South–South knowledge transfers are less explored.⁴⁹⁰

Notwithstanding the net balance between brain gain and brain drain, one of the ways in which the effects of brain drain can be best negated is when the outflow of skilled workers from less-developed countries is circular and not permanent. As such, the removal of barriers at both destination and origin to return migration is important. This could also include ensuring the portability of benefits and savings accumulated while the migrants are in the destination countries. Such a circular migration pattern of South–North migration could have significant advantages not only to southern

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485 Fransen and Kuschminder, 2009, p. 19.

486 ILO, 2011, p. 25.

487 The World Bank and African Development Bank, 2011, p. 4.

488 World Bank, 2015c, p. 13-14.

489 Hugo, 2012, p. 44.

490 ACP/IOM, 2013, p. 39.

nations but also northern countries. One of the major areas of concern in high-income nations is the ageing of their populations. While permanent migration from developing countries to the North would not be a solution, as migrants themselves age, if a pattern of circular migration is set up, the migrant workforce can be maintained with a young profile because of the return outflow of slightly older workers being replaced by an inflow of younger workers.⁴⁹¹

Key points for the region

- The demand for, and supply of, labour is becoming increasingly international as millions may no longer be able to find jobs in their home labour markets and labour shortages increase in destination countries. A lack of opportunities for legal labour migration however forces economic migrants, including many Ethiopians, to move irregularly, which leaves them vulnerable to abuse and hampers the full use of the development potential of labour migration.
- Bilateral agreements supporting temporary migration programs between countries in the region and destination countries (e.g. between Ethiopia and the Gulf States and European countries) could be used to increase legal migration from African countries. These programs, however, require careful monitoring to protect migrants from exploitation by employers and intermediaries. Engaging in stricter law enforcement, providing information on the dangers of migration and improving regulation of intermediaries would all help in organizing well-managed labour migration flows as well as fight trafficking.
- Together with reducing remittance costs, reducing recruitment costs for international labour migration (for example the recruitment amounts paid by Ethiopians and Kenyans who are working in the Gulf States) would lead to saving millions every year, which could be used by migrants and their families in the region to save money, to invest, to spend it on education and household needs or to be used for development purposes.
- Contrary to public perception, developed countries benefit economically from low-skilled migration from developing countries, and especially those ageing populations. Circular migration programs between countries in the region (with a young and fast growing population) and developed destination countries could be beneficial for all.
- Labour migration between developing countries – although under-researched – appears to have many economic benefits for the destination countries (and for migrants themselves and origin countries). One of the best ways to increase regular and well-management labour migration within the region, is to lift immigration restrictions and facilitate more free movement of migrant workers between countries and regions. Countries in the region could benefit from effectively implementing existing free movement agreements, such as the East African Community Free Market Protocol.

491 Hugo, 2012, p. 42-43.

- Mobility between developing countries, and its impact on development, still tends to receive less attention, compared to the migration and development linkages regarding labour migration from developing countries to developed countries. However, most migration occurs within regions and both monetary and non-monetary transfers also occur in the context of South–South migration. This deserves greater attention, as migrants can also make important contributions in other developing countries. If this receives more positive attention in public communication and in the media it could also foster integration and help address the xenophobia that immigrants face in many countries in the South.⁴⁹²

3.4 Free movement

A lack of implementation of free movement provisions

Strongly linked to the discussion above on the potential contribution of labour migration to development, are discussions around the free movements of persons. The developmental impact of labour migration would be better enabled in case of free movement provisions between countries.

In addition to bilateral labour migration arrangements (between countries), regional integration in regional groupings is taking place all over the world. Within regional bodies, free movement of people is often one of the core objectives. However, the implementation of free movement of persons is often lagging behind, compared to the free movement of goods and trade.⁴⁹³ The free movement of people often remains partially realised. Some regional bodies have adopted specific instruments to facilitate labour mobility and are implementing it, such as the Andean Community (CAN), the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), but in many regional organizations and Regional Economic Communities (RECs) free movement provisions only exist on paper.⁴⁹⁴

This is also the case in parts of Africa. Although South-South migration and regional labour mobility are important migration phenomena in Africa and regional frameworks include free movement provisions, implementation remains limited. An exception is the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), where enhanced labour mobility has been established, even though not all aspects of its *1979 Protocol on Free Movement of*

Within regional bodies, free movement of people is often one of the core objectives. However, the implementation of free movement of persons is often lagging behind, compared to the free movement of goods and trade.

492 ACP/IOM, 2013, p. 34.

493 In June 2015, African leaders signed the Tripartite Free Trade Area (TFTA; 'Cape to Cairo Agreement'), which covers 26 countries, representing more than half of the continent's GDP. The TFTA will unite three existing trade blocs (SADC, EAC and COMESA) into a single new zone. The TFTA is intended to ease the movement of goods across the member countries and stimulate intra-regional trade. Although free movement of persons is not part of the TFTA, it could be expected it will lead to greater regional labour migration and trade-related mobility.

494 ACP/IOM, 2014, p. 41.

Persons, the Right of Residence and Establishment are realised and a lack of enforcement remains a serious challenge.⁴⁹⁵

Other regional organizations such as the South African Development Community (SADC), the East African Community (EAC), the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), and the Common Market for East and Southern Africa (COMESA) have all introduced protocols for free movement of nationals between their member states, but the agreements have been poorly implemented or contradicted by the restrictive policies and practices of member states.⁴⁹⁶

Free movement in the EAC

Within the EAC⁴⁹⁷, the *Protocol on the Establishment of the EAC Common Market* (or Common Market Protocol; CMP), entered into force on 1 July 2010. The CMP aims to enhance the free movement of goods, labour, services and capital and provides for the rights of establishment and residence. The Right to Free Movement, as captured by the CMP and its Annex on the Free Movement of Persons, provides for the right to enter the territory of a Partner State without a visa; the right to move freely within the territory of a Partner State; the right to stay in the territory of a Partner State; the right to exit without restrictions; and the right to full protection by the laws of a Partner State. Although it is regarded as the most progressive and extensive system of free movement in the region, the implementation is limited and fragmented, and differs from country to country.⁴⁹⁸ Nevertheless, the International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD) observes a strong political commitment towards the economic integration process in the EAC and argues there is momentum to address implementation challenges.⁴⁹⁹

Box 15: The implementation of the Common Market Protocol in Kenya

A 2013 study for the ACP Observatory on Migration specifically looked at the free movement in the EAC and the implementation of the CMP in Kenya. The study found that the EAC framework is not sufficiently implemented at the Kenyan national level. Challenges include a lack of evidence-backed policy formulation and bureaucratic procedures that hinder the smooth implementation of labour migration-related policies; lack of adequate human resources for some specific vocations; the absence of a cohesive migration policy that could help to resolve outstanding issues; and the marginalization of migration and labour migration among other developmental policy themes by the country's National Council for Population and Development (NCPD). All Kenyan national labour policy frameworks predate the free movement initiative enshrined in the 2010 CMP. According to the authors the national policy frameworks within the

495 UNECA and IOM, 2013, p. 4; ICMPD, 2013, p. 121.

496 Flahaux and de Haas 2014, p. 14-15.

497 Member States of the EAC are: Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Uganda.

498 ICMPD, 2013, p. 42.

499 Ibid, p. 121.

EAC countries require harmonization so that EAC countries can operate at the same wave length and fully implement the protocol. The five freedoms of movement and two rights to establishment and to residence that are part of CMP should be incorporated into national development frameworks. According to the authors, Rwanda has the most comprehensive and versatile law regulating both citizen and foreign labour in the country, which other EAC Partner States should try to adopt or emulate.⁵⁰⁰

Free movement in the SADC and COMESA

Both the 2005 *Protocol on the Facilitation of Movement of Persons in the SADC*⁵⁰¹ as well as the 2001 *Protocol on the Free Movement of Persons, Labour, Services, Right of Establishment and Residence* in COMESA⁵⁰² are not yet in force. According to ICMPD, security concerns as well as economic disparities between Member States and the fear that immigrants will flock to the wealthier countries, drain their public purse and take jobs away from local communities, are regarded as barriers to scaling up mobility.⁵⁰³ The free movement protocol in COMESA, which was already adopted in 2001 should enable COMESA citizens to reside anywhere within the region and Member States agreed on the principle of removing all restrictions to the movement of persons, and on the principle of equality of treatment. COMESA citizens should be able to move freely and take up employment in any Member State under similar conditions as national workers, or pursue activities as self-employed persons. However, only four Member States reported having signed it (Kenya, Rwanda, Burundi and Zimbabwe) and only Burundi has ratified it. In addition to the security and economic issues mentioned, the COMESA secretariat also attributes the lack of implementation also to administrative constraints, such as judicial and administrative restrictions to movement; bureaucracy; different border policies and procedures.⁵⁰⁴

Free movement in the IGAD region

Finally, IGAD⁵⁰⁵ plans to introduce a free movement regime as part of its efforts to accelerate regional integration. IGAD has a Regional Migration Policy Framework (RMPF), which is inspired by the 2006 *AU Migration Policy Framework* (which urges all RECs to develop their own migration frameworks). The IGAD RMPF was adopted in 2012 and should serve as the basis for the development of IGAD's migration-related policies and projects and for the development and harmonisation of Member States' national migration policies. It contains strategies in various migration areas, including labour migration, border management and migration

500 Oucho, Oucho and Ong'ayo, 2013, p. xiv.

501 Member States of the SADC are: Angola, Botswana, the DRC, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

502 Member States of COMESA are: Burundi, Comoros, Djibouti, the DRC, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Rwanda, Seychelles, Sudan, Swaziland, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

503 ICMPD, 2013, p. 121.

504 Ibid, p. 29.

505 Member States of IGAD are: Djibouti, Ethiopia, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda and Kenya South Sudan and Eritrea.

and development.⁵⁰⁶ One of the aims of IGAD, which is included in the 1996 Agreement Establishing the IGAD states, is to promote the free movement of services, people and the establishment of residence. The agreement also states that Member States shall cooperate to facilitate the free movement and right of establishment of residence of their nationals within the sub-region. However, according to ICMPD, it is hard to imagine the actualisation of a free movement regime in the foreseeable future in the IGAD region, given the precarious peace and security landscape and scarce national socio-economic resources in parts of the region. Instead of promoting free movement between countries, the priority for governments in the region seems to reinforce porous insecure borders, reduce mixed-migration flows and safeguard national socioeconomic resources for their own populations.⁵⁰⁷

Reasons for the lack of implementation of free movement provisions

ICMPD concludes that generally the free movement commitments have not enjoyed sufficient political support to be effectively implemented. In order for decision makers in the region to put their political weight behind mobility, ICMPD calls for more evidence on the potential development benefits of mobility as well as the socio-economic loss if mobility is not intensified.⁵⁰⁸ According to a joint statement by UNECA and IOM, the potential of intra-African labour mobility remains limited because of the lack of synergy between labour migration and employment policies and institutions. Apart from missing out on the potential economic benefits, the limited implementation and monitoring of labour mobility frameworks exposes African migrant workers to the risk of exploitation, poor and hazardous working conditions and denial of labour rights, especially with regards to vulnerable groups such as women, youth and child migrants among others.⁵⁰⁹ ICMPD argues that the private sector should actively partake in the crafting and implementation of mobility frameworks, as they will also benefit from the economic gains. ICMPD also pleads for greater awareness among the public of the opportunities that free movement agreements entail.⁵¹⁰

Several barriers hamper the full implementation of free movement arrangements, some of which have been mentioned above in the context of the limited implementation of free movement protocols in the region. Apart from the limited administrative and institutional capacity to implement the agreements, these barriers are to a large extent related to fears. Governments, for example, fear that cheap labourers from neighbouring countries will flood their labour markets and take over jobs from their own nationals.⁵¹¹ This could play a role in Kenya, for example, which has the dominant economy in the East African region. Kenya might, therefore, attract a larger number of regular labour migrants when regional free movement agreements are implemented.⁵¹² Nevertheless, global evidence suggests that in keeping with demand and supply dynamics, the majority

free movement

Instead of promoting free movement between countries, the priority for governments in the region seems to reinforce porous insecure borders, reduce mixed-migration flows and safeguard national socioeconomic resources for their own populations.

506 ICMPD, 2013, p. 96.

507 Ibid, p. 121; p. 98.

508 ICMPD, 2013, p. 121.

509 UNECA and IOM, 2013, p. 4.

510 ICMPD, 2013, p. 121.

511 RMMS, 2015a, p. 2.

512 Ibid, p. 4.

of workers who migrate to other countries in search of employment opportunities, tend to be absorbed in sectors or industries in which there is a shortage of skills or that are considered less desirable by nationals. Rather than displace local workers, migrant workers might therefore help in promoting growth in certain sectors. Free movement of labour could also contribute to the public finances of receiving countries as increased employment rates and consumption of local goods and services would lead to higher tax revenues.⁵¹³ Most evidence points to gains in overall economic activity from reduced barriers to labour mobility.

However, it is difficult to predict migration flows when immigration restrictions are lifted and free movement across borders is facilitated. In 2004, the United Kingdom lifted restrictions on immigration from Poland and immigration was initially far higher than predicted. In 2014, the UK lifted restrictions on immigration from Romania and immigration was far less than predicted. However, according to migration researcher Michael Clemens many predictions with regard to the effect lifting migration restrictions on the volume of migration flows are fearful imagination. When Germany lifted restrictions on Polish immigration in 2012, German trade unions predicted that a million Poles would come to Germany that year, while actual Polish immigration was only 10 per cent of that figure.⁵¹⁴

Another fear relates to sovereignty and security issues. In the view of many governments, promoting free movement requires a relaxation of border controls, which may further increase the porosity of the borders to malign elements. As such, governments fear that human, drugs and fire arms trafficking may increase with more open borders. A particular and very real security concern in the Horn of Africa and Yemen region is that terrorists from the Somali-based Al-Shabaab and the Yemen-based Ansar al-Shari'a (or Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula) could take advantage of more open borders.⁵¹⁵ However, free movement does not necessarily have to imply less control and more open borders.

Visa restrictions in Africa

Apart from the lack of implementation of free movement agreements, visa restrictions and high costs of obtaining travel documents act as clear barriers to (labour) mobility in Africa. Passports can cost over USD 300 and in some African countries their costs can make up between 10 per cent and 60 per cent of the GDP per capita. Moreover, there are procedural constraints, such as long waiting times and only centralized entities issuing passports in origin countries, as well as long and expensive visa granting procedures in destination countries. Due to the lengthy procedures, these processes are prone to corruption as applicants might want to speed up the process by paying extra for it, which further contributes to high costs for migration.⁵¹⁶

The level of border restrictions is high in Africa. In fact, despite all the free movement protocols, there is an increasing trend of further restricting movement since the 1980s. In 2013, on average 78 per cent of Africans needed a visa to enter another African country, which is higher than the

513 RMMS, 2015a, p. 2.

514 Vice, 2015.

515 RMMS, 2015a, p. 2-3.

516 ACP/IOM, 2014, p. 45.

global average of 65 per cent. East Africa has particularly high scores on the visa restrictiveness index for other African nationals of between 80 and 90 per cent.⁵¹⁷ In short, African countries to a large extent remain closed off to each other, which makes travel, business and migration within the continent difficult. Business visas are often more difficult to obtain than tourist visas. Only five African countries (Seychelles, Mozambique, Rwanda, Comoros and Madagascar) offer visa-free access or visas on arrival to citizens of all African countries.⁵¹⁸

Rwanda provides an interesting example of the benefits of lifting immigration restrictions. Rwanda is regarded as having the continent's most liberal migration policy. As of January 1, 2013 Rwanda allows entry-visas for all African citizens arriving at its borders and also offers online visa requests and biometric border management through registration of facial image and finger prints. According to the African Development Bank, in 2013 this has led to a 24 per cent rise in tourism from African countries, a 50 per cent increase in trade with neighbouring countries, and a 73 per cent increase in trade with the DRC.⁵¹⁹

Improving mobility in Africa

The African Development Bank outlined several solutions on how to improve mobility across Africa, as restricted mobility is impeding growth in African countries: scaling up visa on arrival programs; simplifying the visa application process (offering e-visas); offering long-dated visas (e.g. 10 years); ensuring positive reciprocity between countries; and encouraging more visa-free regional blocks. In the long term, the African Development Bank suggests that African policy makers have to address restrictions to the mobility of various groups such as professional service providers, seasonal workers and cross-border traders, as these restrictions are impeding competitiveness in African countries and affecting the private sector's ability to quickly source skills. Other challenges include lacking regional harmonization of frameworks and mutual recognition of qualifications. Many African migrants face systemic disadvantages, often due to the irregular status, such as a lack of access to basic services, education, health, housing and formal financial services. This has broad regional consequences for human capital development.⁵²⁰

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Key points for the region

- Regional organizations such as the SADC, the EAC, IGAD, and COMESA have all introduced rules for free movement of nationals between their member states, but the agreements have been poorly implemented or contradicted by the restrictive policies and practices of member states. Generally, the free movement commitments in the region have not enjoyed sufficient national political support to be effectively implemented. More evidence is needed on the potential development benefits of mobility, as well as the socio-economic loss if mobility is not intensified. Currently, the potential

517 Flahaux and de Haas 2014, p. 21-22.

518 African Development Bank, 2013b.

519 Ibid.

520 Ibid.

of intra-regional labour mobility remains limited. The limited implementation and monitoring of labour mobility frameworks also exposes African migrant workers to the risk of exploitation, poor and hazardous working conditions and denial of labour rights.

- Measures designed to restrict migration can have negative impacts, since they raise the costs and risks of migration for poor people and lower the benefits by keeping them in informal low-paid job markets.⁵²¹ Facilitating legal migration and labour mobility in the region – by implementing the existing free movement arrangements – could benefit both origin and host countries as well as migrant workers themselves. With more opportunities for legal or regular migration, irregular migration is bound to decrease, giving states greater control over migration, decreasing the demand for smugglers and migrants' vulnerability to exploitative smugglers and traffickers.⁵²² Increased mobility and free movement could lead to higher remittances, more investments in origin countries and lesser social costs through the ability to return more frequently.⁵²³
- Visa restrictions, the high costs of obtaining travel documents and procedural constraints all act as clear barriers to (labour) mobility in Africa. East Africa has particularly high scores on the visa restrictiveness index for other African nationals. Rwanda, however, which is regarded as having the continent's most liberal migration policy, showed the benefits of lifting immigration restrictions, as it led to large increases in tourism from African countries and trade with neighbouring countries. Other countries in the region could follow this example, by easing visa restrictions and enhancing labour mobility agreements.⁵²⁴

3.5 Refugee economies and the development impact of forced migration

Forced displacement in Africa

While the sections above mostly discussed the contribution of regular and irregular labour and economic migration, any discussion of African migration must include those forcibly displaced as IDPs and refugees. As of 2015, forced migration globally is at its highest level since World War II, involving 59.5 million people, including 19.5 million refugees, 38.2 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) and 1.8 million asylum seekers.⁵²⁵

521 Lacroix, 2008, p. 9.

522 RMMS, 2015a, p. 6.

523 ACP/IOM, 2014, p. 43.

524 UNECA and IOM, 2013, p. 4.

525 UNHCR, 2015d.

Globally, only 126,800 refugees were able to return to their country of origin in 2014 and 6.4 million refugees are considered to be in protracted situations at the end of 2014.⁵²⁶

The average length of time individuals live as refugees is 17 years, and increasing.⁵²⁷ As of late 2014, Sub-Saharan Africa hosted 3.7 million refugees, primarily from Somalia (753,000), Sudan (627,000), South Sudan (615,300), the DRC (487,800), the Central African Republic (410,400), and Eritrea (239,600).⁵²⁸ Additionally, in Sub-Saharan Africa there were 11.4 million IDPs (as of early 2015), across 22 countries, with Sudan accounting for at least 3.1 million, the DRC 2.8 million, South Sudan 1.5 million, Somalia 1.1 million and Nigeria at least a million. The number of IDPs in East Africa is estimated at 1.9 million, spread across Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Uganda and Zimbabwe.⁵²⁹ With recent and renewed conflicts in South Sudan and the Central African Republic refugee and IDP numbers are rising quickly.⁵³⁰ Refugees are frequently confined to closed camps and settlements (in what is also called 'refugee warehousing'), and deprived of the right to work or to move freely.⁵³¹

The impact of forced displacement

Forced displacement is typically viewed as a humanitarian issue, but given that it has impacts on growth, employment, and public spending for countries of both origin and destination, it also has development implications.⁵³² Increasingly, researchers and practitioners are going beyond the humanitarian perspective and are looking at the development impact of forced migration.

The existing literature provides mixed evidence on the impacts of forced migration on host countries, such as on wages, prices, society and culture, security, natural resources, aid flows and public expenditure (including costs of figuring out who is accepted and who is not). There is a lack of comparable research using macro-economic or other rigorous data. Moreover, impacts differ in the short- and long-term, on rural and urban areas, on different groups within the population, depend on host countries conditions (resources, laws, encampment or non-encampment) and on the number of forced migrants in relation to the host population size.⁵³³ Some of the questions that the World Bank hosted Global Knowledge Partnership on Migration and Development (KNOMAD) is looking into include:

- How can data be used to better understand refugee profiles and what they can offer to host countries in terms of skills and resources?
- What are the development impacts of host countries policies regarding refugees' self-reliance (freedom to move, freedom to work, access to land) on the national level? What are the impacts of integrating refugees in existing health and education systems?

526 UNHCR, 2015d, p. 8; a protracted situation is defined by UNHCR as a situation in which 25,000 or more refugees of the same nationality have been in exile for five years or longer in a given asylum country.

527 Huffington Post, 2015a.

528 UNHCR, 2015d, p. 9.

529 IDMC, 2015, p. 8; p. 28.

530 Huffington Post, 2015a.

531 Betts, et al., 2014, p. 4.

532 World Bank, 2014c, p. 1.

533 KNOMAD, 2014, p. 2.

refugee economies and the development impact of forced migration

Forced displacement is typically viewed as a humanitarian issue, but given that it has impacts on growth, employment, and public spending for countries of both origin and destination, it is also has development implications.

- What are the implications of local integration for the willingness to return?
- What influences public perceptions on asylum seekers and refugees?
- What influences host country policy decisions towards refugees (political economy)? Would evidence of positive development contributions have an impact (as host countries stress negative impacts to show the need for burden-sharing/aid)? How to integrate policies relating to refugees and IDPs in national development policy?⁵³⁴
- What are the costs and benefits of encampment versus taking up more regular residence in host communities?⁵³⁵

New approaches to protracted displacement and alternative-to-camps-policy

Despite the questions listed above and the ongoing debate, there seems to be a growing consensus that existing approaches to protracted displacement are failing.⁵³⁶ These approaches are inefficient, unsustainable, and lead to dependency. A humanitarian and emergency response to a refugee crisis, designed for the short-term, often ends up as a long-term situation in which displaced populations get trapped within the system.⁵³⁷ Currently, tens of billions of dollars a year are spent on food, shelter, health and other life-sustaining essentials for refugees and still there is a lack of resources. This fuels the search to find new solutions to address refugee replacement.⁵³⁸

This is being increasingly acknowledged. Research has shown that camps instil refugee dependence on assistance provision, obstruct effective integration, undercut livelihoods, sustain stigma, undermine security, and, despite rhetoric to the contrary, block long-term resolution of displacement-related problems – for both refugees and their hosts.⁵³⁹ A better alternative to these protracted situations and long-term encampment would be self-reliance, which includes findings ways to offer refugees freedom of movement, the right to work, and support in the pursuit of their own economic opportunities, pending going home.⁵⁴⁰

According to a study by the Humanitarian Innovations Project (Oxford University) on ‘refugee economies’ a rethink is indeed urgently needed, as the existing paradigm fails to adequately recognise that refugees and other displaced persons have talents, skills, and aspirations.⁵⁴¹ The current situation in many places is a waste of human potential.⁵⁴² Despite the constraints placed on displaced populations by their regulatory environment (see below), refugee communities do engage in production, consumption, exchange, entrepreneurship, and the development of financial and capital markets. Sometimes in the formal sector, and where it cannot, it may develop within the informal economy.⁵⁴³

Research has shown that camps instil refugee dependence on assistance provision, obstruct effective integration, undercut livelihoods, sustain stigma, undermine security, and, despite rhetoric to the contrary, block long-term resolution of displacement-related problems – for both refugees and their hosts.

534 KNOMAD, 2014.

535 World Bank, 2014c, p. 19.

536 Betts, et al., 2014, p. 4.

537 Huffington Post, 2015a.

538 Ibid.

539 Lewis, 2015.

540 Betts, et al., 2014, p. 6.

541 Ibid, p. 4.

542 Huffington Post, 2015a.

543 Betts, et al., 2014, p. 4.

In line with this thinking, UNHCR in 2014 launched a new 'alternative to camps policy'. Although UNHCR acknowledges that camps are an important tool, they nevertheless represent a compromise that limit the rights and freedoms of refugees and too often remain after the emergency phase and the essential reasons for their existence have passed. In its policy, UNHCR lists several negative impacts of camps over the longer term:⁵⁴⁴

- Living in camps can create dependency and weaken the ability of refugees to manage their own lives, which perpetuates the trauma of displacement and creates barriers to solutions, whatever form they take.
- Camps can also distort local economies and development planning, while also causing negative environmental impacts in the surrounding area.
- In some contexts, camps may increase critical protection risks, including sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV), child protection concerns and human trafficking.
- Camps may not contribute to security, where they become venue for the forced recruitment or indoctrination of refugees.⁵⁴⁵

On the other hand, UNHCR lists the advantages of hosting refugees out of camps:⁵⁴⁶

- Enabling refugees to reside in communities lawfully, peacefully and without harassment, whether in urban or in rural areas, supports their ability to take responsibility for their lives and for their families and communities.
- Refugees bring personal skills and assets, as well as the qualities of perseverance, flexibility and adaptability demonstrated through their flight and survival. Refugees who have maintained their independence, retained their skills and developed sustainable livelihoods, will be more resilient and better able to overcome future challenges than if they had spent years dependent on humanitarian assistance.
- Refugees can better contribute to the communities where they are living when they are supported in achieving self-reliance in a way that is adapted to local conditions and markets. In many situations, the presence of refugees has stimulated local economies and development.
- Community-based protection activities and livelihoods and education programmes that also involve local people can promote social cohesion, reduce xenophobic attitudes and create a better protection environment. Where people work, study and play together, they are better equipped to resolve differences and live peacefully.⁵⁴⁷

UNHCR concludes that camps should be the exception and a temporary measure.⁵⁴⁸ Nevertheless, nearly half of the world's refugees are still interned in camps.⁵⁴⁹ Moreover, in many refugee-hosting countries the rights to free movement, employment and education are restricted. In its 'alternative to camps' policy, UNHCR states that where it is not possible or practical, to phase out camps, it will pursue the progressive removal of restrictions on

544 UNHCR, 2014b, p. 4-5.

545 Ibid.

546 Ibid.

547 Ibid.

548 Ibid.

549 Lewis, 2015.

the ability of refugees to exercise their rights and seek to build linkages between the camp and host communities and anchor the camp within the local economy, infrastructure and national social protection and service delivery systems.

Durable solutions

Although theoretically the international response to refugees should pass swiftly from emergency assistance to so-called durable solutions, these solutions are in practice often unavailable for political reasons.⁵⁵⁰ Two of these 'durable solutions' are return to the country of origin or resettlement to a third country. Return of refugees to their own countries is not feasible in many instances of protracted conflict. During 2014, 105,200 refugees were admitted for resettlement, including 9,400 Somali refugees. There were 4,900 UNHCR-assisted refugee departures from Kenya. Although the number of resettled refugees is at the highest point since 2009, the figures show resettlement is only available to a small percentage of world's displaced (0.0018 per cent of all displaced people [refugees and IDPs] and 0.005 per cent of all refugees).⁵⁵¹ The result is that many refugees are left for years in camps, settlements or impoverished urban areas, with limited socio-economic rights and opportunities.⁵⁵² The third durable solution, local integration in the host countries – including the right to free movement, (self)employment and education – would thus be the best solution in many protracted refugee situations.

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Refugee rights

Free movement, labour and employment and education rights are enshrined in the *1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol* (referred to collectively as the *1951 Refugee Convention*). All countries in the region (except Eritrea and South Sudan) are a party to the *1951 Refugee Convention*. Article 26 of the *Convention* provides that States shall afford refugees the right to choose their place of residence within the territory and to move freely within the State. Within the region, only Sudan made a reservation to this article, which means that the other countries in the region are legally bound to the free movement article. Yet, countries such as Ethiopia and Kenya specify in their national laws (e.g. *National Refugee Proclamation* in Ethiopia and the *2006 Refugee Act* in Kenya) that the movement of refugees throughout the country may be restricted and that refugees may be limited to living in designated areas, namely refugee camps. Although with regard to Eritrean refugees the Ethiopian government does allow for freedom of movement.

Articles 17 and 22 of the *1951 Refugee Convention* define the right to engage in wage-earning employment and public education. Within the region, only Ethiopia made the reservation that these articles are only recognized as recommendations and not as legally binding obligations.⁵⁵³ In practice, however, efforts to implement work rights in many countries, including Kenya, Ethiopia and Djibouti have been limited, and many of the world's refugees, both recognized and unrecognized, are effectively barred

550 Betts, et al., 2014, p. 6.

551 UNHCR, 2015d, p. 21-22.

552 Betts, et al., 2014, p. 6.

553 RMMS, 2015a, p.7.

from accessing safe and lawful employment for at least a generation.⁵⁵⁴ Uganda is a notable exception, as will be discussed below.

Employment rights

In a report on refugee work rights, Asylum Access identified several common barriers to the realization of the right to employment:

- A number of countries lack national legislation that extends work rights to refugees, or make it explicitly illegal for refugees to seek work. Only a select group of countries have a fully-functional national policy that supports a refugee's right to work without restriction, as provided for in international law.
- Inadequate access to national refugee status and justice.
- Discrimination and xenophobia. Nationals and refugees are not treated equally, in law or in practice.
- Bureaucratic barriers (exorbitant fees, complex paperwork, delays).
- Inadequate access to vocational training, education and language training.⁵⁵⁵

Refugees who are free to move and work could employ their own survival strategies and capitalize on their own capacities. This could lead to successful long-term integration and more sustainable self-reliance systems. Moreover, and this could be an important and compelling argument for host countries, refugees can contribute to local communities – both economically and culturally.⁵⁵⁶ This provides an opportunity to turn humanitarian challenges into sustainable opportunities, so that refugees can be part of economic systems to the benefit of refugees themselves, host states, and donors.⁵⁵⁷

Myths about refugees

Research by the Oxford University Humanitarian Innovations Project on refugee economies summarizes three main myths with regard to refugees based on research undertaken in Uganda: that refugees live in isolated communities, that they are a burden on their host community or country, and that they are dependent on aid:

- The public perception of refugees in developing countries is that of displaced populations living in designated camps, located in remote areas cut off from the outside world. However, the Oxford University research found that refugees' economic lives in Uganda, for example, do not exist in a vacuum shut off from the wider economic structures of their host country. Instead, despite the remote location of some rural refugee settlements, these sites are nested in the local Ugandan economies, attracting goods, people, and capital from outside. In urban settings, self-settled refugees are even more directly connected to the host economy and international business networks.⁵⁵⁸ Evidence from Somali refugees in Kenya also illustrates this.
- Second, refugees are commonly portrayed as a burden on host states. The Oxford University research, however, provided evidence that refugees in Uganda make important positive contributions. A considerable number of Ugandan businesses rely heavily on refugees as suppliers, customers,

554 Asylum Access, 2014, p. 2.

555 Ibid, p. 22.

556 Lewis, 2015.

557 Betts, et al., 2014, p. 6.

558 Ibid, p. 10.

distributors, and employees. The researchers encountered many refugees contributing to Uganda's local and national economies, whether buying, selling, or even training and employing Ugandan nationals.⁵⁵⁹ Contrary to many other countries, Uganda allows refugees the right to work and allows a significant degree of freedom of movement.⁵⁶⁰ Nevertheless, even in Kenya, which is more restrictive towards refugees, research on the economic impact of the Dadaab refugee camps identified more positive impacts (related to access to distributed food, economic opportunities and service improvements) than negative.⁵⁶¹ Moreover, despite the encampment policy, over 55,000 refugees live in Nairobi (in addition to between 100,000-200,000 undocumented Somalis). Many of them live in the Nairobi neighbourhood of Eastleigh, which is one of the most vibrant commercial centres in East Africa. It is estimated each month approximately USD 100 million worth of business is done from Eastleigh.⁵⁶²

- The third myth is that refugees are entirely dependent on assistance from the international donor community. The research in Uganda identified many creative and enterprising ways in which refugees develop sustainable livelihood strategies. While many do incorporate aid into their survival strategies, their livelihood strategies are more complex with diverse sources of income and food. Many rely on aid to supplement certain key shifting gaps in their income, while pursuing strategies of economic self-reliance through other means.⁵⁶³

It is a myth that refugees are entirely dependent on assistance from the international donor community.

Refugees' contribution to host countries

Based on evidence from Tanzania, Uganda, Kenya, Sudan, and Zambia, Asylum Access summarized many ways in which refugees can contribute to host countries and debunks some of the myths around granting refugees access to (self-) employment.⁵⁶⁴

- States often fear that granting refugees the right to work will have negative consequences upon host countries' economy. However, similar to the discussions on labour migration and development earlier in this chapter, the fear that refugees will displace nationals in the labour market is overstated. When governments permit refugees to access their formal economy, refugees can become self-sufficient taxpayers who bring new skills and demand for goods and services to host countries, diversifying markets and stimulating economic growth. Additionally, there is no evidence to prove that more refugees seek asylum in a state that has granted employment rights.
- Refugees who engage in local markets contribute to the expansion of existing markets, the creation of new markets, and an increase in domestic and cross-border trade. This interaction impacts the local economy in ways that can lead to job growth and refute common arguments against enabling access to refugee work rights. Refugees place new demands on the local economy that merchants seek to supply to earn a profit. In Western Tanzania, for example, Western Tanzanian farmers capitalized on the potential for expansion by using

559 Betts, et al., 2014, p. 16.

560 Ibid, 2014, p. 4.

561 Enghoff et al., 2010 p. 10.

562 Sperber, 2015.

563 Betts, et al., 2014, p. 36.

564 All based on: Asylum Access, 2014, p. 6-18.

- refugee labour to expand their farms and increase production, on average doubling in size and output.
- Merchants satisfy refugees' demands by importing foreign goods which can lead to an increase in cross-border trade. A study of the long-term effects of approximately 1.3 million refugees from Rwanda and Burundi on the Tanzanian economy, noted a positive change in trade as a result of refugee influx. Before the arrival of refugees, farmers would travel long distances, sometimes crossing borders, to find markets for their goods. Being able to sell their goods to refugees closer to home freed up time for other productive activities.
 - Refugees fill labour gaps. Refugees ensure that a growing economy is not slowed by a declining labour force.
 - Refugees trade humanitarian aid items for local merchandise, stimulating demand in local markets.
 - Self-employed refugees contribute a range of economic benefits, from self-sufficiency to business and job creation. Refugee entrepreneurs do not stress humanitarian aid or government services, and may create jobs as they grow and expand their businesses. Research from Kampala, Uganda, shows that when refugees were permitted to establish businesses, they went on to create new jobs. Evidence from Kakuma, Kenya, illustrates that Sudanese refugees also hire locals for help with domestic and manual labour.
 - Refugee-entrepreneurs may serve as suppliers to larger companies and create market linkages. Economic benefits of refugee self-employment accrue when entrepreneurship is complemented by larger-scale businesses. Where refugee-entrepreneurs serve as suppliers to businesses, the refugees grow their customer base and gain access to valuable business and technological know-how in the process. Where refugee-entrepreneurs purchase their business goods from larger vendors and connect these goods to other markets, they have contributed to market expansion and transnational trade connections. For example, Congolese refugees in Uganda who trade in colourful textiles purchase their goods from Ugandan wholesalers, who in turn import from across Africa, China, India and the Netherlands.
 - In refugee hosting areas, in addition to humanitarian aid, development aid is usually given out of concern for the host population and works to mitigate the presumed stress refugees place on local public services, natural resources and community harmony. Some aid organizations rely on local agriculture to supply food staples for refugees, instantly and massively increasing their customer base.

On the other hand, denying the right to (self) employment to refugees could lead to:

- Increased job competition. Refugees who are denied employment rights inevitably find some work, and might displace nationals when employers opt to pay refugees less in the informal economy.
- Depressed wages. Efforts denying refugees access to formal labour markets push these workers into the informal market, eroding wages for both refugees and nationals. Nationals are forced to offer their labour for less than the local wage rate in order to compete with refugees for work.
- Lost tax revenue from refugee income. Refugees denied employment rights work informally and are unable to pay taxes to contribute to the provision of public goods and services.

Refugee entrepreneurs do not stress humanitarian aid or government services, and may create jobs as they grow and expand their businesses.

- Refugee entrepreneurs are unable to register their businesses and report income from the enterprise or employees. When employers opt to hire refugees over nationals, the tax base is further diminished with fewer nationals who are working.⁵⁶⁵

Box 16: Example from the Middle East

Increasingly, donors and agencies are looking at the ways to integrate humanitarian and development responses to refugee situations. The European Commission, for example, employs a Regional Development and Protection Programme (RDPP) in response to the Syrian refugee crisis. This three-year programme based in Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq is supported by a platform of humanitarian and development donors. The Syrian RDPP includes both protection programming and development-led responses and the majority of the budget is dedicated to socio-economic development actions for both the refugees and hosts. These aim to improve the life conditions, livelihood capacities, self-reliance, economic opportunities, and labour market participation, for refugees during displacement, and for host communities. According to a study by the Oxford-based professor Richard Zetter, the link between protection and socio-economic development in the Syrian RDPP reflects the profound reconceptualization that is taking place in the way humanitarian and development actors are now responding to humanitarian emergencies. The conventional humanitarian emergency relief model has not provided durable solutions to displacement crises. Although there is still a lack of analysis of the economic impacts of forced displacement - both positive and negative – there is increasing and substantial evidence demonstrating the positive economic developmental outcomes (macro- and micro-, commercial, business and informal sectors) from humanitarian crises for both displaced populations and their hosts. Intergovernmental actors (UNHCR, IOM, UNDP, World Bank, EC), humanitarian NGOs and the private sector are becoming increasingly engaged with development-led approaches to refugee crises.⁵⁶⁶

In a 2013 Communication on 'Maximising the Development Impact of Migration' the European Commission for example announced it will take steps fully integrate forced migration into the development-migration agenda and ensure that refugees and other forced migrants are included in long-term development planning. The Commission added that it will work towards and advocate for the integration of protracted refugee situations into the development agenda to ensure that their situation and possible positive contribution is considered by host governments so as to prevent future displacements and strengthen efforts to find durable solutions.⁵⁶⁷

Refugee economies in Uganda

Within the region, Uganda provides an interesting example to focus on with regard to refugee economies. In Uganda, the government allows refugees

⁵⁶⁵ Asylum Access, 2014, p. 6; 15-16; 21.

⁵⁶⁶ Zetter, 2014, p. 61.

⁵⁶⁷ European Commission, 2013, p. 12.

the right to work and a significant degree of freedom of movement.⁵⁶⁸ The earlier mentioned Oxford University study on refugee economies was to a large extent focused on Uganda. The concept of 'refugee economies' is used to represent the entire resource allocation system (consumption, production, exchange, and finance) relating to a refugee community. It looks at refugees' economic lives holistically and from the standpoint of the people themselves.⁵⁶⁹ The Oxford study in Uganda particularly looked at the role of the private sector as a key instrument for enhancing refugees' economic activities.⁵⁷⁰

In 2006, Uganda adopted new refugee legislation, the Refugees Act. The Act recognises the right of the refugees to work, move around freely within the country and live in the local community, rather than in camps. Unlike most of its neighbours, which encamp refugees, the Ugandan government promotes the self-reliance of refugees, which means that rather than limiting responses to refugees to humanitarian relief, there are opportunities for a development-based approach to refugee assistance.⁵⁷¹

The study concluded that refugees in many cases make a positive contribution to the Ugandan economy:⁵⁷²

- There is a significant volume of exchange between refugees and Ugandan nationals.
- A good number of refugee entrepreneurs are creating employment opportunities for Ugandans.
- Those engaged in brokerage and sub-regional trade are generating new business markets by matching demands and supplies between Uganda and other East African markets.
- Refugees are paying a substantial amount of rent to Ugandan landlords for their market space and shops.
- Those with registered businesses are increasing the revenues of local municipalities by paying taxes and other fees.
- A considerable number of refugees receive financial remittances from diaspora, which increase foreign reserve of the host country.
- Refugees are users and, in some cases, creators of technology. They have higher levels of internet use than the general population, use mobile phones extensively, and frequently adapt their own appropriate technologies.
- Although many refugees do receive humanitarian assistance, most are more dependent on other social relationships, aspire to receive other forms of support, and in many cases create sustainable livelihood opportunities for themselves.

Refugees in Kenya: economic contribution despite policy restrictions

Compared to Uganda, Kenya takes a more negative and regulatory stance towards refugees, which is strongly related to security concerns. Yet, even while more restrictive in terms of free movement and employment opportunities, Kenya also provides some interesting examples of the positive impact of hosting refugees.

568 Betts, et al., 2014, p. 4.

569 Ibid, p. 5.

570 Omata, 2012, p. 3.

571 Ibid, p. 6.

572 Betts, et al., 2014, p. 5.

A 2010 study, for example, looked into the value of Dadaab refugee camps in Kenya, which as of May 2015 hosted 351,358 refugees, of which 95 per cent were Somali refugees.⁵⁷³ The majority of funds flowing into the Dadaab area come from donors and agencies supporting the refugee operation and not from the Kenyan government. The cost of this operation grew from USD 44 million in 2007 to USD 82 million in 2009. Direct support for host community initiatives rose from around USD 2 million in 2007 to USD 5,5 million in 2010 and in 2010 12-15 programmes were working in food security, conflict reduction, environment, education, health, water, sanitation and business development.⁵⁷⁴

The majority of people in the host communities reported improved access to education facilities and to water for people and livestock since the establishment of the camps. Health services catering for host communities have also been improved by agencies working in Dadaab. Local people can access the agency-equipped hospitals in the camps and Dadaab town free of charge. The presence of the camps has also improved the frequency and reach of transport services available to the host community, in an area which used to be in an isolated part of the country. The overall availability of social services is high compared to other pastoral areas in Kenya. The researchers estimated the total economic benefits of the camps and related operations for the host community, using 2010 as the reference year, at around USD 14 million. On a per capita basis this equated to around 25 per cent of average annual per capita income in North Eastern Province. The annual turnover of the camp-based businesses alone was estimated to be around USD 25 million. It is estimated that 600-750 local persons have fixed employment related in some way to the refugee operation, with an additional 500 jobs created in host communities related to trade activities. Local wage rates for unskilled labour were significantly (50-75 per cent) higher in Dadaab than in other comparable parts of Kenya.⁵⁷⁵

It is estimated that each month approximately USD 100 million worth of business is done from Eastleigh (a neighbourhood in Nairobi), which is one of the most vibrant commercial centres in East Africa. Somalis invested heavily in Eastleigh businesses, where bulk imports and textiles from Asia and the Middle East are sold.

There are negative impacts as well, such as depletion of firewood and building materials together with grazing competition in the immediate vicinity of the camps. However, overall, the study identified more positive impacts (relate to access to distributed food, economic opportunities and service improvements) than negative.⁵⁷⁶

Despite encampment policy, a substantial number of refugees in Kenya lives in urban areas. As of May 2015, the number of refugees in Nairobi was 55,569, which is 9 per cent of the total refugee population in Kenya. Most of the urban refugees are from Somalia (32,317), DRC (11,310) and Ethiopia (8,007).⁵⁷⁷ Additionally, it is estimated that between 100,000 and 200,000 unregistered Somali nationals live in Nairobi.⁵⁷⁸ One particular place where many Somali refugees congregate is the Nairobi neighbourhood Eastleigh, nicknamed 'Little Mogadishu.' It is estimated that each month approximately USD 100 million worth of business is done from Eastleigh, which is one of the most vibrant commercial centres in East Africa. Somalis invested heavily

573 UNHCR, 2015c. This figure is for Dadaab and Alinjugur refugee camps together.

574 Enghoff et al., 2010 p. 8-9.

575 Ibid, 2010 p. 8-9.

576 Ibid, 2010 p. 10.

577 UNHCR, 2015c.

578 Human Rights Watch, 2013, p. 44; RMMS, 2014a.

in Eastleigh businesses, where bulk imports and textiles from Asia and the Middle East are sold. As such Somali businesses in Eastleigh, although often indirectly as much of this economy is not taxed, positively contribute to Kenya's economy. Nevertheless, the Kenyan police frequently carries out raids in Eastleigh to round up and crack down on the neighbourhood's residents, both on a regular basis and in response to a terrorist attack. The business success of the Somali diaspora in Kenya made refugees increasingly appealing to corrupt police, who indiscriminately targeted their victims as 'walking ATMs'.⁵⁷⁹ There are reports of abuse and beatings and the police trashing homes, stealing property and taking bribes.⁵⁸⁰

Since the increase of Al-Shabaab terrorist attacks in Kenya, security concerns are increasingly conflated with refugee policies. This affects Somali entrepreneurs. For example, when the Kenyan Government issued a directive to enforce its encampment policy (as they did several times in recent years), Somali entrepreneurs in Eastleigh experienced a sharp drop in the turnover and an adverse business climate.⁵⁸¹

Wide-spread anti-Somali sentiments in Kenya in response to terrorist attacks, fostered ethnic profiling of the Somali population and implicitly gave the police free reign to harass and extort money from refugees. In 2014, new security operations, the arrest of over 4,000 people and deportations to Somalia further mounted pressure on the Somali refugee population. According to a recent paper by the Rift Valley Institute in Nairobi, many Somalis made their way to Uganda as a result of growing pressure on Somali refugees in Kenya but also because of Uganda's progressive and human rights oriented refugee legal framework as described above.⁵⁸²

Consequently, an expanding Somali business community began to emerge in Uganda. Somali refugees have established profitable businesses, including mini-supermarkets, restaurants, transportation services, garage businesses and guesthouses.⁵⁸³ Rising business opportunities in neighbouring countries also turned Kampala into a regional hub from which to operate across borders. Before the conflict, South Sudan was an important destination for Somali cross-border trade from Kampala. Rwanda and the DRC also draw growing interest from the Somali diaspora. In Rwanda, the adoption of English as the official language facilitated access for Somali entrepreneurs. Kampala also provides a central location from where Somalis can manage an extensive network of business services, mainly long-haul transport and fuel supply. This network extends as far as Zambia and Kisangani in the DRC. Moreover, the Rift Valley Institute argues that the seemingly liberal approach to the Somali diaspora in Uganda has its rewards with regard to security, such as intelligence both in Uganda and in Somalia on threats to Ugandan civilian and military targets.⁵⁸⁴

Taken together the sections on Kenya and Uganda above show that Uganda's more liberal stance towards refugees seems to be beneficial to

579 Lazzolino, 2014, p. 3.

580 Sperber, 2015.

581 Lazzolino, 2014, p. 3.

582 Ibid, p. 2-4.

583 Asylum Access, 2014, p. 16-17.

584 Lazzolino, 2014, p. 6-7.

its economy, while Kenya's more restrictive policies could actually hurt the Kenyan economy, especially since it might be the most innovative and entrepreneurial Somalis who are increasingly leaving Kenya (Eastleigh) and are settling and setting up business in Kampala.

Conclusion

The issues discussed above are part of an area of research and understanding which is still relatively new - looking at the development impact of forced migration and refugee economies. While the section above focused on the potential positive impacts, there are many possible impacts, both positive and negative. An influx of displaced persons impacts growth, public expenditure, and poverty, both in positive and negative ways. The increased labour supply could have an impact on wages, but the direction of that effect depends on whether forced migrants/refugees complement or substitute the skills of local workers. If they bring new skills and additional sources of financing, increasing trade and domestic demand, it could enhance economic growth. Host countries can also benefit from additional foreign aid flows to help them care for refugees. In the countries of origin, forced migration impacts development through remittances. Ongoing conflict limits the potential development impact of these remittances, but it can also play an important role in recovery.⁵⁸⁵

Other negative effects include driving up prices and causing food and housing shortages. An influx of refugees also places additional strain on the environment and natural resources, as well as social services, such as education and health, social safety nets, and social infrastructure (water and sanitation, waste management, electricity, communications, transportation, etc.). It can also undermine social cohesion and broaden the scope for conflict and insecurity. For countries of origin, forced migration could lead to the loss of human capital, although it should be taken into account whether potential talents would have been realized had refugees and migrants stayed, especially in unstable and conflict-ridden countries.⁵⁸⁶

Although the impacts of forced migration are neither only positive nor negative and much remains unknown, there is growing recognition that refugees can have positive development impacts on host countries. According to the World Bank efforts are underway to highlight these impacts as factors that could help encourage the acceptance of refugees.⁵⁸⁷

Key points for the region

- Instead of assuming a need for indefinite care and assistance to refugees, refugee interventions should go beyond a strictly humanitarian perspective and focus on development, by nurturing the skills, talents, aspirations and capacities of refugees. This could, for example, involve improved opportunities for education, skills development, access to microcredit and financial markets, business incubation, and improved internet access.⁵⁸⁸

585 World Bank, 2014c, p. 18.

586 Ibid.

587 Ibid.

588 Betts et al., 2014, p. 40.

- This requires allowing refugees to live outside of camps, freedom of movement and the right to (self)employment and education. However, most countries in the region, except Uganda, host most refugees in camps and limit refugees' right to work and freedom of movement. If given the right to work and freedom of movement, refugees are capable of making a contribution to the national and local economies.⁵⁸⁹ Examples from Kenya and Uganda show that Uganda's more liberal stance towards refugees seems to be beneficial to its economy, while Kenya's more restrictive policies could potentially hurt the Kenyan economy.
- The potential of the private sector with regard strengthening refugee livelihoods should be taken into account. Many refugees do engage in petty trading or gain employment in small- and medium-sized businesses, even if they are not allowed to work. Many refugees are self-employed and can even create jobs and new markets for the host economy.⁵⁹⁰

3.6 Kenya

Kenyan diaspora policy

The Kenyan government increasingly recognizes the potential and important contribution of its diaspora (estimated to be three million) to the development of the country. In 2011, the Government of Kenya developed a draft Diaspora Policy. The main objective of this policy is to mainstream the Kenyan diaspora in the development agenda of Kenya, by creating an enabling environment into which the diaspora is effectively integrated and able to make significant contribution to the development of the country. The main objective is to harness the Kenyan diaspora as a resource for development.⁵⁹¹

The 2011 draft acknowledged that, although the significance is visible in terms of remittances and technology transfers, much of the potential contribution of Kenya's diaspora to the country's development remains untapped due to a number of challenges, including:⁵⁹²

- administrative challenges which inhibit proper provision of consular services and lack of a policy framework that is responsive to diaspora needs.
- a lack of administrative structures and mechanisms for the government to tap (leverage) directly into foreign remittance inflows from the diaspora as an asset for investment and national development.
- a lack of clear structures and avenues to facilitate Kenyan diaspora to play a proactive participatory role in the promotion of tourism.

589 Ibid, p. 41.

590 Omata, 2012, p. 11.

591 Government of Kenya, 2011, p.8.

592 Ibid, p.7.

- no proper documentation of the intellectual resources possessed by the Kenyan diaspora. As such, the government is unable to attract qualified and skilled human resources from the diaspora community which inhibits technology transfer.
- a visible lack of policy coherence between, among and within the various state and non-state agencies dealing with diaspora issues, which has resulted in poor co-ordination, duplication of efforts and wastage of resources.
- a lack of bilateral agreements that would facilitate the transfer of social security savings to Kenya upon return of Kenyans from the diaspora.⁵⁹³

To address these challenges, the draft 2011 diaspora policy proposed the following actions:⁵⁹⁴

- To place the coordinative role of diaspora related issues in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs which will, in consultation with other stakeholders, work towards eliminating the overlaps and promote consistency in the management of diaspora issues. It will also oversee formation of a National Diaspora Council of Kenya (NADICOK), which will comprise all the other stakeholders.
- To create necessary structures to address the high cost of sending remittances, with a view to attracting remittances for investment and trade. As such, the government will offer incentives to the Kenyan diaspora such as tax holidays, special investment vehicles, tailor made retirement benefit for the diaspora and create a special counter at the Central Bank of Kenya to enable them to remit and invest in the country. The government will encourage the diaspora to direct their remittances towards investment in development and productive ventures. The government also plans to hold constant briefs with Kenyan diaspora to inform them of investment issues and opportunities in the country.
- To strengthen and enhance the capacity of foreign missions to effectively deal with Diaspora issues.
- To put in place an Integrated Diaspora Information System to collect, collate, analyze and disseminate information to enhance diaspora engagement.
- To mainstream the Kenyan diaspora in its Vision 2030 development plan (the country's development plan, adopted in 2008).
- To explore the possibilities of entering into bilateral agreements with countries of destination to enable Kenyans to transfer the social-security contributions back to Kenya on completion of their contracts.
- Finally, the 2010 Constitution of Kenya has a put in place necessary provisions to provide for dual citizenship which will enable Kenyans in the diaspora to access rights, privileges and obligations in Kenya.⁵⁹⁵

In May 2014 the diaspora policy was finalized and in January 2015 the Kenyan President officially launched the initiative. In the meantime study visits to India and Morocco were undertaken to better understand diaspora engagement strategies and Kenya's offer to host the new African Institute for Remittances (AIR) was accepted in January 2013 by the Executive Council of the Africa Union and is, at the time of writing, setting up in Nairobi.⁵⁹⁶ (See textbox 12 for more on AIR).

593 Government of Kenya, 2011, p.7.

594 Ibid, p. 9-12.

595 Ibid.

596 Bonfiglio, McGregor and Siegel, 2015, p. 32-34.

In the final 2014 diaspora policy, Kenya restated the importance placed on diaspora in foreign policy: “through this policy, we seek to deepen our engagement and partnerships with the Kenyan diaspora in order to leverage and harness their skills and expertise for national development”. It has five main objectives:

- To develop and implement strategies to empower, engage, and mainstream Kenyans abroad into national development process;
- To mobilise Kenyans abroad to form town, city, or country specific umbrella associations as well as regional and global umbrella associations for effective representation and engagement;
- To develop measures to enhance protection of Kenyans abroad;
- To develop mechanisms for dialogue and partnership with Kenyans abroad;
- To establish the necessary institutional mechanism for co-ordination and administration of issues of Kenyans abroad.⁵⁹⁷

Diaspora involvement in Kenya

It remains to be seen how the policy will be implemented, and the impacts that it will have on diaspora engagement. Kenya’s diaspora engagement has been evolving over the course of the past 15 years and the draft diaspora policy was already published in 2011.⁵⁹⁸ However, in 2013 a joint UNFPA and Government of Kenya publication still noted that there is no comprehensive picture on the involvement of the diaspora in Kenya’s development. This report further concluded that:

- Information on emigrant Kenyans is incomplete, which means the profile of the diaspora is not exactly known.
- There is dearth of data on international migration which constrains meaningful and detailed analysis of the context. Databases on visas and work permits, border post data and passenger surveys at international airports remain untapped and no international labour market surveys have been undertaken to inform Kenya about its immigrant labour.
- Kenya lacks a comprehensive international migration policy. As such, there is a need to integrate internal migration into wider, urban national and regional policies and planning.⁵⁹⁹
- Kenya should develop a policy to guide the utilisation of diaspora remittances (while recognizing them as private flows).
- Kenya should appreciate social remittances, such as norms, practices, identities and social capital.
- Kenya should devote more attention to the desirable effects of immigration and take steps to eliminate the undesirable effects.⁶⁰⁰

A 2013 study on the development potential of Kenya’s transnational migrants in the United Kingdom (UK), the United States of America (US), Canada and Ghana, found that most of the Kenyan migrants in these four countries are actively involved in remittance transfers, return-visits, savings and investments in Kenya. Most of the study participants were relatively young (92 per cent are below 47 years) and highly skilled professionals (76 per cent have a minimum of a bachelor’s degree) who could be able to

597 Ibid.

598 Ibid, p. 32-33.

599 Government of Kenya and UNFPA, 2013, p. xix.

600 Government of Kenya and UNFPA, 2013.

The most prominent obstacle to participate in the development at home, according to Kenyans in the UK, the US, Canada and Ghana, is corruption.

contribute to Kenya's development through skills and knowledge transfers. However, the study also revealed that this potential has not been fully utilized due to a myriad of impediments that the migrants face in their transnational transactions. Findings also indicated that most were scarcely informed about the objectives of Kenya's Vision 2030 and therefore may not be consciously involved in its realization.⁶⁰¹

The most prominent obstacle to participate in the development at home, according to Kenyans in these four countries, is corruption. Other barriers included: lack of information about what is going on in Kenya; insecurity; bureaucratic and administrative processes; fraud and lack of trust; lack of a diaspora policy; high costs of remittance transfers and immigration challenges. Specifically with regard to investing in Kenya, the main barriers that were mentioned are: risk of being conned by fraudulent persons; information asymmetries; poor management by workers; and bureaucratic formalities. In short, the study concluded that the benefits that Kenya derives from its diaspora are just a fraction of the development potential that the diaspora possess.⁶⁰² It remains to be seen to what extent the newly launched diaspora policy will make a change.

The above is mainly focused on international migration from Kenya to countries in the global North. The contribution of Kenya's diaspora in the South, as well as the potential benefits of internal, rural-urban migration are often overlooked in migration policy.

Kenya's diaspora in other African countries

A 2013 study specifically looked into the contribution of Kenya's diaspora in the South. The study showed there is limited formal engagement between the Government of Kenya and its members in the diasporas within Africa, even though most Kenyan migrants are located within other African countries, mainly Uganda and Tanzania. Moreover, many of them are interested in national development and either own investments in Kenya or are interested in making private investments in Kenya.⁶⁰³

On average, Kenyan migrants in the South remit USD 4,045 annually or USD 178 per month. This is very high when compared to other within-Africa remittance flows. Respondents in this study had a positive view on the contribution of their remittances to human development, as they believed it contributed to education, housing, health care provision, child care, the strengthening of religious organizations, the development of community infrastructure, self-help groups, agricultural development, the improvement of governance and democratization and the provision of start-up business capital to dependants (in that order). Moreover, the study showed that Kenyan migrants in other African countries also contributed in other ways to Kenya, such as financing political parties, providing intellectual expertise on various aspects of development, support of food and disaster management programmes, drilling of bore holes and business meetings.⁶⁰⁴

601 Mwangi, 2013, p. 213; p. v.

602 Ibid, p. 215-218.

603 Kinuthia, 2013, p. iv; p. 9-10; p. 40.

604 Ibid, p. 33; p. 36; p. 14-15.

Although Kenya's diaspora policy seems to mainly focus on Kenya's diaspora in the global North, Kenyan migrants in other African countries can make an important contribution to development in Kenya as well. Especially when taking into account that the bulk of Kenyan migrants does reside in other African countries and recounting the high remittance transfers costs between East African countries, there is considerable untapped potential, which is often overlooked.

Rural-urban migration in Kenya

Rural-urban migration can contribute to poverty reduction in Kenya. Many migrants fare better in urban destinations, from where they can send remittances to relatives left behind. There are more opportunities for employment in urban centres and wages are higher. This is a strong motivation for many rural dwellers to migrate to the cities in search for employment. Relatively high levels of education combined with high unemployment drive many youth (particularly in Western Kenya) to urban areas.⁶⁰⁵

The impact of rural-urban migration is not necessarily positive though. For example⁶⁰⁶:

- The young, working age population leaves rural areas. As a result, rural land has been left to the aged, the very young and women, who have to take over as household heads while the men migrate. This potentially results in the dismal performance of agriculture, as for example the elderly have limited resources and energy at their disposal to make the most out of rural resources (land and livestock).
- Rural-urban migration in no way guarantees enhanced prospects of securing employment. Many migrants in urban centres are unemployed for a while or fail to secure employment at all and return home.
- Rural-urban migration is mainly responsible for the proliferation of slums in and near to urban centres, where poverty rates are high. This shift of poverty from rural areas to cities has been dubbed the 'urbanization of poverty' by UN-Habitat. Due to limited and constrained resources, national and county authorities are not able to respond adequately and improve slum conditions. As such, rural-urban migration does not necessarily move migrants out of poverty. Some migrants move out of poverty, but others fall into poverty.
- Although mostly used in the context of international migration, brain drain plays a role in rural-urban migration as well, as the highly educated and skilled have a higher propensity to migrate. As with international migration, the health sector is a particular concern, as most skilled personnel in this sector opt for either rural-urban migration or migration abroad, as opposed to working in rural areas.⁶⁰⁷

On the other hand, rural-urban migration has many positive effects and can alleviate poverty. Rural-urban migration decreases the labour supply in rural areas, contributing to increased local wages in these areas. It contributes to poverty alleviation through internal remittances sent by migrants in urban areas. Studies carried out in Kenya, especially in western Kenya, have found that migrants from the region do remit a significant amount of their income

Although Kenya's diaspora policy seems to mainly focus on Kenya's diaspora in the global North, Kenyan migrants in other African countries can make an important contribution to development in Kenya as well.

605 Oucho, Oucho and Ochieng', 2014, p. 3; p. 8; p. 11.

606 Ibid, p. 14-19.

607 Ibid.

Studies carried out in Kenya, especially in western Kenya, have found that migrants from the region do remit a significant amount of their income to facilitate rural development, in anticipation of their eventual return to the rural home.

to facilitate rural development, in anticipation of their eventual return to the rural home. In short, rural-urban migration is a factor in poverty alleviation. It only beneficial when its cons (rural-urban transfers, brain drain, internal brain drain and family disruptions) result in gains in the rural origins, in the short and long run.⁶⁰⁸

It is also important that it is well-managed. However, informed policy and interest on internal migration have been hampered by a lack of adequate, reliable and comprehensive data. Especially given the fast urbanization rates in East Africa, this requires a pro-active approach to urban planning.⁶⁰⁹ Kenya lacks a comprehensive national migration policy. Earlier policies were mainly focused on slowing down rural-urban migration, promoting the growth of small and medium-sized urban centres and encouraging rural development. Kenya also lacks a national, comprehensive national urban policy, although Vision 2030 recognizes that Kenya is moving towards a predominantly urban population.⁶¹⁰ However, according to a joint UNFPA and Government of Kenya publication in 2013, there is a need to integrate internal migration into the wider urban, regional and national development policies and planning. Or, alternatively, develop such a policy which should aim to maximize the potential benefits of internal migration and minimizing risks and costs.⁶¹¹

3.7 Ethiopia

Migration from Ethiopia

Compared to many other countries in Africa, migration rates out of Ethiopia are low. However, due to the sheer size of Ethiopia's population (an estimated 94 million), its diaspora is one of the largest of all African countries.⁶¹² Although the size of Ethiopia's diaspora is unknown, it is estimated around 2 million Ethiopians live abroad, with large numbers in the Middle East (Saudi Arabia and Yemen), the US and Canada and Europe as well as in neighbouring Sudan and Kenya and in other African countries such South Africa and Botswana.

Overview of Ethiopian diaspora policy activities

Since the mid-1990s a growing number of Ethiopian institutions have tried to promote the collaboration with the Ethiopian diaspora by, for example, supporting their return and reintegration as well as their investment in Ethiopia. The central player in this regard is the Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA), which started to focus on the Ethiopian diaspora in the mid-nineties. In 2002, it established the Office of the Ethiopian Expatriate Affairs (EEA). The EEA provided information to the diaspora (on investment possibilities, trade, government affairs, first steps in Ethiopia), has a service section offering concrete support to returnees, carries out research on diaspora issues and seeks to safeguard the rights and privileges of Ethiopian

608 Oucho, Oucho and Ochieng', 2014, p. 20; p. 14.

609 Government of Kenya and UNFPA, 2013, p. 187.

610 Ibid, p. 202; p. 192.

611 Ibid, p. 208.

612 Fransen and Kuschminder, 2009.

migrants and diaspora members.⁶¹³ The EEA has now been replaced by the Diaspora Engagement Affairs Directorate General (see below).

Since 1995, the Ethiopian government's approach has been to facilitate temporary and permanent return and reintegration of the Ethiopian diaspora. The MoFA has for example been collaborating with IOM in carrying out various programmes, such as the Reintegration of Qualified African Nationals (RQAN) programme, which provided salary top-ups to qualified Ethiopians willing to return. A similar project as part of the IOM implemented 'Migration for Development in Ethiopia' Programme (MIDEth) which ran from 2007–2011 and aimed to enable Ethiopian state institutions to work with the diaspora. The programme tried to directly engage the diaspora in Ethiopia through the means of tele-work, visits, permanent return and investments.⁶¹⁴

An important introduction by the MoFA has been the introduction of the Person of Ethiopian Origin Identity Card (Yellow Card) in 2002, which grants diaspora Ethiopians nearly the same rights as Ethiopians holding Ethiopian citizenship. Owners of the Yellow Card are allowed to enter Ethiopia without a visa, live in Ethiopia without a residence permit and own residential property, have access to employment without a work permit and to all economic, social and other benefits and services available to Ethiopian citizens. They can invest as a domestic investor, only having to pay local fees and having the right to import personal belongings duty-free when returning permanently.⁶¹⁵

In 2004 the website 'www.ethiopiandiaspora.org' was established as part of the Migration for Development in Africa (MIDA) programme. The website provided information for the diaspora on life in Ethiopia and available job opportunities. However, the website was found to be little known in the Ethiopian diaspora and lacked content and regularly updated and detailed information and, as such, was found to be of little relevance.⁶¹⁶ At the time of writing the website no longer exists.

In 2005 the Diaspora Coordinating Office of the Ministry of Capacity Building (MoCB) was established. Its main task is to finance and support different initiatives (particularly in health and ICT) to facilitate the transfer of knowledge from diaspora experts to universities, colleges, hospitals and other institutions in Ethiopia.⁶¹⁷

Supported by the Ethiopian Investment Agency (EIA) and regional investment offices, Ethiopian Embassies and Consulates act as the first contact points, in order to reach out to diaspora investors. They provide diaspora investors with the necessary information and support concerning investment in Ethiopia. Regional diaspora offices were established in each region and in cities in 2006, tasked to support diaspora investors with all necessary bureaucratic procedures, the acquisition of land and the setting up of the

613 GTZ, 2009, p. 30-31.

614 Ibid, p. 31.

615 Ibid, p. 30-31.

616 Ibid, p. 31.

617 Ibid, p. 30-31.

necessary infrastructure.⁶¹⁸ Critics have, however, questioned whether the Ethiopian government has considered the long term implication opening up the economy to external investment in a context in which nearly all property is state owned and the economy is state run.⁶¹⁹

Remittances

Acknowledging the significance of remittances sent by Ethiopians abroad, the Ethiopian government appointed the National Bank of Ethiopia (NBE) as the central institution for developing frameworks and initiatives aimed at attracting remittances and increasing the general inflow of foreign currency. The National Bank oversees the Ethiopian remittance policy and seeks ways to improve the sending of remittances through official channels. Foreign currency accounts were introduced in 2004 aimed at encouraging foreign direct investment, diaspora entrepreneurship and increasing Ethiopia's foreign exchange reserves. In 2008, corporate diaspora bonds were launched. The bonds provided funds to the Ethiopian Electric Power Corporation (EEPCO) for investments focusing on increasing the power supply in Ethiopia. The bonds were guaranteed by the Ethiopian government and were issued for a minimum denomination of USD 500, maturing in five, seven or ten years (with interest rates of 4 per cent, 4.5 per cent and 5 per cent respectively). No income tax had to be paid on the interest earned.⁶²⁰

A survey among 1,282 households in 15 communities in Ethiopia, revealed that 58 per cent believed that when people receive remittances from abroad it contributes to the development of the country and over 10 per cent strongly believe this.

A survey among 1,282 households in 15 communities in Ethiopia, revealed that 58 per cent believed that when people receive remittances from abroad it contributes to the development of the country and over 10 per cent strongly believe this.⁶²¹ Nevertheless, the research also showed that remittances are primarily used for non-productive purposes, such as daily needs, debt-repayment and ceremonies. Less than 20 per cent of remittances received are used for productive investments such as education, housing or land, or a business investment. Generally, remittance receiving households are economically better off. They have higher monthly expenditures, larger houses, fewer household income shocks, a greater ability to save and higher levels of subjective well-being.⁶²²

Diaspora Policy 2013

In 2013, the Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs published its official Diaspora Policy. According to the Ministry, several measures had been taken in recent years, no policy had been promulgated to guide the diaspora's affairs and not much has been done to utilize their economic potential and skill in Ethiopia in an organized and consistent way. The new Diaspora Policy has the following major goals (with some examples of proposed activities between brackets).⁶²³

- Preserving the rights and interests of the diaspora (e.g. formulating a system of registration of members of the Ethiopian Diaspora, informing the diaspora on services delivered in Ethiopian missions abroad and encouraging efforts to conclude labour agreements with the countries where there is a huge number of Ethiopian diaspora).

618 GTZ, 2009, p. 32.

619 Campbell, 2009, p. 19.

620 GTZ, 2009, p. 32.

621 Kuschminder and Siegel, 2014, p. 51.

622 Ibid, p. 4.

623 Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 2013, p. 7-8.

- Improving diaspora engagement in investment, trade and tourism (e.g. Ethiopia's missions abroad will gather and document up-to-date information on investment and will do promotion work focusing on the diaspora; federal, and regional' investment offices and stakeholders would be encouraged to provide all round services at one place, support members of the diaspora that will come up with project proposals, and want to participate on various areas of investment; and members of Ethiopian diaspora will be encouraged to participate with their skills and knowledge in governmental institutions in the area of trade).
- Enhancing knowledge and technology transfer (e.g. employment opportunities will be provided for the diaspora based on their request to serve in governmental institutions, education and health sectors; retired professionals will be given opportunities to serve in the country's higher educational institutions and technical and vocational colleges).
- Encouraging foreign currency inflows and strengthening diaspora participation (e.g. a rewarding system promoting the inflow of foreign currencies (for investment, or as remittances) through legal channels will be facilitated; relations with banks and other legal money-transfer service providers abroad will be established via all Ethiopian Missions abroad, and their reliable and speedy service provisions to Ethiopian diaspora will be facilitated; an arrangement will be established that allow Ethiopian diaspora to pay in foreign currencies for federal and regional bonds to run domestically operated development projects).
- Promoting cultural values and promoting image building (e.g. a program to be named 'Know Ethiopia Program-KEP', learning Ethiopian languages and cultural participation would be designed to help youth diaspora to develop strong attachment towards their country of origin).
- Advancing diaspora participation in good governance and democracy e.g. the National Electoral Board will facilitate the participation of Ethiopians who live abroad in elections in accordance with the election law).
- Encouraging philanthropic and development associations.
- Broadening diaspora participation on image building (e.g. diaspora communities will be encouraged to be familiar with their country's development process and participate actively in efforts to protect Ethiopia's national interest including image building).⁶²⁴

Other specific activities include:

- Launching an information database and website with valuable information to the diaspora;
- Establishing a National Diaspora Council, comprising various higher federal and regional officials and stakeholders;
- Establishing an Advisory Council comprising Ethiopian diaspora;
- Establishing a common forum of regional diaspora offices under the leadership of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.⁶²⁵

In short, the 2013 Diaspora Policy is generally in line with previous activities mentioned above, as well as with general policy thinking on diaspora engagement. However, as in Kenya, it is unclear what the results of these policies have been and to what extent these policies have had any impact.

⁶²⁴ Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 2013.

⁶²⁵ Ibid, 2013.

Internal migration

As in Kenya, internal migration flows in Ethiopia are larger than external flows, although the exact number of people who migrate internally is not known.⁶²⁶ Moreover, although increasing, rural-urban migration rates remain relatively low compared to other countries in Africa. While taking into account the potential positive and negative impacts of rural-urban migration as described in the previous section on Kenya, generally speaking rural-urban migration has a positive impact in Ethiopia. According to the World Bank, rural-urban migrants experience improvements in welfare and sending households experience little loss in production, suggesting that migration can reduce poverty and encourage development in Ethiopia.⁶²⁷

Research shows that there is an unconditional increase in agricultural production among migrant sending households relative to non-migrant households, although no claims can be made about a strong impact of migration on productivity. Nonetheless, there is no lost labour effect on agricultural productivity from migration. According to this research, programs that might be designed to encourage younger people to find employment away from home are likely to be attractive to the relatively poor. If remittances could be fostered, agricultural productivity would have a good chance of being increased through migration. Making mobile phones (and the possibility to transfer mobile money, such as through M-Pesa in Kenya) more available to farmers could create new possible remittance channels to enhance productivity on the farm.⁶²⁸

3.8 Somalia

Migration from Somalia

Somalia has lacked an effective central government and suffered on-going power conflicts between rival militias, clans, warlords and different armed forces for over two decades. Despite the election of a president of the Federal Republic of Somalia on 10th September 2012 (which marked the end of a transition period) and improvements in the security situation, the overall situation in Somalia remains fragile. Many Somalis left and are still leaving their country, forced by a range of factors including extreme poverty; prolonged insecurity; human rights violations; lack of access to basic needs such as food, medical services, healthcare and livelihoods, as well as natural disasters, such as the 2011 drought and famine. Moreover, the intervention by the combined African military force, AMISOM, to eject the Al-Shabaab group from Somalia also resulted in large numbers of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in different parts of South Central Somalia and Puntland and an influx of refugees in neighbouring countries.⁶²⁹ Somalis are the third largest group of refugees worldwide, with 1.1 million refugees by mid-2014, mainly in Kenya, Ethiopia and Yemen.⁶³⁰ Additionally, the Somali diaspora is estimated at between 1 and 1.5 million.⁶³¹ In addition to the 'near diaspora' (in Kenya, Ethiopia, Tanzania, Uganda, Yemen) main host countries for the Somali

626 Fransen and Kuschminder, 2009.

627 World Bank, 2015a, p. 106.

628 De Brauw, 2014, p. 21-22.

629 RMMS, 2014c, p. 29.

630 UNHCR, 2014a.

631 UNDP, 2011.

diaspora are the UK, the US, Canada, Norway, Sweden, the Netherlands, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates and South Africa.

Remittances

According to UNDP, the effectivity of the Somali diaspora in supporting relief and development activities in their country of origin is one of the few success stories related to Somalia today.⁶³² Support from the Somali diaspora over the past twenty years has helped people in Somaliland, Puntland and South Central Somalia to survive. In 2011, UNDP estimated that the Somali diaspora provided between USD 130 and 200 million annually for humanitarian and development assistance activities in Somalia. In some places in Somalia, the diaspora provides the only assistance available. Many local NGOs receive support from the diaspora in the form of funding or in in-kind support and technical assistance. Many have Boards of Trustees which include diaspora members.⁶³³

While the diaspora's contribution to development and relief activities is significant, private remittances are even much higher and estimated at 1.3 billion annually. The inflow of financial (and human) capital has been very significant to private sector development in Somalia, as many private investments receive at least partial funding from diaspora businesspeople.⁶³⁴ According to a Forced Migration Review publication, the rehabilitation of Mogadishu, with a diaspora-funded construction boom, new start-ups and the introduction of wireless internet by young entrepreneurs arriving from Europe and the US, is a good example of this.⁶³⁵ Remittances from the Somali diaspora have helped to sustain the economy and new businesses provide significant employment to Somali communities, although businesses still suffer from lack of available credit and major disruption due to the insecurity in South Central Somalia, especially in Al-Shabaab controlled areas.⁶³⁶

While the Somali remittance markets suffer from strict regulations for financial transfers which should prevent money laundering and financing of terrorism, the market for mobile money transfers is growing. The Somali telecoms sector underwent a boom in the years following the collapse of a central government, when a newly competitive marketplace, aided by the lack of regulation in the absence of a functioning state, allowed for the proliferation of cheap and reliable mobile services. The number of mobile subscriptions in the Somali territories is in the millions. Many money transfer operators in the Horn of Africa have recently made acquisitions in ICT industries, enabling them to expand services to those people who have traditionally lacked access to financial services, but who now own or share a mobile phone.⁶³⁷ As in other countries where the formal financial sector is largely inaccessible for many people, the expansion of mobile money transfer services has great potential and could help many Somalis to get access to remittances.

632 UNDP, 2011, p. 1. Unless explicitly stated otherwise, Somalia in this section is used to refer to all regions of the former Republic of Somalia including the autonomous Republic of Somaliland and the semi-autonomous Puntland State of Somalia.

633 UNDP, 2011, p. 1; p.4; p. 8.

634 Duale, 2013, p. 47; UNDP, 2011, p. 8.

635 Duale, 2013, p. 47.

636 UNDP, 2011, p. 8.

637 Duale, 2013, p. 46-47.

Somalia

According to UNDP, the effectivity of the Somali diaspora in supporting relief and development activities in their country of origin is one of the few success stories related to Somalia today.

Diaspora policies and projects

In 2010 the Somaliland Diaspora Agency (housed under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation) and the Puntland Diaspora Department, housed under the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation) were established. In 2013 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Mogadishu established the Department of Diaspora Affairs to deal specifically with diaspora engagement.⁶³⁸ This indicates that governments in Somalia – themselves largely comprised of diaspora Somalis – do acknowledge the importance of proactively engaging with the diaspora and recognize the potential that diaspora capital holds for the reconstruction and development of the country. According to a recent publication by the Mogadishu-based Heritage Institute for Policy Studies (HIPS), the departments in Mogadishu, Garowe and Hargeisa that are dedicated to diaspora affairs do undertake outreach activities to the global Somali diaspora and government officials are actively encouraging the diaspora to return and invest in various sectors considered to be important to the country's recovery. However, it is not clear what these activities consist of. According to HIPS, efforts should be taken though to harmonize activities between these departments and to avoid duplication.⁶³⁹

Various projects exist that sponsor the return of diaspora Somalis, intending to build institutional capacity in Somalia and bring qualified individuals back to Somalia.

NGOs, donors and UN agencies also run projects aimed diaspora engagement in Somalia. Various projects exist that sponsor the return of diaspora Somalis, intending to build institutional capacity in Somalia and bring qualified individuals back to Somalia. These programs should benefit local institutions, while also providing valuable work experience to the diaspora members. The Qualified Expatriate Somali Technical Support - Migration for Development in Africa (QUESTS-MIDA) project, a joint initiative between IOM and UNDP, is a well-known example and is designed to enable diaspora Somalis to share and transfer their acquired skills with civil servants in public institutions through short term assignments.⁶⁴⁰

Several projects focussing on Somalia have been launched within IOMs MIDA strategy (Migration for Development in Africa), all aiming to make migrants active in the socio-economic growth of their countries of origin. In 2008, for example, the IOM office in Helsinki, launched the MIDA Health project, aimed at strengthening the capacities of local health sector professionals in northern Somalia through the transfer of skills and knowledge of highly qualified health professionals from the Finland-based Somali diaspora. Somalia had for long been recognised as a country in which the health sector is under severe pressure due to a general lack of qualified health professionals, inadequate infrastructure, and lack of financial and other resources. The movement of IDPs and irregular migrants from neighbouring countries put further pressures on the health sector in Somalia. According to the project evaluation, health professionals with a Somali background showed great interest in returning to work on a temporary basis in Somalia to assist in the country's health sector and train local staff. Moreover, Somali health sector institutions were enthusiastic about the diaspora's contributions to capacity-building. The evaluators concluded that, although on a modest scale, the MIDA Health project contributed to alleviating some of the most pressing needs in the Somali health sector.⁶⁴¹

638 HIPS, 2014, p. 1.

639 Ibid, p. 3.

640 Ibid, p. 2.

641 Weiss, Reyes, and van Treeck, 2009, p. 139-140; p. 149.

More recently, in March 2015, IOM, with funding from the Italian Development Cooperation launched the MIDA Women Somalia II project. The project aims to impact on the ongoing reconstruction and stabilization process of Somalia through supporting the active role of qualified Somali diaspora who are residing in Italy, especially women. The project supports economic and social development projects focusing on agriculture, food security and health, targets vulnerable groups such as IDPs and aims to reach remote areas in Somalia. The previous phase of IOM's MIDA Women has supported the implementation of a range of small projects mainly aimed at micro-finance, education and health in four regions of Somaliland (Hargeisa, Borama, Berbera and Burao) with different local organizations.⁶⁴²

Another avenue for the engagement of the Somali diaspora in the development of Somalia is by supporting Somali diaspora organizations to become involved in development work. The Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA), for example, besides funding the above mentioned QUESTs-MIDA programme, funds a programme aimed at Swedish-Somali civil society organizations. These organizations can apply for money from the Swedish NGO Forum Syd to implemented development projects with local partner organizations in Somalia. Between 2012 and 2014, 20 project were awarded funding. Between 2015 and 2017 SIDA will again support projects (with over USD 5 million) by Swedish-Somali organizations, focusing on democracy, human rights, health, gender equality, sustainable livelihoods and peace building between different regions of Somalia. SIDA also entered into a partnership with Business Sweden to develop a third programme to support investment and job creation in Somalia.⁶⁴³

Similarly, the Danish Refugee Council (DRC), funded by Danida (the Danish development cooperation agency) seeks to strengthen and support the role of diaspora as development agents by funding Somali (and Afghan) diaspora organizations in Denmark, to implement projects that contribute to the relief, rehabilitation and development of their countries of origin. A 2014 mid-term evaluation concluded that the diaspora program has been very much appreciated by diaspora organizations for its opportunity to fund development initiatives in the countries of origin, although more attention should be devoted to balancing the activities for strengthening diaspora organizations in Denmark and the activities to promote diaspora-led development initiatives in the country of origin. The evaluation also concluded that there is an added-value in diaspora funded initiatives, compared to initiatives by other international donors (INGOs, International Organizations), because the diaspora know the needs of local communities thanks to the common origins. Another advantage is that, due to the cooperation of diaspora organizations with local organizations, the ownership of the projects belongs to the beneficiary communities, who generally have an active role in the project implementation. Beneficiaries mostly valued the diaspora for the technical contribution (innovative competences, advanced skills and capacities), followed by the monetary contribution and social/cultural remittances.⁶⁴⁴

642 IOM, 2015.

643 SIDA, 2015.

644 Saggiomo and Ferro, 2014, p. 4.

Diaspora return

Increasingly, Somali diaspora are returning to Somalia, outside of the sphere of above mentioned assisted temporary return projects. Although data on the scale of diaspora return is lacking, it is broadly acknowledged that there has been a steady increase in returns over the last several years. This, according to the Heritage Institute for Policy Studies (HIPS), marks a new phase of diaspora engagement in Somalia. As a consequence, debates regarding the role the diaspora can play in reconstruction efforts upon their return to Somalia are now increasing. Through their return, the diverse and globally dispersed diaspora are also able to offer vital assistance to the country's reconstruction and development efforts.⁶⁴⁵

The public and non-profit sectors in Somalia attract most diaspora returnees with a desire to contribute towards the reconstruction and development of Somalia. After years of conflict, the public sector throughout Somalia is still weak. As public health and education services are still largely absent, the non-profit sector plays an important role in providing these services. Many diaspora returnees are also attracted to particular business sectors that further contribute to the reconstruction and development of Somalia. Investments in the agricultural sector, for example, generate local employment opportunities while also reducing the country's dependency on food aid.⁶⁴⁶

An important facilitator of return is western citizenship for the Somali diaspora, as it enables mobility to and from Somalia. Without citizenship, it is difficult for Somali diaspora to return to Somalia or travel back and forth and engage in circular migration.⁶⁴⁷

Diaspora returns could cause tension between diaspora and locals. In Somalia, for example, many diaspora returnees are unable to have meaningful and daily interactions with locals due to security concerns, as the security situation discourages them to live in or frequent certain neighbourhoods. Local Somalis might perceive this as having feelings of superiority. Moreover, circular migration patterns might be seen as an indication that the diaspora are not really committed to Somalia. Finally, non-diaspora Somalis might perceive returnees as having advantages in employment opportunities due to their western education and work experience, which creates a disparity in wages, benefits, and prestige. This has also been a factor negatively impacting some of the temporary return projects. Nevertheless, it is expected the diaspora will continue to return and contribute to Somalia, unless widespread conflict re-emerges.⁶⁴⁸

645 HIPS, 2014, p. 1.

646 Ibid, p. 2-3.

647 Ibid, p. 2.

648 Ibid, p. 2-3.

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A Certain Catalyst is the 9th report in RMMS's *Explaining People on the Move* series. It offers a balanced perspective of the migration debate and highlight the importance of full public discussion of the central issues relevant to all regions in our increasingly globalised and interconnected world. Some have argued that of all the social sciences the study of migration is most polemical and taboo because being seen as defending one side or another appears to have ethical and political overtones beyond the defined scope of discussion and often irrespective of evidence. However, unless the debate is made more public the discourse on migration runs a risk of being dominated by extremist interests precisely because more moderate voices shy away from taking clear public positions.

Our choice of title - **A Certain Catalyst** - is to highlight that whether the forces of migration are positive or negative they are a certain catalyst for many people and many policy makers.



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